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Right-Wing Populist Movements and Gender

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Content

Caner Tekin

Introduction: How do Right-Wing Populists come to Terms with Gender Today?

The 65th volume of the journal *Moving the Social* is a special edition dedicated to exploring gender stereotypes used by the far-right in public debates against migration and gender equality. More specifically, it gathers comparative insights into the relationships between gender perspectives, particularly gender equality and stereotyped gender images, and antimigration discourses of populist radical right parties in Europe and the Americas. It gives specific reference to the expressions of masculinity in discourses against (often Muslim) migrants and to the strategies of argumentation through which populist radical right camps justify masculist views. As such, the volume collects four articles written at the intersection of contemporary history, politics, populism studies and gender studies.

This thematically focused main part of the issue is supplemented by two further articles. One on "Framing in a Multicultural Social Movement: The Defence of the San Pedro Mezquital River", the other titled "Beyond Egalitarianism: Statistical Knowledge and Social Inequality in the German Democratic Republic". This is followed by an obituary on Alf Lüdtke. A review article of "Recent Publications on the History of Environmentalism" concludes the issue.

It is a commonplace argument that regardless of their ideologies, populist movements largely choose to forge their propaganda through the standpoint of 'the people'. Either defined as a strategy, a discourse, or even as a logic of anti-capitalist mobilisation, the emphasis on 'the people' always remains at the centre of populist arguments.[1] From

1 Tanja Wolf: Rechtsextreme und rechtspopulistische Parteien in Europa: Typologisierung und Vergleich, Wiesbaden 2019, pp. 108f.; Ghita Ionescu/Ernest Gellner: Introduction, in: Ghița Ionescu/Ernest Gellner (eds.): Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics, New York 1969, pp. 1–8, pp. 3f. For three known definitions of populisms connected to strategy, discourse and emancipation logic, see Kurt Weyland: Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics, in: Comparative Politics 34:1 (2001), pp. 1–22; Ruth Wodak: The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean, London 2015; Chantal Mouffe: For a Left Populism, London Verso 2018; Carlos de la Torre: Is Left Populism the Radical Democratic Answer?, in: Irish Journal of Sociology 27:1 (2019), pp. 64–71.

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this focus on people, the perhaps most frequently used definition of populism builds on a "thin-centred ideology", which draws binaries between the "pure people" and the "corrupt elites", with whom the former is dissatisfied.[2] In order to justify these concepts and the tensions in between, populist camps mostly need moral assumptions, as well as nativist and authoritarian ideologies.[3] After the emphasis on the people, the second relevant element of populism thus emerges to be the need of constructing moral distinctions between people and their others.[4] The difference between right-wing populism and other ideological variants of populism emerges with the representations of an enemy *vis a vis* the people.[5] Contrary to the left-wing populism that did not marginalise migrants but political and economic systems based on capitalism, right-wing populism primarily constructs moral binaries between the people and migrants.[6]

Gender perspectives then come to the fore, as they have so far given the populist camps leverage to further contextualise their moral justifications between the people and their 'antitheses'. Gender, defined as social constructs based on social structures, norms and institutions[7], has so far been mainly relevant for the populist radical right in two cases: defining the autochthonous or native gender images and the others. In regard to defining the native gender images, for a long time, radical right parties advocated patriarchal family structures and traditional family roles and remained uncompromisingly opposed to gender equality. For a long time, the far-right camps in Germany and Austria called gender awareness a 'madness', an ideology of dismantling the so-called 'natural' family values and dictating rules that were contrary to creation.[8]

2 Cas Mudde/Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser: Populism: A Very Short Introduction, New York 2017, p. 6.

3 Jan-Werner Müller: What is Populism?, Philadelphia 2016, pp. 24f.; Cas Mudde: The Populist Zeitgeist, in: Government and Opposition 39:4 (2004), pp. 541–563, p. 543.

4 Daniele Albertazzi/Duncan McDonnell: Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre, in: Daniele Albertazzi/Duncan McDonnell (eds.): Twenty-First Century Populism, New York 2008, pp. 1–14, pp. 10f.

5 Tanja Wolf: Rechtsextreme und rechtspopulistische Parteien in Europa, pp. 111–115.

6 Cas Mudde/Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser: Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America, in: Government and Opposition 48:2 (2013), pp. 147–174.

7 Lynn Hunt: Introduction: History, Culture, and Text, in: Lynn Hunt (ed.): The New Cultural History, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1989, pp. 1–22; Georgia Duerst-Lahti/Rita Mae Kelly: Introduction, in: Georgia Duerst-Lahti/Rita Mae Kelly (eds.): Gender Power, Leadership, and Governance, Ann Arbor 1995, pp. 1–9, pp. 5f.

