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The Present's Past: Recent Perspectives on Peace and Protest in Germany, 1945–1973

On June 6, 1968, Robert F. Kennedy dies. He succumbs to the wounds suffered from an assassin's bullet the previous day. In Berlin, the official student government organizations of both the Free University and the Technical University express their consternation at the murder. They decline, however, to partake in a procession of mourning, pointing out that Kennedy's death should rather prompt people to reflect on the state of a society "whose government condemns violence in this instance but is ready to employ it at any time in order to smash emancipation movements."[1] One of these movements, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF), is alluded to on the very same day in the Swiss town of Basel, some 450 miles southwest of Berlin. There, Christian Meier, a German historian of antiquity, argues in a lecture marking his assumption of a professorship that the jumble of civil and international war in Vietnam was creating a new type of war, which was throwing new light also on the ancient Peloponnesian War. "To put it provocatively: through the war of our days the Peloponnesian War becomes a different war, too."[2]

Meier was describing a phenomenon that is, of course, familiar to every historian, namely the fact that we can not help but put a current perspective on past events. When the Enlightenment broke the power of tradition and separated past, present and future, it became possible—and to a certain degree inevitable—that the past would henceforth be viewed through present expectations for the future.[3] The recent literature on peace and protest movements in Germany is a case in point. Inasmuch as it overcomes the often hagiographic preoccupation of the older literature with prominent personalities and particular organizations[4], many new

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1 Quoted in Klaus Schroeder (ed.): Freie Universität Berlin 1948–1973: Hochschule im Umbruch. Teil 5: Gewalt und Gegengewalt 1967–1969. Comp. Siegward Lönnendonker/Tilman Fichter/Jochen Staadt, Berlin 1983, 99–100.

2 Christian Meier: Die Wissenschaft des Historikers und die Verantwortung des Zeitgenossen, in: idem: Die Entstehung des Begriffs "Demokratie." Vier Prolegomena zu einer historischen Theorie, Frankfurt a.M. 1970, 182–221, 197.

3 Reinhart Koselleck: Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. Keith Tribe, New York 2004.

4 For a brief general treatment see Jeffrey Verhey: Die Geschichtsschreibung des Pazifismus und die Friedensbewegung, in: Benjamin Ziemann (ed.): Perspektiven der Historischen Friedensforschung, Essen 2002, 272–285. While critics of German peace activism have largely ignored the 1950s, the literature on the student and protest movements of the 1960s has long been characterized by vociferous debates between their proponents and adversaries. See Franz-Werner Kersting: Entzauberung des Mythos? Ausgangsbedingungen und Tendenzen einer gesellschaftsgeschichtlichen Standortbestimmung der westdeutschen "68er-Bewegung", in: Westfälische Forschungen 48 (1998), 1–19; Wolfgang Kraushaar: Der Zeitzeuge als Feind des Historikers? Ein Literaturüberblick zur 68er-Bewegung, in: Idem: 1968 als Mythos, Chiffre und Zäsur, Hamburg 2000, 253–347.

studies favor one of two approaches: social movement theory or the concept of peace culture (*Friedenskultur*).

Social movement theory was developed in the United States during the 1970s in order to explain the resurgent protest of the previous decade. In Germany, however, the approach flourished only after the grassroots movements of the 1970s and the tremendous peace movement of the early 1980s captured the attention of social scientists.[5] At first largely confined to these movements, the approach has been applied to the 1960s only with the recent emergence of scholarly interest in that decade.[6] In addition, Alice Holmes Cooper has extended its reach into the 1950s.[7]

The concept of peace culture is even younger, dating back to a 1989 UNESCO conference. It targets not only physical but also structural and symbolic violence and stresses the interdependence of social and political forms of conflict resolution. The term 'peace culture', then, embraces norms, values, and mentalities which de-emphasize war, militarism, and violence both internationally and domestically.[8] The concept can not conceal a certain proximity to Johan Galtung's influential notion of structural violence, which is—as Benjamin Ziemann has rightly pointed out—highly problematic as a scientific term because it disguises rather than delineates differences.[9] As a result, the concept of peace culture can be applied to a seemingly infinite number of political, social, and cultural contexts—a fact that puts the field of peace research in danger of becoming frayed. At the same time, however, it is exactly this impulse to transcend traditional borders of the field, which—as we shall see—promises fresh insights.

5 Friedhelm Neidhardt/Dieter Rucht: The Analysis of Social Movements. The State of the Art and Some Perspectives for Further Research, in: Dieter Rucht (ed.): Research on Social Movements. The State of the Art in Western Europe and the USA, Frankfurt a.M./Boulder, Col., 1991, 421–464; Ansgar Klein: Bewegungsforschung: Quo vadis? Ein Überblick zu Entstehung, Ausprägung und Forschungsstand, in: Vorgänge. Zeitschrift für Bürgerrechte und Gesellschaftspolitik, 42/4 (2003), no. 164: Von der APO zu ATTAC: Politischer Protest im Wandel, Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 146 pp., € 10.00 (pbk.), 12–21. See also Thorsten Bonacker's and Lars Schmitt's contribution to the present volume.

6 See in particular Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey (ed.): 1968 – Vom Ereignis zum Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft, Göttingen 1998; Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey: Die 68er Bewegung. Deutschland – Westeuropa – USA, Munich 2001. For the earlier focus see Karl-Werner Brand/Detlef Büsser/Dieter Rucht (eds.): Aufbruch in eine andere Gesellschaft. Neue soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik, rev. ed., Frankfurt a.M./New York 1986.

7 Alice Holmes Cooper: Paradoxes of Peace. German Peace Movements since 1945 (Social History, Popular Culture, and Politics in Germany), Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1996, 331 pp., $75.00 (cloth). It is telling, however, that this book grew out of a dissertation that also originally focused on the 1980s. See Alice Holmes Cooper: The West German Peace Movement of the 1980s. Historical and Institutional Influences, Ph.D. diss., Harvard University 1988.

8 Thomas Kühne: "Friedenskultur", Zeitgeschichte, Historische Friedensforschung, in: Idem (ed.): Von der Kriegskultur zur Friedenskultur? Zum Mentalitätswandel in Deutschland seit 1945, Münster/Hamburg/London 2000, 13–33. See also UNESCO and a Culture of Peace: Promoting a Global Movement, 2nd ed., Paris 1997, 15–21.

9 Benjamin Ziemann: Perspektiven der Historischen Friedensforschung, in: Ziemann, 13–39, esp. 18–22.

A look at the treatment of peace and protest movements in the standard narratives of postwar German history suggests that the impetus provided by social movement theory and the concept of peace culture is long overdue. Not only do some of these texts view peace activism with disparaging skepticism, but almost all of them turn out to be narrowly concerned, at least for the 1950s, with party politics and the political effectiveness, or rather ineffectiveness, of protest movements. Thus, in Hans-Peter Schwarz's monumental depiction of the Adenauer era, social movements count for little next to great men. With barely concealed contemptuousness, Schwarz points out that it was academics who were shooting their mouths off at the Paulskirche meeting protesting the 1954 Paris treaties, prompting a popular movement that purportedly amounted to nothing more than a demonstration of 25,000 unionists in Munich. The assumption of a leadership role by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the campaign against the *Bundeswehr*'s sharing in NATO's nuclear defense (*Kampf dem Atomtod* or Fight Nuclear Death) in 1958 is portrayed as a resentful reaction to Adenauer's overwhelming success at the polls the previous fall. Schwarz leaves no doubt that the campaign went astray in its call for a popular referendum, and he scorns it for failing to accept the realities of power politics.[10] More recent treatments of the subject are, to be sure, less derisive but scarcely any more innovative. Like Schwarz, Peter Graf Kielmansegg is primarily concerned with political success or failure, pointing out that early sentiment against rearmament, captured by the slogan "Count me out" (*Ohne mich*) never resulted in emphatic mass protest and that the Fight Nuclear Death campaign was, after all, quite limited and quickly subsided.[11] Similarly, Heinrich August Winkler confines himself to the observation that peace activism did not meet with a lively public response, while Manfred Görtemaker characterizes protest in the early 1950s as ephemeral and not particularly effective, reminding us that the antinuclear campaign was aborted without any ado after the SPD had yielded to the German Supreme Court's dismissal of popular referenda.[12] Even Hans Karl Rupp, who made an important contribution to the history of extra-parliamentary opposition in the Adenauer era some thirty years ago[13], limits his analysis to the institutionalized societal players, commending ordinary union members for tenaciously supporting the antinuclear campaign while being left in the lurch by their leadership. His observation that Fight Nuclear Death was probably the most widespread public campaign in West Germany prior to the peace movement of the 1980s has a somewhat shallow ring to it, even in an introductory text-

10 Hans-Peter Schwarz: Die Ära Adenauer. Gründerjahre der Republik 1949–1957, Stuttgart/Wiesbaden 1981, 119–126, 259–261, 359–363; idem: Die Ära Adenauer. Epochenwechsel 1957–1963, Stuttgart/Wiesbaden 1983, 51–57.
11 Peter Graf Kielmansegg: Nach der Katastrophe. Eine Geschichte des geteilten Deutschland, Berlin 2000, 320–323.
12 Heinrich August Winkler: Der lange Weg nach Westen. Vol. 2: Vom "Dritten Reich" bis zur Wiedervereinigung, Munich 2000, 165, 182–183; Manfred Görtemaker: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart, Munich 1999, 190–192.
13 Hans Karl Rupp: Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer. Der Kampf gegen die Atombewaffnung in den fünfziger Jahren. 3rd ed., Cologne 1984. This has since been surpassed by Marc Cioc: Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany during the Adenauer Era, New York 1988.

book for political scientists. Incredibly, given the upheavals of the 1960s, Rupp suggests that the defeats suffered by organized labor throughout the previous decade destroyed the self-confidence of politically engaged segments of the population.[14]

Talking about the 1960s: on this subject the picture gleaned from the grand narratives becomes somewhat more complicated but not considerably brighter. In the course of this turbulent decade, peace activism became increasingly intertwined with other protests: against emergency legislation, the Grand Coalition, the personal and supposedly institutional inheritance of National Socialism, problems of higher education, the mass media, and traditional norms and values in general. Consequently, the legacy of these protest movements is to be found less in their influence on political decisions than in the social and cultural transformations they brought about. At most, it is disputed whether or not the protest contributed to the reform agenda of Willy Brandt's coalition government after 1969. Rupp believes it did, whereas Görtemaker maintains that the changing of the guard occurred not because of but despite the extra-parliamentary opposition (APO), and Kielmansegg sees therein an adequate response of the system to the turmoil—a response, however, to which the APO as such contributed exactly nothing.[15] Besides political effects, Rupp credits the movement with a democratic rejuvenation of German political culture and displays some sympathy for its suspiciousness of a subliminal fascism.[16] In contrast, Görtemaker can not fathom why anybody would demonstrate against the Emergency Laws or against a 1972 provision barring those who supported organizations that purportedly undermined the constitution from civil service. To him, the APO was marked by blind actionism and was out of touch with political, social, and economic realities. Despite coining the pithy phrase of an "Umgründung der Republik," suggesting a fresh laying of foundations, Görtemaker hardly pinpoints a lasting legacy of the movement. While he mistakenly asserts that the core of the terrorist Baader-Meinhof group came from the ranks of the German Socialist Students League (*Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund*, SDS), he stresses the differences between the student movement

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14   Hans Karl Rupp: Politische Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Lehr- und Handbücher der Politikwissenschaft). 3rd rev., exp., & updated ed., Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag 2000, 448 pp., € 34.80 (cloth), 79–80, 124–125. In this latter judgment, Rupp follows an assessment made in the mid–1960s by Wolfgang Abendroth. This reliance on outdated literature is typical for the first three out of five chapters in the volume. While each chapter concludes with a few updated suggestions for further reading, the results of the past two decades of contemporary historical research are hardly discernible anywhere in the narrative. Instead, the author evokes a picture of early postwar political aspirations against which he measures the history of the Federal Republic but which is all too redolent of the ideal leftists confronted an alleged conservative restoration with. In a way, then, Rupp tacitly continues to cling to the time-worn debates of the 1970s. The final two chapters bring the story up to the first months of the Red-Green coalition.

15   Rupp, 147–148; Görtemaker, 491; Kielmansegg, 329–330. More imaginative, if not entirely persuasive, is Jeremy Suri's recent contention that while the global upheaval triggered détente in general and German Ostpolitik in particular, these policies in fact represented conservative responses to internal disorder. See Jeremi Suri: Power and Protest. Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente, Cambridge, Mass./London 2003.