8 Juliane Lang/Ulrich Peters: Antifeminismus in Deutschland. Einführung und Einordnung des Phänomens, in: Idem. (eds.): Antifeminismus in Bewegung: Aktuelle Debatten um Geschlecht und sexuelle Vielfalt, Hamburg 2018, pp. 13–36; Marion Loffler: Maskulinismus: Der ganz normale ‚Gender-Wahnsinn', in: Brigitte Bargetz/Eva Kreisky/Gundula Ludwig (eds.): Dauerkämpfe: Feministische Zeitdiagnosen und Strategien, Frankfurt 2017, pp. 185–194.

Fidesz in Hungary, since its taking office in 2010, sought to end gender awareness through, among other things, the closure of gender departments at Hungarian universities. The Freedom Party of Austria, one of the oldest far-right parties in Europe after the Second World War, increased the number of women assuming party positions in the last decades, but still remained the sworn defender of the traditional Austrian family, rejected abortion and same-sex marriages, and regarded gender equality and feminism as threats to Austrian society.[9] Overall, the populist radical right changed little concerning the given gender roles and patriarchal family structure.

The past two decades, however, also witnessed various radical right parties employing limited gender-sensitive vocabulary and masking their known stands against gender equality in an attempt to attract moderate voters and enlarge electoral bases. The National Rally from France, formerly known as the National Front, officially describes itself as a mass party essentially based on gender equality. Since she assumed chairpersonship of the party from her father in 2011, Marine Le Pen has begun a process called 'de-demonisation', aiming to deconstruct its previously masculine and patriarchal party image.[10] Although the National Rally had officially condemned abortion in 2011, the following year, it showcased a more tolerant attitude towards gender groups and even acknowledged same-sex marriage, provided couples were not allowed child adoption.[11] The party drastically increased its voter support through this de-demonisation process, but each time failed to gain victory, as the moderate voters united to

9 Carina Klammer/Judith Goetz: Between German Nationalism and Anti-Muslim Racism: Representations of Gender in the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), in: Michaela Köftig/Reneta Bitzan/Andrea Petö (eds.): Gender and Far Right Politics in Europe, Cham 2017, pp. 79–93; Natascha Strobl/Julian Bruns: Preparing for (Intellectual) Civil War: The New Right in Austria and Germany, in: Maik Fielitz/Laura Lotte Laloire (eds.): Trouble on the Far Right: Contemporary Right-Wing Strategies and Practices, Bielefeld 2016, pp. 105–110; Marion Loffler: Maskulinismus, pp. 187–189; Carina Klammer: Imaginationen des Untergangs: Zur Konstruktion antimuslimischer Fremdbilder im Rahmen der Identitätspolitik der FPÖ, Münster 2013.

10 Jean-Yves Camus/Nicolas Lebourg: Far-Right Politics in Europe (translated by Jane Marie Todd), Cambridge and Massachusetts 2017, pp. 200f.; Gilles Ivaldi: A new Course for the French Radical Right? The Front National and 'de-demonisation', in: Tjitske Akkerman/Sarah L. de Lange/Matthijs Rooduijn (eds.): Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream?, London 2016, pp. 225–246; Annie Benveniste/Etienne Pingaud: Far-Right Movements in France: The Principal Role of Front National and the Rise of Islamophobia, in: Gabriella Lazaridis/Giovanna Campani/Annie Benveniste (eds.): The Rise of the Far Right in Europe Populist Shifts and 'Othering', Basingstoke 2016, pp. 55–79.

11 Tjitske Akkerman: Gender and the Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Policy Agendas, in: Patterns of Prejudice 49:1–2 (2015), pp. 37–60, pp. 46f.; Francesca Scrinzi: A 'New' National Front? Gender, Religion, Secularism and the French Populist Radical Right', in: Michaela Köttig/Renate Bitzan/Andrea Petö (eds.): Gender and Far Right Politics in Europe, Basingstoke 2017, pp. 127–140, pp. 130f.

support the concurrent candidates in the second electoral rounds. Next to Marine Le Pen's leadership image appealing to female voters, some of the right-wing populist parties led by the Alternative for Germany, the Progress Party in Norway, the Danish People's Party, the Law and Justice Party in Poland and the Brothers of Italy, also chose to be represented by women, supposedly for electoral reasons. Contrary to these examples, the Party for Freedom from the Netherlands had presented itself as inherently gender-protective from the beginning. Since its foundation in 2006, the party's official programmes have arguably promoted various aspects of gender equality, including same-sex marriages and LGBTI (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender) rights.[12]

The actions and propaganda of radical right parties restrict their credibility in their gender-sensitive arguments. Today, it is commonly observed in Europe that the radical right parties still refuse to discuss the lack of gender equality in their respective countries and present it as a problem only seen in migrant communities.[13] In other words, these parties largely assume that gender equality is already achieved in European countries and manipulate gender issues to ground their assertions about Muslims' so-called 'noncongruence' with European values.[14] That is why populist radical right parties, in the end, face criticism from feminists and gender activists, the support of whom these parties aim to achieve. For example, the representatives of the feminist movement at the European level, the European Women's Lobby, rejected coming to terms with the radical right parties on the grounds that their ostensibly gender-sensitive positions served a xenophobic rationale.[15]

The manipulation of gender equality issues in oppositions to Muslim migrants is not a new state of affairs, but is strongly linked to the transformation of the political agenda in the West concerning debates about Muslim migrants. In Western Europe, breaking away from the ideological constraints of the Cold War, party politics converged on economic and political liberalism, and ideological conflicts were replaced by cultural issues, such as European integration, international migration, and diversity of migrants.[16] Globalising economic activities and communication also resulted in

12 Ulrike M. Vieten/Scott Poynting: Contemporary Far-Right Racist Populism in Europe, in: Journal of Intercultural Studies 37:6 (2016), pp. 533–540, p. 536; Tjitske Akkerman: Gender and the Radical Right in Western Europe.

13 Mieke Verloo: Gender Knowledge, and Opposition to the Feminist Project: Extreme-Right Populist Parties in the Netherlands, in: Politics and Governance 6:3 (2018), pp. 20–30, pp. 27f.

14 Cornelia Möser: Sexual Politics as a Tool to 'Un-Demonize' Right-Wing Discourses in France, in: Gabriela Dietze/Julia Roth (eds.): Right-Wing Populism and Gender: European Perspectives and Beyond, Bielefeld 2020, pp. 117–134, pp. 123f.

15 Pauline Cullen: From Neglect to Threat: Feminist Responses to Right Wing Populism in the European Union, European Politics and Society (2020), pp. 2–19, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2020.1801183.

16 Cas Mudde/Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser: Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism, pp. 147–174.

the internationalisation of norms and institutions concerning migration, which ultimately added to this transition.[17] Additionally, the 9/11 attacks in the United States and its aftermath in Europe directed the emphases of migration politics towards migrants from Muslim countries. European nation states began to stipulate integration criteria for Muslim migrants, in which gender equality was used as a yardstick of measuring how 'integrated' migrant communities are.[18] The debates over Islamic attire of women, commonly referred to as the veil, and its limitation in the public sphere dramatically exemplify the culturalisation of migration politics against Muslim migrants. One of the critical conclusions drawn by the EU-funded Veil Project conducted between 2006 and 2009 was that "regulating religious apparel for Muslim women relates to specific developments regarding the renegotiation of the self-definition of nation-states, in particular at a time when European nation-states are becoming increasingly heterogeneous in their ethnic, religious and cultural makeup".[19] Indeed, France and Germany, in the process of rebuilding national identity after the Cold War, attributed gender inequality to Muslim women's veil and came to restrict Islamic attire in the public sphere.[20] In other countries of Western Europe, the mainstream media and politics also increasingly discussed the concepts of migration, integration, and diversity through the prism of gender equality.

In response to party politics centred on cultural debates, the populist radical right parties of Western Europe attempted to reformulate their opposition to migration by stigmatising it as a phenomenon between receiving liberal democracies and illiberal migrant communities.[21] For many studies, a key event of this transition was the 9/11 attacks in the United States , after which populist radical right parties securitised migration on secular grounds and presented Islam as a threat to western nations.[22] The common propaganda emerged that Islamic values, and therefore migrants from Muslim countries, were inherently at odds with liberal democratic values, such as the

17 Hanspeter Kriesi/Edgar Grande/Romain Lachat/Martin Dolezal/Simon Bornschier/Timotheos Frey: West European Politics in the Age of Globalization, Cambridge 2008, p. 6; Randall Hansen: Globalization, Embedded Realism, and Path Dependence: The Other Immigrants to Europe, in: Comparative Political Studies 35:3 (2002), pp. 259–283.

18 Petra Rostock/Sabine Berghahn: The Ambivalent Role of Gender in Redefining the German Nation: Between Universalism and Rejection of the 'Other', in: Ethnicities 83:3 (2008), pp. 345–384, p. 358.

19 University of Vienna: Final Report Summary – VEIL (Values, Equality and Differences in Liberal Democracies. Debates about Female Muslim Headscarves in Europe) 028555, CORDIS Community Research and Development Information Service, at: https://cordis.europa.eu/docs/results/28/28555/124376731-6_en.pdf (accessed on 12 March 2021).

20 Birgit Sauer: Headscarf Regimes in Europe: Diversity Policies at the Intersection of Gender, Culture and Religion, in: Comparative European Politics 7:1 (2009), pp. 75–94.

21 Cas Mudde: Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, New York 2007, p. 84.

22 Cas Mudde/Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser: Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism, p. 24.

autonomy of the individual, democracy, emancipation of women, gender equality, LGBTI rights, freedom of expression, and separation of church and state.[23] Far-right parties in Western Europe, which were already notorious for their racist and xenophobic communication in in the past, came to devise suggestive election campaigns depicting all these negative images of Muslim migrants in order to cause public dismay. Owing to these propaganda the National Rally in France increased its voter support and the Northern League in Italy and the Freedom Party of Austria participated in coalitionary governments during the 2000s and 2010s.