16   Rupp, 146.

and later grassroots organizations.[17] In the same vein, Kielmansegg finds that the movement in a way criticized anything and nothing at all and was rising up against an ideological chimera. The state, though chided for an occasional overreaction, can claim considerably more empathy, having been subjected to an irritating surprise attack. Kielmansegg admits that the student movement brought out into the open fundamental structural changes within German society, but it is not clear if there is a connection between the two.[18] Carrying on the authoritative history of the Federal Republic where Schwarz left off, Klaus Hildebrand does not hesitate to ascribe results to the movement. But it is, without exception, a history of losses— from the traditional university to conventional manners. He juxtaposes the rumpus of demonstrations with the accomplishments of the Grand Coalition. The extra-parliamentary opposition mutates into an anti-parliamentary opposition that put the republic at peril, whereas the Grand Coalition helped democracy to stand the test of time. Protesters are portrayed as out of touch with reality—naïve at best, dangerous at worst; they are depicted as spoiled, modish, romantic, seduced, bereft of common sense, dull and vague. In the end, the cultural revolution of the 1960s is reduced to a successful defense action of rational democrats against unrealistic utopians.[19] Unlike Hildebrand, Winkler has a feel for the ambivalence and contradictions of the movement, pointing out how activists denounced the United States but furthered Westernization, how they scoffed at pluralism but helped to make the Federal Republic more pluralistic, and how they strived to come to terms with the past but abused the concept of fascism, all at the same time.[20]

The preoccupation with the contested cultural legacy of '1968' has relegated interest for more narrowly understood peace activism of the 1960s to the sidelines. If Karl A. Otto, more than twenty-five years ago, exaggerated the role that the Campaign for Disarmament (*Kampagne für Abrüstung*, KfA), the organizers of the Easter peace marches, played within the extra-parliamentary opposition[21], then the standard narratives of German history simply ignore the organization; not one of the discussed volumes even mentions it. The Vietnam War, of course, is referred to, variously as a starting point for student protest, as a crucial subject and catalyst of the movement, or as the major concern unifying the New Left throughout the world.[22] But the movement's interpretation of the war and the way in which it was intertwined with other concerns is scarcely explored. Also indicative of the low status obviously accorded to peace and social movement research within German historiography is a survey of recently published works on postwar German history, which does not include any relevant studies.[23]

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17 Görtemaker, 453–457, 485–491, 585–588, 628–634.

18 Kielmansegg, 326–330.

19 Klaus Hildebrand: Von Erhard zur Großen Koalition 1963–1969, Stuttgart/Wiesbaden 1984, 365–367, 374–383, 410–411, 417–460 esp. 421, 423–425, 427, 433, 436.

20 Winkler, 252–253.

21 Karl A. Otto: Vom Ostermarsch zur APO. Geschichte der außerparlamentarischen Opposition in der Bundesrepublik 1960–1970, Frankfurt a.M./New York 1977.

22 Kielmansegg, 326; Görtemaker, 482–485; Winkler, 250–251.

23 See Udo Wengst: Deutsche Geschichte nach 1945, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 54 (2003), 182–201, 261–273, 355–376, 455–467.

It has been argued that in order to do justice to German peace movements, future studies will have to concentrate on peace culture studies and understand these activities as part of the new, post-materialist, social movements.[24] But what exactly can social movement theory and the concept of peace culture contribute to invigorate the field and help it to overcome its wallflower-like existence? First of all, these approaches are well suited to transcend the focus on political results, which characterizes so many of the standard treatments. In fact, social movement theory is ill equipped to detail the impact of protest on political decision-making. On the other hand, it is particularly useful in explaining the rise of movements, their dynamics, and their development of collective identities. Similarly, the concept of peace culture is not so much concerned with outcomes but is primarily interested in discourses that can reveal important aspects of both the inner life of movements and their relationships to other segments of society at any one time. In dealing with mentalities and attitudes of societies or their subgroups toward war and peace, the concept of peace culture stresses perceptions, patterns of behavior, symbolic practices, lifestyles, and emotions, thereby expanding the traditional focus of peace research on the causes and consequences of violent international conflict and the individuals and organizations proposing non-violent alternatives.[25]

Trading Places? 'Pacifists' and Civil Society in the 1950s

For those interested in popular dissent during the first decade of the Federal Republic's existence, the empirical starting point has lately improved dramatically. Wolfgang Kraushaar has recorded more than 10,000 individual protest events, summarizing them on the basis of— among other sources—more than 650 newspapers and magazines; in addition, fourteen maps illustrate the regional distribution of various campaigns.[26] Whoever fears to miss the forest for the trees among all this detail, can get a true bird's eye view by turning to the results of the Berlin *Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung*'s "Documentation and Analysis of Protest Events in the Federal Republic of Germany" (Prodat). Utilizing a cross-section of issues of two quality dailies, Dieter Rucht and his colleagues at Prodat capture a wide spectrum of rebellious behavior over an extended period of time (1950–1994) and analyze its long-term trends and structural characteristics. Admittedly, this quantitative approach is capable only of reproducing the surface of protest activities. It can tell us in which ways a certain number of individuals spoke up against a particular issue. It is rather ill-equipped, however, to pro-

24 Kenan H. Irmak/Colin Pritchard: German Peace Movement (Friedensbewegung), in: Javier Perez De Cuellar/Young Seek Choue (eds.): World Encyclopedia of Peace, New York 1999, 2:290–296, 295. As an entry for a major reference work, this article is rather unreliable and incomplete. The historical summary, for instance, suddenly leaps from the mid–1950s to the early 1970s.

25 Kühne, 16; Jost Dülffer: Internationale Geschichte und Historische Friedensforschung, in: Wilfried Loth/Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.): Internationale Geschichte. Themen – Ergebnisse – Aussichten, Munich 2000, 247–266, 250–251.

26 Wolfgang Kraushaar: Die Protest-Chronik 1949–1959. Eine illustrierte Geschichte von Bewegung, Widerstand und Utopie. 4 vols., Hamburg 1996. Kraushaar is currently preparing a follow-up chronicle for the 1960s, excerpts of which are regularly published in the journal *Mittelweg 36.*

vide information about the motives and goals of demonstrators or the consequences of their effort. On the one hand, it can correct popular misperceptions. Thus, the protests of the late 1960s, though characterized by a high frequency, could not mobilize nearly as many people as their precursors in the 1950s or successors in the 1980s. On the other hand, perceptions are an important constituent also of reality, and the contemporary impression of a state of siege holding sway in West Germany in the 1970s threatens to evaporate in the face of data showing that the percentage of overall protests accompanied by personal violence was actually higher in the 1950s than two decades later.[27] These shortcomings notwithstanding, Prodat will undoubtedly yield a wealth of fresh information and analysis invaluable to future research. Next to—and perhaps in conjunction with—Kraushaar's chronicle, it also provides a reinforced foundation upon which scholars of 1950s protest in West Germany can build. Finally, some important groundwork has been done by the historical research agency of the German Ministry of Defense. As part of its multivolume history of the beginnings of West German security policy, it has commissioned several extensive chapters dealing with domestic opposition to rearmament. The resulting studies, to be sure, shun a social movement perspective. They focus instead on the attitudes of political parties, churches, labor unions, youth organizations, and prominent opponents of rearmament. Nevertheless, they are meticulously researched, drawing on archival repositories and personal papers of all of the groups mentioned, and scholars approaching this topic are well advised to consult these studies early on.[28]

Whereas textbooks, grand narratives and most historical monographs still neglect social movements, former participants and later sympathizers tend to stress their importance. Thus, Andreas Buro, who led the Campaign for Disarmament during the 1960s, maintains that social movements left their mark on the twentieth century. Admitting that neither opponents of rearmament nor critics of nuclear weapons achieved their political goals in West Germany in the 1950s, Buro goes on to consider whether they expounded alternative concepts of conflict resolution and to assess the repercussions their activism had both within the movements themselves and in society at large.[29] While this commendably widens the narrow

27   Individual results of Prodat are collected in Dieter Rucht (ed.): Protest in der Bundesrepublik. Strukturen und Entwicklungen, Frankfurt a.M. 2001. Some general findings are surveyed in Friedhelm Neidhardt/Dieter Rucht: Protestgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950–1994. Ergebnisse, Themen, Akteure, in: Max Kaase/Günther Schmid (eds.): Eine lernende Demokratie. 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Berlin 1999, 129–164; they are also briefly summarized in Dieter Rucht: Zum Wandel politischen Protests in der Bundesrepublik. Verbreiterung, Professionalisierung, Trivialisierung, in: Vorgänge 42/4 (2003), no. 164, 4–11.

28   Hans-Erich Volkmann: Die innenpolitische Dimension Adenauerscher Sicherheitspolitik in der EVG-Phase, in: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.): Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956. Vol. 2: Die EVG-Phase, Munich 1990, 235–604, esp. 463–604; Hans Ehlert: Innenpolitische Auseinandersetzungen um die Pariser Verträge und die Wehrverfassung 1954 bis 1956, ibid., vol. 3: Die NATO-Option, Munich 1993, 235–560.

29   Andreas Buro: Die deutsche Friedensbewegung nach 1945. Zwischen Expertenarbeit, gesellschaftlichen Lernprozessen, Mobilisierung und drohender Marginalisierung, in: Astrid Sahm/Manfred Sapper/Volker Weichsel (eds.): Die Zukunft des Friedens. Eine Bilanz der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Opladen 2002, 131–160.

perspective of most standard treatments, Buro's yardstick is too closely attached to a normative notion of pacifism, thus missing developments which fail to match the according criteria.

One of these developments was the interesting process, described by Alice Holmes Cooper, through which the peace movements of 1950s succeeded in establishing lasting links between their immediate concern and specific yet flexible issues like redemption for the crimes of Nazism, democratization, or the German question.[30] Cooper herself, however, refrains from venturing deep into these discourses. Attempting to explain the ebb and flow of peace activism and the make-up of its core representatives, she employs a 'political process' approach—a variant of social movement theory—which pays as much attention to political opportunities and to organization as it does to interpretive frames. As a consequence, she risks falling back into the old organizational sociology. More important, her analysis of political opportunity structures, based almost exclusively on secondary sources, relies on scraggy historical sketches that occasionally conceal more than they reveal. Thus, she determines that the relatively poor mobilization of the 1960s was due to the absence of an electrifying issue.[31] But the Vietnam War could well have been such an issue, suggesting that the real problem consisted in the manner it was—literally—brought home to the German public. Similarly, Cooper believes that the failure of peace activism resulted– among other things—from religious cleavages and the general popularity of Adenauer's policies.[32] But Michael Geyer has recently observed that, concerning opposition to nuclear weapons, the real fault line was between Protestant as well as Catholic churchgoers and merely nominal members of both confessions. He also discards the notion—implicit in Cooper's second point—that peace activists were unsuccessful because people had other priorities.[33] Geyer suspects that the puzzle of widespread antimilitarist sentiment on the one hand and the success at the polls of a government promoting rearmament on the other had more complicated origins. His endeavor to disentangle this paradox turns out to produce one of the most subtle, imaginative and fascinating interpretations of West German attitudes toward militarism and its discontents in the 1950s.