In Eastern Europe, a different course of events influenced the migration policies of far-right parties.[24] Except in Serbia and Russia, populist radical right parties in Eastern Europe could not gain noteworthy success in the 1990s. A far-right victory became possible from the next decade onwards, not least because mainstream political parties, most prominently Fidesz in Hungary and Law and Justice in Poland, began to resort to radical populism and achieved electoral success through their propaganda targeting the European Union's liberal policies as well as ethnic minorities, especially Roma people.[25] With the rising refugee movements to Europe and the collapse of the EU's refugee regime in 2015, populist radical right movements in Eastern Europe also brought into focus Muslim migrants in party politics and propaganda, which represented women as the agents of reproduction.[26] As an example of these stereotypes, Fidesz and Law and Justice began to portray Muslim women as threats to the demographic future of Hungary and Poland and called on native-born women to bear children to counter Muslim migration.[27] Thus, Viktor Orbán, through tax exemptions, recently

23 Tjitske Akkerman: Anti-Immigration Parties and the Defence of Liberal Values: The Exceptional Case of the List Pim Fortuyn, in: Journal of Political Ideologies 10:3 (2005), pp. 337–354; Hans-Georg Betz: Against the 'Green Totalitarianism': Anti-Islamic Nativism in Contemporary Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, in: Christina Schori Liang (ed.): Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right, Aldershot 2007, pp. 33–54; Hans-Georg Betz/Susi Meret: Revisiting Lepanto: The Political Mobilization against Islam in Contemporary Western Europe, in: Patterns of Prejudice 43:3–4 (2009), pp. 313–334.

24 Cas Mudde: In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People: Populisms in Eastern Europe, in: East European Politics and Societies 14:2 (2000), pp. 33–53.

25 Ben Stanley: Populism in Central and Eastern Europe, in: Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser/Paul A. Taggart/Paulina Ochoa Espejo/Pierre Ostiguy (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Populism, Oxford 2017, pp. 140–160.

26 Lenka Buštíková: The Radical Right in Eastern Europe, in: Jens Rydgren (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right, New York 2018, pp. 565–581.

27 Elżbieta M. Goździak/Péter Marton: Where the Wild Things Are: Fear of Islam and the Anti-Refugee Rhetoric in Hungary and in Poland, in: Central and Eastern European Migration Review 7:2 (2018), pp. 125–151.

sought to encourage Hungarian women to have at least four children, in an attempt to strengthen the country's ethnic homogeneity against Roma and Muslim migrants.[28]

The stereotyped gender images thus partly originated from Islamophobia and constituted the arsenal with which populist radical right movements devised their visual and written propaganda against Muslim migrants. Publications hence address the moral differences constructed in these materials between the native and the migrant gender identity groups.[29] The common images of migrant women portray them as victims of Islamic subordination: in written and visual propaganda, Muslim women remain motionless figures whose distress is always visible. They are almost always covered by veils, which symbolise inferior migrant mentality disfavouring gender equality. Muslim men remained criminals and even sexual molesters harassing the autochthonous women in receiving countries. Propaganda drawing on gender stereotypes about Muslim migrants also attributes traditional images to the women of the receiving country. The native women in turn are the representatives of national pride, keen subjects of patriarchal family lives, or agents encumbered with reproduction to ensure survival of the nation.[30] In other words, as also noted in this volume, the populist radical opposition drawing on gender stereotypes evinces a paradigm in which Muslim migrants are essentially against gender equality and thus culturally inferior to western and European values. At the same time, it still propagates traditional and patriarchal gender roles that contrast with gender equality.

The main research themes used in the literature centred on Western European politics have largely been the victimisation of Muslim women, the criminalisation of Muslim men, and the objectification of native women.[31] In contrast, studies focussing

28 Shaun Walker: Viktor Orbán: No Tax for Hungarian Women with Four or More Children, in: the Guardian, 10.02.2019, at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/10/viktor-orban-no-tax-for-hungarian-women-with-four-or-more-children (accessed on 7 March 2021).

29 Floya Anthias: Transactional Mobilities, Migration Research and Intersectionality, in: Nordic Journal of Migration Research 2:2 (2012), pp. 102–110; Carina Klammer: Imaginationen des Untergangs: Zur Konstruktion antimuslimischer Fremdbilder im Rahmen der Identitätspolitik der FPÖ, Münster 2013, pp. 91f.; Carina Klammer/Judith Goetz: Between German Nationalism and Anti-Muslim Racism, p. 79. See also, Peter Morey/Amina Yaqin: Framing Muslims: Stereotyping and Representation after 9/11, Cambridge, MA 2011 and Brigitte Bargetz/Eva Kreisky/Gundula Ludwig (eds.): Dauerkämpfe: Feministische Zeitdiagnosen und Strategien.

30 Tjitske Akkerman/Anniken Hagelund: 'Women and Children First!' Anti-Immigration Parties and Gender in Norway and the Netherlands, in: Patterns of Prejudice 41:2 (2007), pp. 197–214; Hans-Georg Betz/Susi Meret: Revisiting Lepanto; José Pedro Zúquete: The European Extreme-Right and Islam: New Directions?, in: Journal of Political Ideologies 13: 3 (2008), pp. 321–344.

31 Ulrike M. Vieten: Far Right Populism and Women: The Normalization of Gendered Anti-Muslim Racism and Gendered Culturalism in the Netherlands, in: Journal of Intercultural Studies 37:6 (2016), pp. 621–636, pp. 621–625; Catherine Kinvall: Borders and Fear: Inse-

on how far-right camps conceptualise native men in their antimigration discourses are limited.[32] The present special edition, following the definition of masculinity as social construction of not only male dominance in gender hierarchy but also male hegemony over social relations[33], aims to address this gap. The articles in this special edition raise the following questions:

- In the face of the ostensibly gender-protective opposition against migration, what aspects of masculinity emerge in the populist right's antimigration discourse in contemporary politics?
- How do these aspects of masculinity structure gender hierarchies revealed by the populist radical right parties?
- How do positions voiced by political leaders, election campaigns and official party propaganda illustrate the stereotyped national and migrant gender images?

Dorothee Beck opens the discussion with her analyses of masculist narratives of externalisations of violence and migration in the mainstream media of Germany. She draws on the findings of her research project entitled *'Genderism' in Media Debate. Thematic cycles from 2006 to 2016*. Beck suggestively demonstrates that the mainstream media and populist radical right camps in Germany meet on masculinity concepts when they refer to Muslim migrants. The conservative and liberal print media partially includes articles and commentaries with masculist views, which were in fact shared and propagated by far-right parties. Beck demonstrates that the opinions voiced in her investigation construct violence as an external threat and connect it exclusively to the crimes reported in Cologne on New Year's Eve 2015. In doing so, the articles and commen-

curity, Gender and the Far Right in Europe, in: Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23:4 (2015), pp. 514–529; Sara R. Farris: Femonationalism and the 'Regular' Army of Labor Called Migrant Women, in: History of the Present 2:2 (2012), pp. 184–199; Liz Fekete: Enlightened Fundamentalism? Migration, Feminism and the Right, in: Race and Class 48:2 (2006), pp. 1–22; Stefanie Mayer/Edma Ajanovic/Birgit Sauer: Intersections and Inconsistencies. Framing Gender in Right-Wing Populist Discourses in Austria, in: NORA – Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research 22:4 (2014), pp. 250–266; Tjitse Akkerman: Gender and the Radical Right in Western Europe, pp. 37–60; David Paternotte/Roman Kuhar: Disentangling and Locating the 'Global Right': Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe, in: Politics and Governance 6:3 (2018), pp. 6–19.

32 Alice Blum: Men in the Battle for the Brains: Constructions of Masculinity Within the 'Identitary Generation', in: Michaela Köttig/Renate Bitzan/Andrea Petö (eds.): Gender and Far Right Politics in Europe, pp. 321f.

33 Jeff Hearn: From Hegemonic Masculinity to the Hegemony of Men, in: Feminist Theory 5:1 (2004), pp. 49–72; Georgia Duerst-Lahti/Rita Mae Kelly: On Governance, Leadership and Gender, in: Georgia Duerst-Lahti/Rita Mae Kelly (eds.): Gender Power, Leadership, and Governance, pp. 11–34, pp. 21–24.

taries present German men as guardians of the family and native women. The media partially defend the traditional values underpinning male hegemony in society and, thereby, connect to far-right arguments. In other words, masculist arguments function as a bridge between mainstream media and radical-right propaganda and, thus, serve the normalisation of far-right politics.

In the following article, Julia Roth further explores the argumentative ways in which populist radical right leaders in the Americas manipulate gender to justify not only masculist views, but also claims of occidental superiority over migrants. She discusses statements made by Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro and their use of a number of discursive patterns common in far-right discourse on gender. Furthermore, she also uses comparative examples from party elites of the Alternative for Germany. According to Roth, the given leaders reveal a modernisation paradigm, which positions the 'already emancipated' society *vis a vis* 'backward' Muslim migrants and gender groups. The criminalisation of male migrants mentioned in Beck's article concerning the German case also emerges in assertions made by the populist radical right in the Americas. This modernisation paradigm equally underpins traditional gender roles and a male-dominated gender hierarchy. To better understand the xenophobic, masculist and racist aspects of the investigated far-right arguments, Roth refers to the intersectionality logic, which gives insight into the overlapping nationalist, class-based, and gender-related exclusions of national and migrant gender groups.