Historians have demonstrated more than once that much of the resistance against rearmament in Germany was inspired by nationalist motives.[34] Neutralists, but also critics principally oriented toward the West—to say nothing of those echoing the slogans of the East—stressed the fateful consequences of such a move for the fundamental goal of reunification. Devout Protestants, who figured so prominently among opponents of rearmament, had mostly rejected the Weimar Republic as part of the right-wing 'nationalist opposition' and now moved to the left in order to conserve their nationalism. Their leading spokesman, the

30 Cooper, Paradoxes, 34–43, 50–58, 81, 282–283.
31 Ibid., 83–84.
32 Ibid., 74–75. See also Alice Holmes Cooper: The West German Peace Movement and the Christian Churches. An Institutional Approach, in: Review of Politics 50 (1988), 71–98.
33 Michael Geyer: Cold War Angst. The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons, in: Hanna Schissler (ed.): The Miracle Years. A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968, Princeton/Oxford 2001, 376–408, 396, 377.
34 See e.g. Cooper, Paradoxes, 53–63; Volkmann, 505–518, 581–584; Ehlert, 338–351.

enigmatic pastor Martin Niemöller, despite numerous twist and turns over the years, never wavered in his nationalist convictions.[35] It is emblematic that speeches at the Paulskirche meeting on January 29, 1955, which took as its motto "Against Communism and National-ism," incessantly revolved around the question of national unity, culminating in a resolution adopted out of grave concern for the reunification of Germany and called "German mani-festo."[36] Geyer takes this correlation one step further, arguing that the predominant senti-ment among opponents of rearmament was neither pacifism nor nationalism but "nostalgia for the good old days of the Third Reich."[37] They rejected rearmament, he contends, not be-cause they were traumatized by the war but because they were traumatized by what they con-ceived of as the postwar besmirching of their military honor and integrity. As long as the fledgling democratic regime could not safeguard the latter and control the interpretation of the past they felt no obligation toward it. On the other hand, most realized—if only retro-spectively—that the Nazi regime had also let them down. The upshot of these traumata was what Geyer calls "injured citizenship," an emotionally upset and angry disenchantment with the state. As a consequence, the traditional worship of the state was superseded by an overrid-ing concern for private well-being: finally, the personal had trumped the political.[38] It is here that Geyer finds the explanation for the seemingly unbridgeable chasm between people's atti-tudes and their political choices. But much more than that: according to Geyer, injured citi-zenship and its consequences created a breathing space between a disastrous past and the fu-ture of a civil society, which—in contrast to the interwar years—gave the latter a chance to grow.[39]

Not surprisingly, this transitional period was characterized by numerous contradictions. Thus, according to opinion polls, about every other German was opposed to conscription in January 1955 and only one out of five felt that a professional military career was recommend-able. But at the same time, large majorities believed the influence of military service on young men to be beneficial because it would teach them order and manners.[40] In 1959, when the government decided to register the cohort of 1922, which had borne the brunt of World War II, some of the former soldiers reacted in an equally ambiguous way. They rejected a return to military duty but expressed their displeasure through rituals that were intimately bound up with military tradition, e.g. torchlight processions, the laying of wreaths at the monument for fallen soldiers, and the eloquent confirmation of their comrades' self-sacrifice. As Geyer suc-cinctly observes, "all this carried the cultural baggage of the past. The past was overcome (in the rejection of military service) and yet reproduced (in the language of the rejection)."[41]

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35 Winkler, 145. Lamentably, there is still no comprehensive and thorough scholarly biography of Nie-möller. Matthias Schneider: Martin Niemöller, Reinbek 1997, is a slim volume that cannot remedy this desideratum.
36 Ehlert, 408–409.
37 Geyer, 383.
38 Ibid., 385–392.
39 Ibid., 399.
40 Ibid., 390; Ehlert, 331.
41 Geyer, 389.

But those veterans were by no means the only opponents of conscription or rearmament clinging to time-honored traditions. The primary goal of the German Communist Party (KPD) until its ban in 1956 was to prevent West German rearmament. The party warned of a return to militarism, fought hard for a popular referendum in 1951–52, and proclaimed the struggle against the 1954 Paris Treaty to be the most urgent task of its supporters.[42] Yet, as Till Kössler has shown, the party's efforts were marked by a characteristic style reminiscent of the militant rhetoric customary in the Weimar Republic.[43] Not only were the party's positions informed by a strict dichotomy of ally and enemy, but at times it seemed to conceive of itself as a military unit proper. Pronounced the party guidelines in 1950, "The party is a unified fighting force (*Kampforganisation*). (…) The strength of the party lies within the unity of its formation and the integration of its will and its action."[44] In the party's 'battle for peace', therefore, the 'party soldiers' (*Parteisoldaten*) received 'party commands' (*Parteibefehle*) to initiate campaigns that were often planned with military precision. During demonstrations the Communists usually marched as a well-ordered unified group, carrying their own flag with them as an ensign.

From the perspective of a culture of peace, then, many of the putative pacifists of the 1950s leave a great deal to be desired. Antimilitarism, it turns out, was not always truly enlightened. Ironically, we can simultaneously discern serious efforts in the nascent West German military to jettison the martial legacy of the past and adjust to the outlines of a civil society. The planners in Bonn envisioned the new soldiers as 'citizens in uniform' (*Staatsbürger in Uniform*), ready to defend democracy but at the same time protected by the latter's guarantee of civil rights and liberties.[45] In fact, the umbrella organization of German youth associations, many of whom viewed rearmament with strong reservations, collaborated with reformers in Bonn to outlaw dehumanizing drill and blind obedience, and to establish a constitutional right to conscientious objection.[46] Henceforth, German soldiers could disobey orders that lacked military necessity, and next to a parliamentary defense ombudsman (*Wehrbeauftragter*) watching over the soldiers' basic rights there would be elected ombuds-

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42 See Volkmann, 499–503; Ehlert, 348–351.
43 Till Kössler: Zwischen militanter Tradition und Zivilgesellschaft. Die Kommunisten in Westdeutschland 1945–1960, in: Kühne, 219–242.
44 Quoted ibid., 224.
45 See Georg Meyer: Zur inneren Entwicklung der Bundeswehr bis 1960/61, in: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 3:851–1162, esp. 858–917. Although this author is generally sympathetic to the new concept, he displays a much stronger *esprit de corps* than other contributors to the compendium. In his account, the military is continuously depicted as a victim either of dubious perceptions – like being a state within the state during the Weimar Republic or too closely allied to the Nazis during the Third Reich – or of unwarranted mistrust in postwar Germany, not to speak of the "coarse pessimism" (873) of naïve pacifists playing the game of sinister Eastern propagandists. See also Ehlert, 481–513; David Clay Large: Germans to the Front. West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era, Chapel Hill/London 1996, 176–184; Detlef Bald: "Bürger in Uniform." Tradition und Neuanfang des Militärs in Westdeutschland, in: Axel Schildt/Arnorld Sywottek (eds.): Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau. Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre, Bonn 1993, 392–402.
46 Volkmann, 572–573; Ehlert, 395–404.

men within each unit acting as go-betweens between officers and enlisted men. The armed forces were completely subordinated to civilian control with the powers of command held by the defense minister in times of peace and by the chancellor during war or national emergency. In addition, the Defense Committee of the *Bundestag* was set up as a standing committee of investigation. Not content with structural and organizational features, Social Democrats objected to the term *Oberbefehl* (supreme command), claiming that it had become enveloped by a mystical air. Instead, the term *Befehls- und Kommandogewalt* was chosen, which in its redundancy made double sure that no important powers were to reside outside the civilian realm.[47] Reformers also tackled other symbols and rituals from saluting to military music to the oath of allegiance that had been perverted into a personal pledge of fealty to Hitler. It escaped elimination only because civil servants were also required to take an oath, making it seem odd to bind professional soldiers less closely to the state. Conscripts, on the other hand, should only partake in a ceremonial obligation.[48] Finally, when the *Bundestag* had to decide on the name of the reconstituted armed forces, it deliberately rejected the tainted terms *Reichswehr* or *Wehrmacht* and eventually agreed on *Bundeswehr*, despite the phonetic parallel to the German term for fire brigade (*Feuerwehr*).[49]

All this did not, to be sure, take place without a constant stream of subterranean disapproval and derision, occasionally gushing out into the open. Traditionalists feared a 'soft line'—epitomized by the foam rubber pillows introduced at the *Bundeswehr*'s first barracks in Andernach—that would undermine the required degree of virile discipline (*Manneszucht*).[50] Even generally reform-minded military experts mocked the planners for wanting to create an "unsoldierly army," and lamented that too much emphasis was being placed on civilian control of the military.[51] Adding insult to injury, Germany's international partners in the still-born European Defense Community reacted with a decided lack of appreciation to the baffling idea of blurring the distinction between military and civilian life. The French refused to retreat one inch from the idea of unconditional obedience, while the Italians were

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47 During the Weimar Republic the commander-in-chief of the *Reichswehr* actually retained some extraordinary powers of command independent from the responsible cabinet member. See Ehlert, 498–499.

48 Ibid., 504–507; Meyer, 903; Large, 247–253. Some of the most recent literature on the role of the military in modern German history is reviewed in Annika Mombauer: From Imperial Army to Bundeswehr. Continuity and Change in the Role of the Military in German History, in: The Historical Journal 47 (2004), 187–193.

49 Ehlert, 507–508; Large, 243–244.

50 Meyer, 859.

51 Large, 186–192, 240–242, and 295, note 15; Meyer, 892–900. The complicated process through which the West German national security and foreign policy elites adapted their actions and the way they saw themselves to radically altered conditions is currently being investigated with a generational approach at the Hamburg *Institut für Sozialforschung*. See Klaus Naumann: Integration und Eigensinn – Die Sicherheitseliten der frühen Bundesrepublik zwischen Kriegs- und Friedenskultur, in: Kühne, 202–218; Klaus Naumann: Nachkrieg als militärische Daseinsform. Kriegsprägungen in drei Offiziersgenerationen der Bundeswehr, in: Thomas Kühne (ed.): Nachkrieg in Deutschland, Hamburg 2001, 444–471.

appalled at the functional uniforms the Germans proposed for the common European forces, insisting that their soldiers would not die in overalls.[52]

Yet it is precisely these reactions—not least of Germany's western allies—which demonstrate how far some of the *Bundeswehr*'s creators were willing to push the new German forces toward a civilian appearance—the ultimate purpose of which, it is to be remembered, was to facilitate their integration into a civil society. One conspicuous result of these efforts was a more civilian ideal of manliness, not only within the military but in society as a whole. To be sure, the more casual body language that asserted itself in the 1950s did not necessarily mean that people were more peaceable. Nor did the pronounced coolness displayed by many adolescents come without its own machismo.[53] Moreover, the less martial image of the new German soldier, far from questioning traditional gender roles, in fact helped to remasculinize postwar society by deliberately depicting this soldier as a protector of German families.[54] But conversely, prominent peace activists—mostly men as it were—cast themselves similarly as protectors of home and family, while most women in the movements accepted conventional gender roles.[55] And more importantly, the fact that ordinary Germans, and especially the young generation, turned their backs on the clipped-militaristic body language of old and overcame the dominance in everyday social relations of cultural patterns derived from Prussian militarism represented in itself a historic watershed.

All this is not to say, of course, that West German military reformers of the 1950s embodied a culture of peace generally less discernible among traditional peace activists. But the ambivalences and contradictions that come to the fore once we apply this concept to historical phenomena promise fresh perspectives and can help us overcome the time-worn dichotomy between peace movements and representatives of power.[56] If the relationship between foreign policy elites and social movements has become an increasingly important theme for peace historians[57], then this more relaxed atmosphere should in turn allow us to ask hitherto unusual and in some respects more critical questions of peace movements.

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52 Large, 197–201; Meyer, 902–903. See also David Clay Large: Partners in Defense. America, West Germany, and the Security of Europe, 1950–1968, in: Detlef Junker (ed.): The United States and Germany in the Era of te Cold War, 1945–1990. A Handbook, 2 vols., Washington, D.C./Cambridge 2004, 1:209–216.

53 See Kaspar Maase: "Give peace a chance" – Massenkultur und Mentalitätswandel. Eine Problemskizze, in: Kühne, 262–279.

54 See Uta G. Poiger: Krise der Männlichkeit. Remaskulinisierung in beiden deutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaften, in: Naumann, 227–263, esp. 234–238; Hanna Schissler: "Normalization" as Project. Some Thoughts on Gender Relations in West Germany during the 1950s, in: Idem, 359–375.

55 Lawrence Wittner: Gender Roles and Nuclear Disarmament Activism, 1954–1965, in: Gender & History 12 (2000), 197–222.

56 See also the somewhat different yet similar plead in Jost Dülffer: Friedensbewegung und Staatsmacht, in: Andreas Gestrich/Gottfried Niedhart/Bernd Ulrich (eds.): Gewaltfreiheit. Pazifistische Konzepte im 20. Jahrhundert, Münster/Hamburg 1996, 165–176.

57 Peter van den Dungen/Lawrence S. Wittner: Peace History. An Introduction, in: Journal of Peace Research 40 (2003), 363–375, 366.