Within far-right discourses, masculinities indeed do not only structure written or spoken arguments but also stylistic and performative expressions. Feyda Sayan-Cengiz and Selin Akyüz further contextualise this assumption with two cases from different cultural and historical contexts; they analyse argumentative methods employed by Fidesz in Hungary and its leader Viktor Orbán on the one hand and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands and its leader Geert Wilders on the other. The authors initially define 'political masculinities' and use this concept to approach the masculist arguments and performances embedded in propaganda for 'the people'. Programmatic statements and leaders' statements, as well as Orbán's and Wilders' gestures and emotions revealed in speeches, accordingly serve one aim: creating the image of a 'brave bad boy' who protects the Hungarian and Dutch 'peoples' against outsiders. Here, one can remember a generalisation drawn elsewhere: in Eastern Europe nationalism structures gender perspectives, but in Northern and Western parts of Europe it is rather the civilizational rhetoric about a Western cultural cosmos and liberal values that underpins gender arguments.[34] Two cases discussed by Sayan-Cengiz indeed point to differences, in the sense that Orbán accentuates the nation and its survival in his

34 Roger Brubaker: Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective, in: Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies 40:8 (2017), pp. 1191–1226.

masculist opposition to migration, whereas Wilders uses references to the Western civilisation, Judeo-Christian and liberal values, and freedom. Orbán stands for traditional and patriarchal family values. In contrast, Wilders presents himself as the sworn apologist of gender rights, which he deems part of the Western-Dutch civilisation. The influences of geographical and cultural spheres on the masculine performances of far-right leaders should thus be further researched. In conclusion, as the authors agree, investigating the masculinity performances of populist elites helps us to better understand the affective capacities of populist movements to mobilise masses.

My article, drawing on the comparisons between the Freedom Party of Austria and Northern League in Italy, is the last addendum to the debate about gender representations by populist radical right movements against Muslim migrants. I address common assumptions in populism and gender literatures regarding the far right's discursive changes over the past two decades. To this end, my article investigates the election propaganda of both parties since the early 2000s and locates representations of Muslim gender groups in visual and textual data. It demonstrates that both parties oriented their antimigration propaganda towards the rejection of Muslim migrants, not only in secular and gender-sensitive but also in ethnic and class-oriented terms. Party propaganda drew up a differentiation of migrants into Muslim criminal men and their female victims, which corroborates the arguments raised by Beck, Roth, Sayan and Akyüz regarding the externalisation of violence and criminal allegations against migrant men. A relevant question raised in the literature comes to attention, however. Namely, whether the populist radical right camps use these images and integrate Muslim women into the economic sectors that require a cheap labour force, e. g. the care sector.[35] The two parties' official propaganda evince their concerns about Italian and Austrian women's roles in family and reproduction and show signs of some limited tolerance of female migrants in the care sector. Still, it does not seem possible to answer the question whether these parties actually began to tolerate Muslim female workers because their propaganda did not suggest any positive conceptions of Muslim women in national labour markets.

The articles in this collection address problematic concepts raised by populist radical right camps in Europe and the Americas, such as the people and migrants, 'male saviours' of the people, criminal migrant men and victimised women. They also scrutinise the argumentative strategies which populist camps use to justify these stereotypes. As such, they add to the comparisons of far-right discourses drawing on differ-

35 Sara R. Farris/Francesca Scrinzi: 'Subaltern Victims' or 'Useful Resources'? Migrant Women in the Lega Nord Ideology and Politics, in: Jon Mulholland/Nicola Montagna/Erin Sanders-McDonagh (eds.): Gendering Nationalism: Intersections of Nation, Gender and Sexuality in the 21st Century, Cham 2018, pp. 241–257; Sara R. Farris: Femonationalism and the 'Regular' Army of Labor Called Migrant Women, pp. 184–199; Sara R. Farris: In the Name of Women's Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism, Durham 2018.

entiation between gender groups in the receiving country and migrant communities. Finally, the contributions underline the need for further comparative inquiries into the influences which local cultural and geographical factors exert on gender representations in populist radical right parties. They additionally call for studies exploring not only programmatic and rhetorical, but also performative and visual aspects of far-right discourses, since populist camps are more and more likely to rely on the latter facets.

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Dorothee Beck

A Bridge with Three Pillars. Soldierly Masculinity and Violence in Media Representation in Germany[1]

Abstract

The paper reflects on the externalisation of violence in media discourses about migration in Germany. I discuss in how far news media build discursive bridges to masculist and far-right groups. To this end, I draw on some of the findings of my research project *'Genderism' in Media Debate. Thematic cycles from 2006 to 2016.* Soldierly masculinity is seen as hegemonic in the far right. By means of an alleged crisis of masculinity and victimisation of men, this is linked to masculist concepts. The far right as well as masculists accuse women, especially feminists, of being to blame for the effeminacy of men. This crisis of masculinity is considered a problem, to which soldierly masculinity is offered as a solution. The findings of the mentioned genderism-project show that news media discuss the crisis of masculinity, as well as the blaming of feminists. Yet, they do not take up far-right concepts directly. Masculist views can be regarded as the central pillar of a discursive bridge between news media and far-right concepts of masculinity. I argue that the notion of a discursive bridge only works with masculist views as intermediary between news media and the far right. Thus, masculism is a crucial ideology to link far-right views regarding discourses in society.