Two directions that seem particularly rewarding in this regard are the themes of gender on the one hand and emotions on the other. While the question of gender is discussed elsewhere in this volume[58], the importance of emotions is as plain as a pikestaff in much of the recent literature on protest in the 1950s and 1960s but is hardly ever taken as a point of departure, let alone analyzed systematically. We have already seen how feelings of wounded pride and questioned integrity led to the emotional state of an 'injured citizenship' that informed much of the antimilitarism of the early 1950s. But deep-seated fears and traumata also haunted the antinuclear protests of the later 1950s. After the first American H-Bomb test at Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954, had gone awry and the consequences of the radioactive fallout had resuscitated antinuclear activism around the globe, West German public opinion became increasingly agitated over the dangers of atomic weapons.[59] In 1955, a NATO simulation of nuclear war, code-named Carte Blanche, shocked West Germans with the news that millions of them were predicted to be killed instantly, while countless others would die from nuclear fallout.[60] The year after that, an unusually cold and damp summer gave remarkable prominence to reports of a connection between nuclear tests and climate change, resulting in a veritable atomic psychosis and prompting a Hamburg daily to include data for radioactivity in its front-page forecast.[61] All this set the stage for the heated debate of 1957–58 about equipping the *Bundeswehr* with (American-controlled) nuclear weapons. This debate, as Michael Geyer has argued, once again reflected a recent trauma: the specter of extermination. West Germans understood very well that nuclear war would be a war of annihilation and in this respect it would resemble the war of extermination they had fought before. According to Geyer, "this occupation of the present with the nightmares of the past is what Cold War angst was all about."[62] To a certain degree, Germans shared this pervasive fear of death—they were, as Geyer aptly notes, campaigning against nuclear death rather than for nuclear disarmament, as their British counterparts did—with the Japanese. Americans, on the contrary, who had actually employed atomic weapons but kept evading pictorial evidence of the resultant suffering, understood the future war not as one that had already been waged but as something to be newly imagined.[63] Both Germans and Japanese knew, moreover, that they were in no position to control decisions of war and peace. Therefore, West Germans obviously refused to make the nuclear threat an issue of electoral politics.

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58 See the essay by Belinda Davis in this volume.

59 On global repercussions see Lawrence S. Wittner: Resisting the Bomb. A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970, Stanford, Calif., 1997, 1–28. The reaction in West Germany is detailed in Ilona Stölken-Fitschen: Atombombe und Geistesgeschichte. Eine Studie der fünfziger Jahre aus deutscher Sicht, Baden-Baden 1995, 91–116. See also Detlef Bald: Hiroshima, 6. August 1945. Die nukleare Bedrohung, Munich 1999, 105–113.

60 Wittner, Resisting the Bomb, 18; Kori N. Schake: NATO Strategy and the German-American Relationship, in: Junker, 1:233–239.

61 Stölken-Fitschen, 123–127.

62 Geyer, 398.

63 Ibid.; Lane Fenrich: Mass Death in Miniature. How Americans Became Victims of the Bomb, in: Laura Hein/Mark Selden (eds.): Living with the Bomb. American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age, Armonk, N.Y./London 1997, 122–133.

Fight Nuclear Death, like earlier antimilitarist campaigns, failed to affect political decisions. Indeed, in its obsession with atomic weapons it relegated the general problem of peaceful conflict resolution to the sidelines. The campaign relied heavily on traditional forms of protest (resolutions and appeals by prominent citizens, mass demonstrations, collection of signatures, calls for a public referendum), and its close association with the SPD makes it hard to think of the campaign as a new social movement.[64] Nevertheless, it left several important legacies. The rapid proliferation of regional and local committees, though largely dominated by Social Democrats and unionists, initiated a learning process in democratic participation and created a pool of experienced activists, who resolved that any future campaign had to be autonomous and build up from the grassroots level in order to avoid the sorry fate of Fight Nuclear Death after the SPD abandoned it.[65] Moreover, the antinuclear campaign sparked political activism at German universities, culminating in a students' congress against nuclear armament at West Berlin's Free University in January 1959.[66] It was here that the Socialist German Students League (SDS)—soon to become the vanguard of 1960's turmoil—gained some early notoriety and managed to attract youths with traditionally conservative backgrounds.[67] Finally, renowned intellectuals also played a leading role in the antinuclear campaign, providing it with much of the public esteem it enjoyed. Most prominent was a declaration by eighteen of Germany's leading physicists, in which they refused to take part in the production, testing, or application of atomic weapons. The fact that the manifesto was made public in Göttingen conjured up comparisons of the Göttingen Eighteen with the Göttingen Seven, a group of professors who exemplified the commitment to constitutional government—and hence democracy—because they had refused in 1837 to swear an

64 Buro, 137–138; Jost Dülffer: The Movement Against Rearmament 1951–1955 and the Movement Against Nuclear Armament 1957–1958 in the FRG. A Comparison, in: Maurice Vaïsse (ed.): Le Pacifisme en Europe des années 1920 aux années 1950, Brussels 1993, 417–434.

65 Cooper: Paradoxes, 76–81; Rob Burns/Wilfried Van der Will: Protest and Democracy in West Germany. Extra-Parliamentary Opposition and the Democratic Agenda, New York 1988, 86–91.

66 See Kraushaar, Protest-Chronik, 3:1897–1901, 1908, 1934–1935, 1938, 1940, 1955, 2076–2079.

67 Willy Albrecht: Der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (SDS). Vom parteikonformen Studentenverband zum Repräsentanten der Neuen Linken, Bonn 1994, 318–324; Friedhelm Boll: Von der Hitler-Jugend zur Kampagne "Kampf dem Atomtod!" Zur politischen Sozialisation einer niedersächsischen Schüler- und Studentengruppe, in: Ulrich Herrmann (ed.): Protestierende Jugend. Jugendopposition und politischer Protest in der deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte (Materialien zur Historischen Jugendforschung), Weinheim/Munich: Juventa 2002, 496 pp., € 45.00 (pbk.), 357–385. Boll's instructive article follows the so-called "Gespräche-Kreis" from its inception as a group of high school students creating a student representation body in Hanover in the late 1940s to its gradual westernization and turn to the SPD during the 1950s, resulting in a leading role in the creation of local student committees against nuclear armament and a coordinating function between the latter and the SDS, particularly in planning the Berlin congress. – There are two other articles in this volume dealing with West German antimilitarism in the 1950s. One of them, however, comes down to a rather transfigurative and empirically unreliable personal recollection, while the other constitutes a conventional organizational history replete with the usual hagiographic tendencies. Heiner Halberstadt: Protest gegen Remilitarisierung, "Kampf dem Atomtod" und Ostermarschbewegung in Westdeutschland, in: Herrmann, 313–327; Michael Schmidt: Der Kampf gegen Wiederaufrüstung und Atombewaffnung in den 50er Jahren. Die Aktivitäten des Berliner Landesverbandes der "Falken", ibid., 329–353.

oath of allegiance to the duke of Cumberland, following the latter's abrogation of the Hanoverian constitution of 1833. Perhaps this mystic chord of memory spoiled conservative efforts to denounce the Göttingen Eighteen for trespassing upon political turf. The act itself, at any rate, proved to be momentous. In spearheading the politicization of students and faculty—and in a broader sense of a critical intelligentsia—it added a whole new dimension to the antinuclear protests. Because of this dimension the protests "might well be understood as a threshold in the annals of German politics in that they indicate an erosion of old boundaries that had separated and protected the state and its ability to conduct politics according to its own *raison d'état*."[68]

These boundaries of a semi-authoritarian state shored up by order and discipline were crumbling in other spots, too. If, as Ulrich Herbert has recently argued, Europeans, and Germans in particular, amid the confusion and uncertainty after World War II found reassurance in time-honored turn-of-the-century norms and values, then the stability achieved at the end of the first postwar decade seemed to make this reassurance obsolete.[69] Gradually, the anachronisms between rapid modernization and outmoded cultural standards led to numerous frictions. The publicist Fritz René Allemann, who famously pronounced in 1956 that Bonn was not Weimar, paid tribute to the established democratic type of government by changing the traditional maxim according to which quiet was the first and foremost duty of citizens to read: quiet is the first and foremost *right* of citizens.[70] Whereas this dodge only glossed over remnants of a deep-seated German subject-mentality (*Untertanengeist*), critics began to overturn the old-fashioned maxim in earnest during the antinuclear protests. The young Jürgen Habermas declared *disquiet* to be the first and foremost duty of citizens.[71] In the same vein, Rolf Schmiederer, a student at the Academy for Social Sciences in Wilhelmshaven, denounced in the local student newspaper what he called the "quiet-is-the-citizen's-duty-conformism" and asked whether riots of working-class adolescents (*Halbstarken-Krawalle*) and jazz sessions were really the only way for young people to mutiny. His answer was to question venerable institutions like 'the fatherland', prompting the academy's administration to ban the newspaper since devotion to people and fatherland was a precondi-

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68   Geyer, 394. Geyer does not specify the democratic traditions conjured up by the physicists, which, in an occasionally unreliable German translation of his article, results in a mix-up of the Göttingen Eighteen with the Göttingen Seven; see Michael Geyer: Der Kalte Krieg, die Deutschen und die Angst. Die westdeutsche Opposition gegen Wiederbewaffnung und Kernwaffen, in: Naumann: Nachkrieg, 267–318, 306. As a different historical marker the manifesto also reiterated and continued the self-constructed legend according to which German nuclear scientists – many of whom now signers of the manifesto – had deliberately withheld the bomb from Hitler, whereas their Anglo-American colleagues had been less scrupulous. See Stölken-Fitschen, 215–220. On the furor created by the manifesto in West Germany see also Wittner: Resisting the Bomb, 61–67.

69   Ulrich Herbert: Liberalisierung als Lernprozeß. Die Bundesrepublik in der deutschen Geschichte – eine Skizze, in: Idem (ed.): Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland. Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung 1945–1980, Göttingen 2002, 7–49.

70   See Kielmansegg: 323.

71   Jürgen Habermas: Unruhe erste Bürgerpflicht, in: Diskus. Frankfurter Studentenzeitung 8 (1958), no. 5, reprinted in Kraushaar: Protest-Chronik, 3:1899.

tion to register at the school.[72] Similar frictions between, on the one hand, an outdated conception of the state still cultivated by political and bureaucratic elites and, on the other, a younger generation that strived to redeem the promises of democracy and consumer capitalism by demanding the right to a say and by experimenting with new lifestyles would multiply in the years to come, eventually igniting the turmoil of the 1960s.

Rolf Schmiederer's reference to the *Halbstarke* reminds us that not only intellectuals resisted the strait jacket of authoritarian traditions. The mostly working-class youths who appropriated American styles, fashion, and music in order to mark out their own spaces also ran up against the entrenched customs of a bygone era.[73] Although these conflicts do not come under the usual definition of protest, which presupposes the formulation of a social or political demand[74], they nevertheless entail attempts to effect social and cultural changes. In fact, as Uta Poiger has shown, authorities in both East and West Germany initially politicized *Halbstarken* behavior, and it was only during the latter 1950s that experts in the Federal Republic attempted to depoliticize this form of youthful deviance in an effort to make consumption central to a more liberal West German identity that stood out against the rigor of the East German regime.[75]

This rigor was in itself characterized by varying degrees of repression and leniency, as Marc-Dietrich Ohse demonstrates in his fine study on youth in the GDR after the building of the Berlin Wall.[76] For most of the 1960s, however, and despite several about-turns signified by the promising rhetoric of the 1963 Youth Communiqué and the inexorable backlash at the eleventh plenary session of the Central Committee two years later, East German authorities never stopped to worry about the individualism that seemed to express itself in juvenile preferences for western music and fashion. To them, pop music was damaging the development of a socialist personality and therefore represented an instrument of West German psychological warfare. Next to this ideological dissociation, however, ran strong currents of an all-German cultural pessimism that perceived Anglo-American cultural imports as a threat to bourgeois values and traditional gender roles.[77] Whereas West German authorities finally

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72 Rolf Schmiederer: Denken oder studieren, in: Zoon Politikon, no. 4, June 23, 1958, reprinted in Kraushaar: Protest-Chronik, 3:1931.

73 See Kaspar Maase: BRAVO Amerika. Erkundungen zur Jugendkultur in der Bundesrepublik in den fünfziger Jahren, Hamburg 1992; Thomas Grotum: Die Halbstarken. Zur Geschichte einer Jugendkultur der 50er Jahre, Frankfurt a.M. 1994.