Keywords: *soldierly masculinity*; *far right*; *masculism*; *crisis of masculinity*; *male resovereigning*; *externalisation of violence*; *discursive bridge*; *media discourse*

The sexual assaults on New Year's Eve in Cologne in 2015 have predominantly been ascribed to migrant men from Muslim, Arab or North African countries. The debate in German media was characterised by one main discursive figure: the statement that 'our' (white, autochthonous) women had to be defended against hypersexualised, criminal migrants with archaic views of gender relations. This figure constructed a racist and sexist dichotomy: on the one hand, a liberal and gender-equal society as a collective 'we', in which all doors are open to women, giving them the possibility

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to live as they please without any offense or threat. On the other hand, young men emerging from backward cultures, who take certain female attire, such as a mini skirt, as an invitation for sexual assault, who do not see women as equals, who are unwilling to integrate themselves into the receiving society, and thus serve as the 'others' to a liberal democracy and society.[2]

Yet, there is a second discursive figure, linked to the first one, but with a different focus and impact. According to this second figure, white autochthonous men have lost the ability and willingness to protect 'our' women against threats coming from abroad, namely from male Muslim migrants. In the first figure, 'our' society is imagined as gender equal. And it is this equality that must be defended (for the sake of 'our' women). Such a logic can be linked to postfeminist positions.[3] The second figure rather addresses the traditional gender hierarchy: men in their role as active protectors, women (and families) as passive objects to be protected against violent invaders from abroad. This figure, therefore, aims at *male resovereigning*.[4] Thus, it is open to interconnection with masculist and far-right concepts of masculinity and gender relations.[5]

There are several studies of right-wing groups' attempts to build thematic bridges to other parts of society.[6] Regarding gender, there have been different focuses on the idea of thematic bridges. Juliane Lang describes a 'hinge function' to topics which are relevant in gender or family policies. These policies link different positions from the

2 Denise Bergold-Caldwell/Barbara Grubner: Effekte der diskursiven Verknüpfung von Antifeminismus und Rassismus. Eine Fallstudie zu Orientierungskursen für neu Zugewanderte, in: Annette Henninger/Ursula Birsl (eds.): Antifeminismen. ‚Krisen'-Diskurse mit gesellschaftsspaltendem Potenzial?, Bielefeld 2020, pp. 149–192; Gabriele Dietze: Das ‚Ereignis Köln', in: femina politica 25:1 (2016), pp. 93–102.

3 Critical: Elisabeth Klaus: Anti-Feminismus und konservativer Feminismus – eine Intervention, in: feministische studien 26:2 (2008), pp. 176–186; Angela McRobbie: Top Girls: Feminismus und der Aufstieg des neoliberalen Geschlechterregimes, 2nd ed., Wiesbaden 2016.

4 Edgar Forster: Männliche Resouveränisierungen, in: feministische studien 24:2 (2006), pp. 193–207. By the term 'male resovereigning' Edgar Forster describes processes of (re-) producing different modes of patriarchal structures.

5 Hinrich Rosenbrock: Die anti-feministische Männerrechtsbewegung: Denkweisen, Netzwerke und Online-Mobilisierung, Berlin 2012, URL: https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/antifeministische_maennerrechtsbewegung.pdf (accessed on 4 March 2021); Birgit Sauer: Gesellschaftstheoretische Überlegungen zum europäischen Rechtspopulismus. Zum Erklärungspotenzial der Kategorie Geschlecht, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 58:1 (2017), pp. 1–20, at: https://doi.org/10.5771/0032-3470-2017-1-3 (accessed on 4 March 2021); Idem.: Authoritarian Right-Wing Populism as Masculinist Identity Politics. The Role of Affects, in: Gabriele Dietze/Julia Roth (eds.): Right-Wing Populism and Gender. European Perspectives and Beyond, Bielefeld 2020, pp. 23–40.

6 Overview: Fabian Virchow: ‚Rechtsextremismus': Begriffe – Forschungsfelder – Kontroversen, in: Fabian Virchow/Martin Langebach/Alexander Häusler (eds.): Handbuch Rechtsextremismus, Wiesbaden 2017, p. 7.

far-right, the conservative or religious right to the civic mainstream.[7] Eszter Kováts and Maari Põim discuss gender as a 'symbolic glue' unifying different rightist traditions like anti-EU (European Union), anti-liberal, anti-communist, anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant and homophobic attitudes.[8] My paper focusses on the role of the print media in this phenomenon: how do those media represent certain topics to interconnect different societal or political groups? This is to understand in which respect taboos are being broken in societal debates to popularise and reinforce far-fight narratives. To stress this aspect, I use the term 'discursive bridge'.