74 See e.g. Rucht, Protest, 19.

75 Uta G. Poiger: Jazz, Rock, and Rebels. Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany, Berkeley, Calif., 2000. Ironically, this depoliticization may have contributed to the common impression of a politically apathetic younger generation in the early 1960s, which in turn provoked efforts of 'politicization from above'. When these were unexpectedly supplemented with 'politicization from below', events took a turn that authorities had not anticipated. See Detlef Siegfried: Vom Teenager zur Pop-Revolution. Politisierungstendenzen in der westdeutschen Jugendkultur 1959 bis 1968, in: Axel Schildt/Detlef Siegfried/Karl Christian Lammers (eds.): Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften, Hamburg, 2000, 582–623.

76 Marc-Dietrich Ohse: Jugend nach dem Mauerbau. Anpassung, Protest und Eigensinn (DDR 1961–1974), Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag 2003, 407 pp., € 24.90 (pbk.).

77 See ibid., 54–63, 103–109, 299–301; Poiger, Jazz, 84–91, 137–205.

accepted popular culture as a weapon in the Cold War arsenal, the culture industry discovered youths as a market, and the resulting spread of juvenile fashions and styles eventually meshed with political protest, the sweeping ideological demands of the East German regime continued to politicize youth culture, thus confining it to insular spaces.[78] When the GDR, in the early 1970s, finally started to depoliticize suspicious juvenile styles by tacitly tolerating them, most adolescents had long since retreated into private niches.[79]

The intermittently similar reaction in East and West to juvenile delinquency suggests that German social history in the 1950s may not be as divided with regard to all forms of protest as appears from the essays in a recent comparative volume edited by Ulrich Herrmann. The distinctive feature of the volume is its pairing of many historical analyses with personal reminiscences and reprints of documents. As with many conference volumes, the quality of individual contributions varies considerably.[80] With regard to our current discussion, it is noticeable that while there are two essays on West German *Halbstarke*, there is none on their East German counterparts. Birgit Gebhardt comes closest to instances of East German juvenile deviance in her analysis of the 1961 Anklam case, demonstrating that in its harsh reaction to an act of harmless and hardly ideological rebelliousness on the part of students the regime went a long way to single-handedly create its own opponents.[81] The continuing repression of youthful forms of protest, even if they manifested themselves through everyday phenomena like appearance, bearing, gestures, and language, prevented that these forms would become "fermentations from below," as Wilfried Breyvogel aptly calls them with regard to West Germany.[82] His contention that the *Halbstarke* were concerned with unleashing juvenile emotions leads us right back to the importance of this theme as pointed out already in connection with the antimilitarist campaigns. Because adolescents, as Breyvogel argues, were unable to symbolically articulate their emotions with the repertoire available in postwar German society, they appropriated American popular culture for the purpose. Frequent overreactions by authorities eager to restore peace and quiet anticipated the confrontations of the following decade. Indeed, Breyvogel suggests that the student revolt of the 1960s only continued the dissolution of authoritarian notions of duty and obedience heralded by the *Halbstarke* a decade earlier.

The continuities between *Halbstarke* and APO rebels, between 58ers and 68ers, remain a subject of contention. Jürgen Zinnecker points out that both revolts were actually borne by

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78 Ohse, 139–150.
79 Ibid., 303–322, 370–372. Ohse's characterization of this gradual softening as "repressive tolerance," however, might be misleading because the term, coined by Herbert Marcuse and extremely influential within the West German New Left, connotes the manipulation of political speech through commercial mass culture and mass media whereas the East German regime continued to suppress criticism rather than integrating it.
80 See fn. 67, 141, 143.
81 Birgit Gebhardt: Der "Fall Anklam". Schülerprotest an der EOS Anklam im September 1961, in: Herrmann, 41–55.
82 Wilfried Breyvogel: Provokation und Aufbruch der westdeutschen Jugend in den 50er und 60er Jahren. Konflikthafte Wege der Modernisierung der westdeutschen Gesellschaft in der frühen Bundesrepublik, ibid., 445–459, 446.

different social strata of one and the same age cohort born around 1940. Sixteen to seventeen year old apprentices made up the bulk of the *Halbstarke* in 1956–58, while twenty-five to thirty year old students dominated the revolt of 1968.[83] Zinnecker admits, however, that any stylistic legacies of the *Halbstarken* subculture are still largely unexplored. Breyvogel, for his part, while understanding both movements as manifestations of a modernization of everyday life, which gradually dissolved bourgeois mentalities in Germany, at the same time stresses the social differences between both groups. In the 1960s, he notes, the revolt moved toward the top in two respects: socially, activists now came from middle class backgrounds; figuratively, it shifted from the tummy to the head.[84] As we shall see, however, this should not be taken to mean that emotions played no role in 1960s protest.

The 1960s: Protest as Sensation

If we think of the turn from the 1950s to the 1960s in West German history as if a clip with four small hooks was holding together the two decades and simultaneously serving as a bridge connecting the one with the other, then the antinuclear campaign and the *Halbstarke* riots would represent the two hooks (one political, one cultural) on the one side, while the *Spiegel* affair and the Schwabing riots of 1962 would represent the two hooks on the other side. Probably the most remarkable aspect of the *Spiegel* affair—in which authorities arrested the owner and an editor of the news magazine, alleging that they had committed treason by publishing details of NATO's defense strategy—was the conspicuous refusal of both press and public to bow to the government's appeals to patriotic sentiment and *raison d'état*.[85] A similar dismissal of hitherto tolerated requests of loyalty and good conduct also led to the Schwabing riots.

Nick Thomas ranks both the *Spiegel* affair and the Schwabing riots among the origins of the APO in what undoubtedly will become the standard English textbook treatment of protest in 1960s West Germany.[86] Originally conceived as a follow-up volume to Arthur Marwick's monumental history of the 1960s cultural revolution[87], Thomas wisely decided to confine his study to protest movements. Less exhaustive but also less impressionistic than

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83 Jürgen Zinnecker: Halbstarke – die andere Seite der 68er-Generation, ibid., 461–485. Similarly, Marina Fischer-Kowalski: Halbstarke 1958, Studenten 1968. Eine Generation und zwei Rebellionen, in: Ulf Preuss-Lausitz et al.: Kriegskinder, Konsumkinder, Krisenkinder. Zur Sozialisationsgeschichte seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, 4th ed., Weinheim/Basel 1995, 53–70; Heinz Bude: Das Altern einer Generation. Die Jahrgänge 1938 bis 1948, Frankfurt a.M. 1997, 49–55. With stronger reservations against direct comparisons, Siegfried, 583.

84 Breyvogel, 456.

85 See Winkler, 209–213. The most detailed portrayals of the affair still date from the 1960s. See Jürgen Seifert (ed.): Die Spiegel-Affäre. 2 vols., Olten/Freiburg i. Br. 1966; David Schoenbaum: The Spiegel Affair, Garden City, N.Y., 1968.

86 Nick Thomas: Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany. A Social History of Dissent and Democracy, Oxford/New York: Berg Publishers 2003, xv + 277 pp., £ 15.99 (pbk.).

87 Arthur Marwick: The Sixties. Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958–c.1974, Oxford/New York 1998.

Marwick's weighty tome, this is a concise narrative that, admittedly, has not much to say about ideological underpinnings or the countercultural dimension of West Germany's '1968' but makes excellent use of freshly mined archival sources to illustrate the campaign for university reform as well as those against Emergency Legislation, the Vietnam War, and the Springer publishing house. Although Thomas' key argument, according to which the protest movements of the 1960s were crucial in augmenting the foundations of West German democracy, is not particularly original, he is by no means uncritical of his subject, and much of what he has to say adds to our understanding of this turbulent decade.[88] Among the book's highlights are the author's brilliant sketch of the Schwabing riots and his meticulous description of the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg. In both instances we find the by now familiar clash between authoritarian traditions and antiauthoritarian 'provocations'. In the case of the Schwabing riots, the latter consisted in jazz musicians playing past the curfew time of 10 p.m., whereupon police during several nights in June 1962 used truncheons to disperse audiences, arrest the culprits, and keep the peace.[89] Similar reactions by East German police to a gathering of beat fans in Leipzig in 1965 suggest that mental predispositions had not grown all that far apart in the two Germanys.[90] The opposite is true for criminal justice systems however. Sentences for the Schwabing rioters may have been out of proportion to the original 'crimes', but compared to the admission of their Eastern brethren to forced labor camps, fate was rather kind to them.

This can not be said for Benno Ohnesorg, who was killed on June 2, 1967 by a plainclothes police officer during a demonstration against a state visit to West Berlin by the Shah of Iran. As Thomas convincingly demonstrates, the deterioration of the demonstration into a riot was caused as much by ill-prepared police tactics as by the provocative designs of the SDS leadership. This is only the most glaring example of a whole series of overreactions on the part of authorities, which—at least for West Germany, as Thomas leaves no doubt—calls into question Arthur Marwick's assertion that the so-called establishment responded with 'measured judgment' to the countercultural challenge of the 1960s.[91] Typically enough, the police officer who shot Ohnesorg viewed the use of firearms against protesters as perfectly normal, and furious West Berliners, far from expressing sorrow at the fatality, called for quiet, discipline and order.[92]

Both the ferocious action of the police and the rabid reaction in the West Berlin press and public indicate that it might be worthwhile to explore the theme of emotions with regard to the so-called establishment, too. Klaus Weinhauer has recently shown that police continued to base their operations on experiences gained during the Weimar Republic and that many

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88 The author's only blunder is his repeated suggestion that the Grand Coalition was an all-party coalition (Thomas, 3, 88, 92). In future – to be wished for – editions, the publisher should also take care to correct the names of Carlo Schmid (131) and Jutta Limbach (247).

89 See ibid., 40–42.

90 See Ohse, 83–89. See also Thomas Lindenberger: Volkspolizei. Herrschaftspraxis und öffentliche Ordnung im SED-Staat 1952–1968, Cologne 2003.

91 Thomas, 243; Marwick, 13–19.

92 Thomas, 107–123.

rank and file officers were still closely attached to the traditional worship of the state.[93] This mental predisposition inevitably led officers to view dissent with suspicion and culturally deviant students with open aversion, which could easily turn into outright hatred once tensions escalated. As for many ordinary Germans, it is telling—but as yet not pursued further—that they were particularly sensitive to provocations associated with state visits. It was on these occasions that the state exhibited the full range of its representational paraphernalia, proposing interpretations of political hierarchies and generating appeals to conformity. Such symbolic performances aimed at public assent and invited the identification of the audience with the symbolically represented community.[94] As ceremonial spectacles they mobilized feelings of belonging and thereby generated loyalty. The Federal Republic and other modern states employed what has been called 'street politics' to orchestrate a precarious balance between this emotional mobilization and the control of the masses.[95] All this suggests that it was precisely the highly emotionalized dramaturgy of state visits, which in turn elicited an equally emotional reaction when these festivities were disrupted. Such disturbances not only spoiled the aura affiliated with a sense of community, but also seemed to besmirch this very community—just as it was most intensely experienced—in the face of the visitor and the wider world. This is particularly true for provocations by the SDS and the notorious *Kommune 1*, which were deliberately designed to ridicule official ceremonies. In a way, rebellious students responded to official 'street politics' in staging their own public spectacles.

Emotions were a crucial ingredient in the new forms of protest. Much evidence for this can be gleaned from a recent book from which, nevertheless, the reader comes away with mixed feelings. Three former SDS activists, Siegward Lönnendonker, Bernd Rabehl, and Jochen Staadt, have undertaken to process the records of the SDS housed at the *Archiv APO und Soziale Bewegung* at the Free University Berlin. The authors plan to present their findings in two volumes, the first of which—covering the years 1960 to 1967—has now been published[96], while the second—which will describe important events like the 1968 International

93 Klaus Weinhauer: Schutzpolizei in der Bundesrepublik. Zwischen Bürgerkrieg und Innerer Sicherheit. Die turbulenten sechziger Jahre, Paderborn 2003. From the perspective of a culture of peace it is interesting to note that Weinhauer sees a generational divide within the police between what he calls "patriarchs" (born before 1912), who embodied notions of belligerent-militaristic manliness, and "modernizers" (born after 1920), who supported a more civilian conception of manliness focused on technological prowess.

94 On the importance of festivals, celebrations, and commemorations in generating meaning see Eric Hobsbawm/Terence Ranger (eds.): The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge 1992; Sabine Behrenbeck/Alexander Nützenadel (eds.): Inszenierungen des Nationalstaats. Politische Feiern in Italien und Deutschland seit 1860/71, Cologne 2000. See also Johannes Paulmann: Monarchenbegegnungen in Europa zwischen Ancien Régime und Erstem Weltkrieg, Paderborn 2000.

95 An exemplary analysis of this can be found in Andreas W. Daum: Kennedy in Berlin. Politik, Kultur und Emotionen im Kalten Krieg, Paderborn 2003, esp. 10–19, 107–109, 146–162. For the concept of 'street politics' see also Thomas Lindenberger: Straßenpolitik. Zur Sozialgeschichte der öffentlichen Ordnung in Berlin 1900 bis 1914, Bonn 1995.

96 Siegward Lönnendonker/Bernd Rabehl/Jochen Staadt: Die antiautoritäre Revolte. Der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund nach der Trennung von der SPD. Vol. 1: 1960–1967 (Schriften des Otto-Stammer Zentrums im Otto-Suhr-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin 91), Wiesbaden: Westdeut-

Vietnam Congress and the shooting of Rudi Dutschke in more detail and bring the story up to the dissolution of the organization in 1970—is still in preparation. Lönnendonker and Staadt have meanwhile fallen out with Rabehl, and the present volume reflects this alienation not only with regard to interpretations but also in the way the authors set about their task. In the book's preface Lönnendonker and Staadt explain that they aim at disclosing the organizational history of the SDS and at integrating this history into the contemporary West German and international context; they largely succeed in the former but fail in the latter. Rabehl, on the contrary, in the final chapter of the volume, proclaims that the archival record was consisting mostly of trivial stuff—a contention amply disproved in the preceding 400 pages—and attempts to give sudden insights into his subject through a collection of aphorisms.[97] However, this quickly deteriorates into a mere recapitulation of events, which already marked the preceding chapters. Overall, the volume is as fascinating in its exhaustive (and sometimes exhausting) presentation of debates and discussions within the SDS as it is frustrating in its lack of analysis and neglect of the larger historical context.

The above suggests that this multi-authored volume is best utilized—and indeed indispensable—as a quarry for various aspects of the student movement. The theme of emotions, for instance, surfaces at several points in the narrative, ranging from the reference to Norman Birnbaum's observation that the student generation which gave birth to the New Left was characterized by a feeling of moral unease and incessant nuclear angst to the counterculture's infatuation with a realization of innermost instincts or Dieter Kunzelmann's plans for group therapy within the *Kommune 1*.[98] Most important, however, the notion—developed most emphatically by student leader Rudi Dutschke—that the emotional experience of direct action would open people's eyes for the repressive nature of the system and turn simple critics into revolutionaries is amply exposed throughout the volume. Dutschke later described a demonstration against a state visit to West Berlin by Congolese premier Moise Tshombe on December 18, 1964, in which activists had broken through a police cordon and thrown tomatoes at the visitor's limousine, as the starting point of the cultural revolution because—for the first time, as he believed—protesters were concentrating primarily on themselves and were leading on their self-education about aim and objective of their action through the action itself.[99] Wrote Dutschke: "Agitation and elucidation as a process of self-education on

scher Verlag 2002, xiii + 529 pp., € 39.90 (pbk.). In fact, the endeavor dates back to the 1980s but lay dormant for more than a decade before the debate about German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's past in 2001 revived plans for publication. The volume indeed betrays numerous signs of hasty preparation, such as the verbatim repetition of certain passages (274/285, 318/348), but also several factual errors. U.S. ambassador George C. McGhee's first name, for instance, is given as Howard (248); neither are the professional affiliations of Herbert Marcuse stated correctly (276, 367). Innumerable typing errors are an additional nuisance. Obviously, the publisher either could not find the time or did not care to carefully copy-edit the volume.

97 Ibid., 403–404.
98 Ibid., 46, 305, 432–435.
99 See Rudi Dutschke: Die Widersprüche des Spätkapitalismus, die antiautoritären Studenten und ihr Verhältnis zur Dritten Welt, in: Uwe Bergmann et al.: Rebellion der Studenten oder Die neue Opposition, Reinbek 1968, 33–93, 63. The passage is neither quoted correctly in Lönnendonker/Rabehl/

the part of the demonstrators were of a sensuous nature."[100] In the same vein, he and the leading theorist of the Frankfurt SDS chapter, Hans-Jürgen Krahl, declared in their famous *Organisationsreferat* at the 1967 delegates conference that the power of the state had to be lured out from behind a feigned tolerance, so that it would physically manifest itself and leave an indelible imprint in the consciousness of demonstrators.[101]

The origins of this thought in the avant-gardism of the Paris-based Situationist International and the critical social theory of the Frankfurt school are uncovered by Michael Schmidtke.[102] Schmidtke sees in the New Left "a movement of ideas," and—following a particular strand of social movement theory[103]—he is first of all concerned with the way in which these ideas formed and shaped a collective identity among movement participants. Above and beyond this, however, Schmidtke is interested first and foremost in both the diffusion and the legacy of the New Left's ideas. This and the innovative methodology that the author applies to a wide range of topics will most likely represent the lasting contribution of this important book. Schmidtke takes up Rainer M. Lepsius' extension of Max Weber's deliberations concerning the social relevance of ideas. He not only distinguishes between the original conditions that bred ideas and the circumstances under which they eventually produce effects, but also enumerates four specific modes in which ideas work, namely (1) in setting the course for interests, (2) as "collective symbols" (i.e. detached from their original context and therefore open to the ascription of various meanings), (3) as "ideas in action" (i.e. popularized in order to be transformed into praxis), and (4) as "turntables of diffusion" (i.e. organizational forms inspired by ideas but detached from the latter's original sponsors).[104] In this latter mode ideas become inscribed into social practices and as such radiate into society as a whole. Schmidtke uses Free Cities, food-coops, and Free Universities in the United States as well as Critical Universities and the experimental educational methods of the West German *Kinderläden* as examples to illustrate this process. He rightly emphasizes that there is no such thing as a linear diffusion and argues persuasively that the social and cultural consequences of diffusion markedly differed from the New Left's vision of a cultural revolution be-

Staadt, 201, nor translated adequately in Thomas, 94. On Dutschke's elation at the demonstration right after it took place see his diary entry in Rudi Dutschke: Jeder hat sein Leben ganz zu leben. Die Tagebücher 1963–1979, ed. Gretchen Dutschke, Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch 2003, 430 pp., € 22.90 (cloth), 22–25. Dutschke viewed state visits as "circus spectacles" staged to hold the masses like conditioned "Pavlov's dogs". Quoted in Michaela Karl: Rudi Dutschke. Revolutionär ohne Revolution, Frankfurt a.M. 2003, 75. In one of the most fascinating passages of the Lönnendonker/ Rabehl/ Staadt volume, Rabehl quotes extensively from internal protocols of the *Kommune 1*, whose members wondered whether exposing the ridiculousness of U.S. vice president Hubert Humphrey's state visit to West Berlin in April 1967 might alleviate their own emotional problems (440–454).

100 Dutschke, Widersprüche, 63.
101 See Lönnendonker/Rabehl/Staadt, 379–383.
102 Michael Schmidtke: Der Aufbruch der jungen Intelligenz. Die 68er Jahre in der Bundesrepublik und den USA (Campus Historische Studien 34), Frankfurt a.M./New York: Campus 2003, 314 pp., € 34.90 (pbk.), 170–176.
103 For more on the promise and pitfalls of this approach see Wilfried Mausbach: Historicising '1968', in: Contemporary European History 11 (2002), 177–187.
104 Schmidtke, 18–26.

cause the latter's ideas were adapted by various groups ignorant of the ideas' origins.[105] In relating ideas to social practices, Schmidtke overcomes the fixation of previous social movement research on ideas, thereby paving the way for future scholarship in this field to integrate intellectual history more closely with cultural history.

This formidable achievement notwithstanding, Schmidtke's study is afflicted by numerous inconsistencies. To begin with, there is a lack of conceptual clarity in the term 'diffusion'. Schmidtke uses the term indiscriminately to mean both the spread of ideas and their relationship to interests and social action. Moreover, if his analysis of the way ideas work is a model of subtle differentiation, then his understanding of the genesis of the 1960s revolt is rather simplistic and almost deterministic. In the end it comes down to a group of intellectuals who initiate a "cognitive reorientation" in the 1950s, which includes a novel strategy of change and the identification of the young intelligentsia as the agent of this transformation—and when all these pieces fall into place, Bob's your uncle![106] Conspicuously absent from this top-heavy explanation are the actual body politic and its social conditions. This problem is aggravated by Schmidtke's decision to limit his analysis to the German SDS and the American Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).[107] To be sure, both formed the vanguard of the movement in their respective countries, but after all they represented just the tip of the iceberg. In addition, the decision to consider the diffusion of the New Left's ideas in two different national contexts is certainly plausible given the filter of specific cultural traditions through which these ideas were read. But it inevitably runs the risk of scratching only the surface of either national context. Thus, Schmidtke's endeavor to trace the effects of the American SDS's ideas in the civil rights movement predictably turns into an illustration of the latter's influence upon the SDS.[108] Not only does this result in a confusion as to who is sender and who receiver in the process of diffusion, but the focus on white, middle-class northern students also misrepresents the character of the civil rights movement and ultimately denies agency to African-American Southerners.[109] A similar example on the German side is the author's assertion, offered without much further ado, that the New Left provided the "cognitive orientation" for the opposition against the proposed Emergency Laws.[110] Although there was more

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105 See ibid., 109–124, 160–169, 225–240.

106 See ibid., 33–40.

107 In the German case, this aggravates the danger – pointed out recently by Stefan Hemler – of social movement theory degenerating into a mere intellectual history of the SDS. In order to steer clear of this danger, Hemler proposes to link social movement theory with a generational approach. This would allow for a closer analysis of milieus and life-worlds and might thus indeed permit a closer integration into social movement theory of actual social change. See Stefan Hemler: Soziale Bewegung oder Generationskonflikt? Ein Schlichtungsvorschlag im Deutungskampf um '1968', in: Vorgänge 42/4 (2003), no. 164, 32–40.

108 Schmidtke, 58–72.

109 See in particular John Dittmer: Local People. The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi, Urbana, Ill., 1994; Charles Payne: I've Got the Light of Freedom. The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle, Berkeley, Calif., 1995.

110 Schmidtke, 126–131, relying on a flawed analysis in Pavel A. Richter: Die Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1966 bis 1968, in: Gilcher-Holtey, 1968, 35–55.

interaction between students and workers in this campaign than is usually believed[111], it is doubtful that the latter's perception of reality corresponded with the ideological postulates of the SDS—apart from the fact that students and workers were only part and parcel of a much more heterogeneous opposition. Finally, among those topics that Schmidtke finds pertinent enough on both sides of the Atlantic to warrant a comparative analysis (reform of higher education, women's movement, identification with Third World liberation movements), he maintains that students opted for an alliance with national liberation movements only after their efforts at mobilizing a non-proletarian revolutionary subject had foundered.[112] Yet Rudi Dutschke and his antiauthoritarian friends were fascinated from the very beginning with liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, while the Black Power movement's inclination to regard African-American neighborhoods as colonial territory within metropolitan boundaries naturally found its vanishing point not so much in class but in race.[113] These examples suggest that Schmidtke may not have thoroughly researched every area that he subjects to his methodological approach.[114] He succeeds admirably in demonstrating that the historical relevance of the 1960s youthful departure "is to be found not so much in the activists' revolutionary ambitions and actions but in the secondary, often unintentional consequences their actions triggered."[115] However, his approximation of the legacies of '1968' gets stuck midway because his provisions for the journey are at the same time too meager (in his concentration on the two SDS) and too weighty (in his shouldering of both West Germany and the United States). Given this load, on the other hand, Schmidtke is surprisingly uninterested in examples of transnational diffusion between protest movements in these two countries.

Instances of intercultural transfer and transnational diffusion indeed warrant closer scrutiny, the recent proliferation of studies dealing with international or comparative aspects of the 1960s notwithstanding.[116] In a recent issue of the journal *Vorgänge*, Holger Nehring cau-

111   See Marica Tolomelli: "Repressiv getrennt" oder "organisch verbündet." Studenten und Arbeiter 1968 in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in Italien, Opladen 2001.

112   See Schmidtke, 263–283.

113   See Ingo Juchler: Die Studentenbewegungen in den Vereinigten Staaten und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland der sechziger Jahre. Eine Untersuchung hinsichtlich ihrer Beeinflussung durch Befreiungsbewegungen und -theorien aus der Dritten Welt, Berlin 1996; Clayborne Carson: In Struggle. SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s, Cambridge, Mass./London 1995, 226–228; William L. Van Deburg: New Day in Babylon. The Black Power Movement and American Culture, 1965–1975, Chicago/London 1993, 129–152.

114   Occasionally, this results in outright factual blunders. Most glaringly, when Schmidtke (96) explains that U.S. military aid to South Vietnam (supplied until 1975) ceased to be publicly acceptable after an NLF offensive in December 1972 (probably the North Vietnamese army's spring offensive that year) had expelled the Americans from Hanoi (where they had never been) and led to a peace treaty that ended the war (for the Americans, that is).

115   Ibid., 289–290.

116   See Gilcher-Holtey, 1968; Gilcher-Holtey: 68er-Bewegung; Marwick; Schmidtke; Suri; Tolomelli; Juchler; Etienne François et al. (eds.): 1968 – ein europäisches Jahr? Leipzig 1997; Carole Fink/Philipp Gassert/Detlef Junker (eds.): 1968 – The World Transformed, Washington, D.C./Cambridge 1998; Wolfgang Kraushaar: Die erste globale Revolution, in: Idem, 1968, 19–52; idem: Die transatlantische

tions us not to jump to conclusions in the face of superficial similarities. He maintains that among antinuclear activists and Easter marchers, national traditions were eventually decisive.[117] Certainly, protesters needed to connect their interpretation of global outrages to contemporary as well as past national experiences in order to find receptive audiences. The German SDS, for example, wanted to persuade Easter March organizers that the problem of nuclear armament had to be seen in the context of existing social conditions in West Germany.[118] Gradually, the antinuclear movement, hitherto dominated by religiously motivated pacifists, indeed evolved into a definitely oppositional force in German politics.[119] The SDS also made great strides to politicize the initially merely moral and humanitarian protest against the Vietnam War.[120] In fact, internationalists within the SDS portrayed the Vietnamese national liberation movement as the last best hope for change. Only if the imperialist strategy in Southeast Asia failed would other emancipation movements sprout up and disrupt the reproductive process of capitalism, thereby undermining the consumerist strategies responsible for Western workers' apathy. This theoretical framework added a domestic dimension to the Vietnam War. For some Berlin SDS members it provided such a strong source of identification with the Vietnamese that they were accused of having mentally migrated to Vietnam.[121] Conversely, one could argue that they relocated Vietnam in Germany. In a parallel development, protesters increasingly compared Vietnam and Auschwitz. This resurrection of Germany's past was not only meant to mobilize an apathetic West German public against the war, but also offered activists the chance to make up for the resistance that failed to materialize more than twenty years earlier against National Socialist atrocities.[122] The background of a specific national past helps to explain some of the characteristics of West German protest against the Vietnam War, not least its partial descent into terrorism in the 1970s.

Protestkultur, ibid., 53–80; Beate Fietze: "A spirit of unrest". Die Achtundsechziger-Generation als globales Schwellenphänomen, in: Rainer Rosenberg/Inge Münz-Koenen/Petra Boden (eds.): Der Geist der Unruhe. 1968 im Vergleich. Wissenschaft – Literatur – Medien, Berlin 2000, 3–25; Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey: Der Transfer zwischen den Studentenbewegungen von 1968 und die Entstehung einer transnationalen Gegenöffentlichkeit, in: Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 10 (2000), 485–500.

117 Holger Nehring: Die Anti-Atomwaffen-Proteste in der Bundesrepublik und in Großbritannien. Zur Entwicklung der Ostermarschbewegung 1957–1964, in: Vorgänge 42 (2003), no. 164, 22–31. See also Nehring's contribution to the present volume.

118 Eberhard Dähne: Aspekte unserer Arbeit, in: Neue Kritik 3 (1962), no. 12, 3–6. See also Thomas Leithäuser: SDS und Abrüstungsbewegung, ibid. 4 (1963), no. 18, 12–15; Edgar Wieck: Ostermarsch und Politik, ibid. 5 (1964), no. 21, 3–4; Egon Becker: Zur Politik der Kampagne für Abrüstung, ibid., no. 23, 17–19.

119 See Thomas, 37–40.

120 Ibid., 69–85.

121 See Lönnendonker/Rabehl/Staadt, 224–226, 281–282.

122 Wilfried Mausbach: Auschwitz and Vietnam. West German Protest Against America's War During the 1960s, in: Andreas W. Daum/Lloyd C. Gardner/Wilfried Mausbach (eds.): America, the Vietnam War, and the World. Comparative and International Perspectives, Washington, D.C./Cambridge 2003, 279–298.

Terrorism, to be sure, grew out of the increasingly violent-prone rhetoric of the student movement in the late 1960s. Yet, as with more benign consequences of the revolt, we should not easily infer a causal nexus between motives and outcomes here. After 1967, the maelstrom of mobilization and counter-mobilization carried away many certainties—and many an antiauthoritarian, too. It led Rudi Dutschke to advocate the damage of property and to envision an armed struggle if the latent repression of the system should turn into manifest violence and German troops should be deployed against emancipation movements either at home or abroad. This was a slippery slope given the difficulty of damaging property without hurting people, the insistence of many activists that the German government was already supporting American actions in Vietnam in various ways, and Dutschke's considerable vacillating regarding the question of violence.[123] Nevertheless, and in spite of all this rhetoric, an overwhelming majority of SDS members—not to speak of tens of thousands of other activists and millions of sympathizers—never thought of 'picking up the gun.'

Still, from the perspective of a culture of peace, ambivalences become apparent long before one reaches the stage of bank robberies, car bombs, and assassinations. In fact, some of the protest movement's rhetoric is reminiscent of what we have seen in the 1950s. Rudi Dutschke, for example, cultivated a highly militarist rhetoric derived from the language of class struggle. As early as February 1966, trying to justify a maverick action in which he and his friends put up antiwar posters, Dutschke introduced the Berlin chapter of the SDS to his adaptation of Che Guevara's focus theory, designating university campuses as "security zones" and envisioning tiny guerrilla units distinguished by supreme physical, moral and military training.[124] The SDS's federal executive, still dominated by traditionalists, imagined the Vietnam congress in Frankfurt in May 1966 as a major show of strength of the left (*Heerschau der Linken*). The following year, in discussions with Herbert Marcuse, the antiauthoritarians conjured up a new anthropology that was establishing a new attitude to life through struggle (*im Kampf eine neue Lebensauffassung*).[125] To them, pacifism was totally inadequate. If peace activists were unwilling to resign to their helplessness, they ultimately had to engage in active resistance, which—according to Dutschke—entailed efforts to redirect the aggression that manifested itself in the streets at home and in Vietnam onto those responsible for this aggression.[126] As Jost Dülffer recently put it, "The students' protest and especially their Vietnam protest was no longer a peace movement."[127] The movement's increasing militancy inevitable left its traces also in the language of later years. Dutschke, recuperating from his shooting, lamented that late capitalism had enticed the working class to surrender without a fight and

123 On the latter see Thomas, 149–150; Karl, 126–133, 253–256.
124 Dutschke's notes for his presentation are reprinted in Lönnendonker/Rabehl/Staadt, 235–237.
125 Ibid., 255–256, 479.
126 See Ein Gespräch über die Zukunft mit Rudi Dutschke, Bernd Rabehl und Christian Semler (Oktober 1967), in: Kursbuch 4 (1968), no. 14, 146–174, 160–161. See also Lönnendonker/Rabehl/Staadt, 392–397.
127 Jost Dülffer: The Anti-Vietnam War Movement in West Germany, in: Christopher Goscha/Maurice Vaïsse (eds.): La Guerre du Vietnam et l'Europe 1963–1973, Brussels/Paris 2003, 287–305, 303.

called for a renewed struggle to revive its pugnacious instincts.[128] He referred to perished companions as if they were fallen soldiers, killed in action—casualties of war.[129] From here, it seems to be a small step indeed to demands of jailed members of the Red Army Faction to be treated as prisoners of war.[130]

The importance of emotions and an occasionally bellicose rhetoric may not be the only parallels between West German protest movements in the 1950s and the 1960s. If we are to believe Bernd Rabehl, nationalism was an element as important in the 1960s as it had been during the previous decade. Indeed, Rabehl suggests that he and Dutschke understood themselves as national revolutionaries (*Nationalrevolutionäre*) eager to follow the example of Third World national liberation movements and rid the two Germanys of heteronomy at the hands of the Second World War's victors.[131] To be sure, there are some kernels of truth in Rabehl's argument. First of all, there can be no doubt that many protesters in the 1960s rejected the bipolarity of the Cold War.[132] In this denial of a geopolitical ossification that also stifled domestic debate, they took up a concern of their predecessors in the 1950s—a common thread that is not yet fully explored.[133] Neither is the extent to which early experiences in the GDR shaped the thinking of Dutschke, Rabehl, and other refugees from East Germany. There is ample evidence suggesting that the suppressed uprisings in Central Europe during the 1950s left a much stronger mark on this group than on their West German companions.[134] It is by now also well documented that Dutschke harbored much more concern for German reunification than most movement participants. At a meeting in a Berlin suburb in June 1967, he presented his idea of turning West Berlin into a Free City that would serve as a focus for a revolutionary transformation of both the FRG and the GDR, thus breaking up the bloc confrontation and enabling the reunification of Germany.[135] It seems that during the 1970s his

128 See Dutschke: Leben, 105: "(...) es gilt nur, die vom Spätkapitalismus organisierte Kampflosigkeit der Arbeiterklasse durch Kampf zu liquidieren." (July 19, 1969).
129 See ibid., 223, 227 (November 9 and 30, 1974).
130 See Thomas, 217.
131 Bernd Rabehl: Die Provokationselite, in: Lönnendonker/Rabehl/Staadt, 400–512, 428–429 and passim; Bernd Rabehl: Rudi Dutschke. Revolutionär im geteilten Deutschland (Perspektiven 6, ed. Karlheinz Weißmann/Götz Kubitschek), Dresden: Edition Antaios 2002, 132 pp., € 12.00 (pbk.), 7–9 and passim.
132 See e.g. Lönnendonker/Rabehl/Staadt, 13–14, 405, 421–422; Schmidtke, 13.
133 See Michael Frey: Confronting Cold War Conformity. The Peace Movement and the Early New Left in West Germany and the United States. Paper presented at an international conference held at the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., October 17–18, 2003; for a brief summary see the conference report by Martin Klimke/Carla MacDougall/Wilfried Mausbach: Atlantic Crossings? Transcultural Relations and Political Protest in Germany and the United States, 1958–1977, in: Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., no. 34 (Spring 2004), 184–189.
134 See e.g. Karl, 22–23, 261.
135 Dutschke's shorthand notes of the meeting are reprinted in Lönnendonker/Rabehl/Staadt, 355–366; see also ibid., 474–477; R. S. [Rudi Dutschke]: Zum Verhältnis von Organisation und Emanzipationsbewegung, in: Oberbaumblatt, no. 5 (June 1967), 1 and 4–6, reprinted in Wolfgang Kraushaar (ed.): Frankfurter Schule und Studentenbewegung. Von der Flaschenpost zum Molotowcocktail 1946–1995, 3 vols., Hamburg 1998, 2:255–260; Karl, 153–160.

interest in the German question even increased.[136] All this notwithstanding, however, there are grave problems with Rabehl's line of argument.

To begin with, Rabehl misrepresents the widespread rejection of Cold War politics among protesters, insinuating that it constituted a cultural repulsion of both Eastern and Western traditions. Apart from the fact that there is scant evidence for such reservations on the part of Dutschke or, for that matter, the protest movement as a whole, this position in fact revives German conservatism's traditional cultural conceit—a conceit that the younger generation in the 1960s actually tried hard to overcome. Rabehl maintains that both the FRG and the GDR represented mere colonies or vassals of their respective hegemonic powers in East and West. As for the latter, he writes: "Western Europe had shed the Enlightenment like a rotten fruit and, after 1945, was forced by the United States to reconstruct government and law according to the latter's principles. There were no social forces capable of bringing their own interests to bear, as in 1789, 1848 or 1917/18."[137] This, if you will pardon, is crude right-wing revisionism. Rabehl asserts that he and Dutschke wanted to take up national traditions and the legacy of the "European liberation struggles" of 1953 and 1956 in order to overcome the dominance of the "alien powers" (*Fremdmächte*) America and Russia.[138] But there is hardly any evidence that Rudi Dutschke perceived the front lines this way, and reverting to narrowly defined national traditions would have certainly made him an outcast rather than a leader of the movement.

In addition, we now know that the East German uprising in June 1953 would not have been particularly suitable as a point of reference for a genuinely European emancipation struggle—and certainly not one led by socialist convictions. For one, most historians agree that far from representing a worker's uprising, the events in 1953 involved large sections of East German society.[139] Furthermore, Gary Bruce has recently demonstrated that western democratic ideals were central to the demonstrators' actions.[140] These demonstrators, he maintains, took up examples of resistance and dissident views displayed by the anti-Marxist political parties of the Eastern zone from 1945 onwards. Although Bruce's work is grounded in meticulous archival research, some of his conclusions seem overdrawn. While there is a

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136 See Wolfgang Kraushaar: Rudi Dutschke und die Wiedervereinigung. Zur heimlichen Dialektik von Nationalismus und Internationalismus, in: Idem, 1968, 89–129; Karl, 267–272, 404–413.

137 Rabehl, Rudi Dutschke, 52.

138 See ibid., 7–8, 14–15, 63–67, 81, 96–97, 109–114; Rabehl, Provokationselite, 472–473. It might be of interest in this context that U.S. officials did not feel that the antiauthoritarians threatened the American position in Berlin, noting that "despite the number of demonstrations against U.S. policy in Vietnam, the radical groups never attempted in 1967 to direct their protests against the U.S. presence in Berlin." Morris to Department of State, Subject: U.S. Policy Assessment for West Berlin, January 30, 1968, POL 1 GER B-US, Box 2113, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF) 1967–1969, Record Group (RG) 59, National Archives, College Park, Md. (NA).

139 See Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk: 17. Juni 1953 – Arbeiteraufstand, Volksaufstand, Revolution. Aufstandsgeschichte, Forschungskontroversen und Erinnerungskultur, in: Internationale wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 39 (2003), 1–36.

140 Gary Bruce: Resistance with the People. Repression and Resistance in Eastern Germany, 1945–1955, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 2003, xiv + 287 pp., $75.00 (cloth).

lively debate within the field about what constituted reluctance, deviance, dissidence, opposition or resistance[141], Bruce uses the latter term even for the early postwar period when the non-Marxist parties still represented a legal if impeded opposition. Moreover, the juxtaposition of communist oppressors and democratic resisters begs the question of what happened to the majority of the region's population, which did not favor either communism or democracy prior to 1945. Bruce also fails to explain why most members of the anti-Marxist parties were brought into line by the Socialist Unity Party (SED) rather smoothly. Finally, Bruce's characterization of the 1953 events as a revolution, although echoing other recent studies[142], seems questionable. Even if we take for granted the breadth of the movement and its aim to topple the regime, its failure to take over more than a few token positions of power and its swift suppression still suggest that it is more accurately described as a revolutionary uprising rather than an outright revolution. Despite these shortcomings, Bruce presents abundant evidence of calls for western liberal-democratic freedoms and basic rights. This is substantiated by several essays in the already mentioned volume edited by Ulrich Herrmann.[143] In the end, then, there can be no doubt that many demonstrators in June 1953 risked their freedom (and sometimes their lives) for the very western values that Rabehl defames as foreign and purportedly wanted to overcome by employing the example of 1953.

Above and beyond all this, it is also misleading to put too much emphasis on Dutschke's longing for reunification. Rabehl implies that this was a prime concern of Dutschke's and repeatedly speculates why it was never really articulated in public.[144] The most plausible explanation, of course, is that it was simply not as central as Rabehl suggests. In fact, a closer look at the evidence reveals that Dutschke's nationalism always constituted a mere means to a higher end. Yes, the envisioned Free City of West Berlin might lead to reunification, but above all it was meant to be an example of democratic socialism, a beacon of hope not for German nationalists but for the *international* revolution in the metropolitan centers. In passing Rabehl actually admits that the concept was ultimately internationalist, and he quotes a diary entry by Dutschke, which explicitly characterizes the idea as "the real second front *for Vietnam*," making it clear that Dutschke continued to think in terms of world revolution.[145]

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141 This discussion, which at times seems to get tangled up in its own intricacies, can not be reviewed here. A useful summary can be found in Ehrhart Neubert: Was waren Opposition, Widerstand und Dissidenz in der DDR? Zur Kategorisierung politischer Gegnerschaft, in: Herrmann, 273–300. See also Rainer Eppelmann/Bernd Faulenbach/Ulrich Mählert (eds.): Bilanz und Perspektiven der DDR-Forschung, Paderborn 2003, 153–202; Ehrhart Neubert/Bernd Eisenfeld (eds.): Macht – Ohnmacht – Gegenmacht. Grundfragen zur politischen Gegnerschaft in der DDR, Bremen 2001.

142 See e.g. Bernd Eisenfeld/Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk/Ehrhart Neubert: Die verdrängte Revolution, Bremen 2003.

143 See Klaus-Dieter Müller/Jörg Osterloh: Eine studentische Widerstandsgruppe an der Universität Halle 1949/50 – im Spiegel persönlicher Erinnerungen und von NKWD-Dokumenten, in: Herrmann, 71–82; Patrik von zur Mühlen: Der "Eisenberger Kreis". Opposition und Protest gegen das SED-Regime in den frühen fünfziger Jahren, ibid., 107–134.

144 Rabehl: Provokationselite, 480, 503–505.

145 Rabehl: Rudi Dutschke, 73; idem: Provokationselite, 473. The diary entry of June 17, 1967, is in Dutschke, Leben, 53–54 (my emphasis).

Yet Rabehl insists on calling him a national revolutionary. In contrast and more accurately, Dutschke's longtime spouse, in her afterword to his published diary, has this to say about his attitude: "He was no 'national revolutionary' but an internationalist socialist, who—unlike others—realized that it was a political mistake to ignore the national question."[146]

Mistake or not, today's students of the peace and protest movements of the 1950s and 1960s would do well to dispense with the nation state; or, more precisely, with the notion that it comprised an insular and bounded culture. The inevitable hybridity of any 'national' tradition challenges us to pay more attention to intercultural transfers, i.e. to the circular processes by which ideas and social practices are imported, adapted to a particular context, reformulated or charged with new meaning, then retransmitted to start the cycle again. Peace research, in other words, should become more receptive not only to international perspectives but also to transnational and intercultural approaches.

Unquestionably, a fertile field for future research will be the numerous frictions that resulted from the clash between rapid socio-economic modernization and the postwar 'mentality overhang'. It should be rewarding to learn more about the ways in which this collision affected, informed, or even sparked various occurrences of protest. The divide between socio-economic progress and the adherence to traditional manners and values undoubtedly contributed to the charged emotional atmosphere accompanying many protest events. This divide, however, probably differed in its size and shape not only from country to country but also between urban and rural areas. We need to pay more attention both to these differences and to peripheral areas *per se*. Especially with regard to the 1960s, it is time to overcome the infatuation with the ideological vanguard populating the sociology departments of universities in metropolitan areas and instead take a closer look at more provincial places and more ordinary protesters. As a consequence, peace as a concern in its own right could be rescued from the tidal waves of countercultural protest and revolutionary upheaval. In the end, to be sure, it would be untenable to separate these currents. But a temporary isolation might be useful since the latter has hitherto enveloped the former to such an extent that we have neither a comprehensive study of West German opposition to the Vietnam War nor an adequate and systematic analysis of the Campaign for Disarmament.

The latter in particular could also reveal continuities between the 1950s and the 1960s, which have so far been neglected. As we have seen, there was strong nationalist sentiment in the peace movements of the 1950s but the antiauthoritarians of the 1960s were not immune to erratic flare ups of nationalism either.[147] Are we confronted here with disjointed interludes

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146   Nachwort von Gretchen Dutschke, ibid., 400. Michaela Karl's intellectual biography of Dutschke suggests a similar conclusion. Although she demonstrates that his understanding of the national question shifted over time and displayed an ominous affinity to right-wing nationalist sentiments in the late 1970s, it is clear from her analysis that at the end of the previous decade Dutschke, while supporting the Third World's revolutionary nationalism, saw no need for such nationalism in Germany. See Karl, 409–412, 153.

147   For an example from the early 1960s see Gerd Koenen: Vesper, Ensslin, Baader. Urszenen des deutschen Terrorismus, Cologne 2003, 29–31.

attributable to specific periods and circumstances or with a continuous thread running through the history of peace activism from the 1950s to the early 1980s? To what extent did this nationalist sentiment inform the criticism of Cold War bipolarity prevalent among peace activists throughout the second half of the twentieth century? How did this criticism itself change over time? Another continuous phenomenon is the bellicose rhetoric cultivated by some peace groups. The deep-seated causes of this paradox in mentalities and political socialization still warrant detailed exploration. Finally, the theme of emotions has emerged as an important ingredient in the confrontation between protesters, including pacifists, and state authorities or even the public at large. A closer examination of particular instances of protest might reveal the degree to which both the moral unconditionalness of the cause, which tends to endow peace activists with an excessive zeal, and other cultural, social or political conditions contribute to the emotionally charged nature of many encounters.

It goes without saying that the analysis of discourses acquires additional importance once we turn our attention to languages of dissent and the conditions of their communication. Such analyses can yield substantial insights not only into the mindset of peace and protest groups but also into the chances their concerns stood within society at large. The discursive conditions under which these concerns had to be articulated and the limits of acceptable speech should be as important to peace historians as the speakers themselves or their cause.[148]

Finally, Germany's peculiar situation as a divided country begs the question of how antagonistic political systems responded to the clash between socio-economic progress and traditional mentalities, which became increasingly virulent from the mid–1950s on. As we have seen, reactions to youthful deviance—symbolized by the adaptation of Anglo-American popular culture—at first revealed strikingly similar sentiments that began to diverge only slowly. Once discontent seemed to take on political dimensions, however, differences come into stark relief. Although the notion of East Germany as a closed-downed society (*stillgelegte Gesellschaft*)[149] disregards the effervescence of small circles in numerous niches and ultimately denies agency to ordinary East Germans, the regime nevertheless managed to corral these stirrings into closely delineated spaces.[150] The resulting fragmentation of society and the lack of a public sphere rendered the creation of any social movement impossible. East German peace activists, many of them certainly no less sincere than their western counterparts, could function as a 'movement' only under the tutelage of the regime. Protest always had to be voiced in unison with the government, not against it, as was the rule in the West.[151]

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148 See Ziemann: Perspektiven, 36–38.

149 Sigrid Meuschel: Überlegungen zu einer Herrschafts- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 19 (1993), 5–14.

150 See Thomas Lindenberger: Die Diktatur der Grenzen. Zur Einleitung, in: Idem (ed.): Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur. Studien zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR. Köln/Weimar/Wien 1999, 13–44.

151 This is a crucial difference that should not be lost among the many common difficulties confronting peace movements in East and West because of the structural conditions of the Cold War. On the latter see Günter Wernicke: Verbündete oder Rivalen? Einige Anmerkungen zur Diskussion über die Friedensbewegungen im Kalten Krieg, in: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 41 (1999), 62–

Still, if we return to various forms of deviance or tacit obstinacy (*Eigen-Sinn*) and view its protagonists as active subjects rather than just passive objects of political or social repression, there appears to be a curious parallel. People responded to the colonization of their life-worlds, whether attempted by a communist regime in the East or the culture industry in the West, by recontextualizing and redirecting the demands of either 'colonizer'. While East Germans integrated the *Jugendweihe*, a socialist rite of passage, into their private festivities regardless of its ideological content, West German youths appropriated consumer products and commercials and transformed them into tools of their own identity construction, and sometimes even of protest.[152] Perhaps these phenomena of interaction and appropriation can, after all, provide a few starting-points for a truly integrated social and cultural history of postwar Germany.

77; idem: The Communist-led World Peace Council and the Western Peace Movements. The Fetters of Bipolarity and some Attempts to Break Them in the Fifties and Early Sixties, in: Peace & Change 23 (1998), 265–311.

152 For the former see Ohse, 46–49, 232–235, 369–370; for the latter Wilfried Mausbach: "Burn, warehouse, burn!" Modernity, Counterculture, and the Vietnam War in West Germany, in: Axel Schildt/ Detlef Siegfried (eds.): Between Marx and Coca Cola. Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies, 1960–1980, New York (forthcoming).