In the project *'Genderism' in Media Debate. Thematic Cycles from 2006 to 2016*, a small set of articles mostly referring to the Cologne incidents was framed by the discursive figure of soldierly masculinity.[9] In the present paper, these articles are analysed to discuss male resovereigning. While one side of this discursive bridge—namely the function of anti-gender discourse in the far-right—has already been researched intensively, the aim of my paper is to analyse liberal and conservative news media that serve as the other bridgehead of this discourse.

To elaborate on my argument, I first provide key definitions of basic terms. I then summarise the construction of masculinities, which are dominant in the far-right as well as in masculist groups, focusing on their interconnections and tensions. In this context, I reflect on the relevance of violence. This comprises the use of violence, the threat of violence and the externalisation of violence.[10] Subsequently, I discuss selected findings of the research project *'Genderism' in Media Debate*. The focus is on gender images of the man as protector, as well as on enemy images and the legitimacy of using violence. The last section reflects on the analytical benefits of using the notion of a *discursive bridge* to understand how media link with far-right concepts of masculinities.

7 Juliane Lang: Familie und Vaterland in der Krise. Der extrem rechte Diskurs um Gender, in: Sabine Hark/Paula-Irene Villa (eds.): Anti-Genderismus: Sexualität und Geschlecht als Schauplätze aktueller politischer Auseinandersetzungen, Bielefeld 2015, p. 174.

8 Eszter Kováts/Maari Põim (eds.): Gender as symbolic glue. The position and role of conservative and far right parties in the anti-gender mobilizations in Europe, Budapest 2015, p. 77, at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/11382.pdf (accessed on 4 March 2021).

9 Dorothee Beck: Arenen für Angriffe oder Arenen der Akzeptanz? Medien als Akteure in ‚Genderismus'-Diskursen, in: Annette Henninger/Ursula Birsl (eds.): Antifeminismen, pp. 61–104; in this project, a content analysis as well as a frame analysis of gender-related media articles and their readers' comments was conducted. The sample comprised articles that included compounds of the term 'gender'. It was collected in the leading newspapers *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Die Welt* (both conservative), *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (liberal) and the online service *Spiegel online* (liberal). It was funded by the Hessen State Ministry of Higher Education, Research and Art.

10 The term 'externalisation' describes the process of shifting the violence that exists within a society onto persons and groups marked as racial or cultural 'others'.

Key Definitions: The Far Right and Masculism

There are different terms for the rightist political spectrum, primarily the far (or extreme) right, the 'new' right, right-wing extremism, right-wing populism. Although there are multifaceted scholarly debates of the aspects and definitions of these terms there are some basic categories. These are racial or ethnic homogeneity and a biologistic justification of social inequality that is presented as 'natural'. According to Fabian Virchow, this is the basis of the racist, anti-Semitic, antifeminist, homophobic and elitist programmatics of the far right.[11] In this paper, the antifeminist aspect is focussed upon. Birgit Sauer describes right-wing populism as a "gendered issue" that is "rooted in a fundamental transformation of gender regimes, especially in Western bread-winner-oriented societies".[12] The decline of men's formerly widespread role as the sole providers for families "was accompanied by the erosion of hierarchical gender regimes and of male dominance in the private sphere as well as in the public sphere".[13] The far right can thus be understood as a countermovement to these developments. Hence, antifeminism is a central aspect of far-right ideology. It constructs a dichotomy between 'normal people' on the one hand and 'mighty feminists' on the other. The latter are perceived as guilty of effeminising autochthonous men.[14]

Sauer employs the term 'right-wing populism', stressing the political strategy of spreading racist, nationalist, *völkische*[15] and sexist ideologies.[16] By means of this term, Sauer seeks to point out a strategic innovation: the discursive use of chains of equivalence for the antagonism of 'us', i. e., 'the people', versus 'the elite'.[17] The term 'right-wing extremism', in the German debate, is often linked to the popular metaphor of a horseshoe. This metaphor positions extremism as parallel lines, which figuratively cross somewhere in the distance, on either side of the political spectrum. I disagree with this notion in two respects: first, it suggests an accord of opposing political ideologies (left and right). Second, it suggests that anti-liberal and anti-democratic atti-

11 Fabian Virchow: ‚Rechtsextremismus': Begriffe – Forschungsfelder – Kontroversen, p. 10.
12 Birgit Sauer: Autoritarian Right-Wing Populism as Masculist Identity Politics, p. 29.
13 Ibid.
14 Suvi Keskinen: The 'crisis' of white hegemony, neonationalist femininities and antiracist feminism, in: Women's Studies International Forum 68 (2017), pp. 157–163.
15 There is no English equivalent to the German word *völkisch*. It does not only mean nationalist but also includes the notion of ethnic purity and blood-and-soil-ideology.
16 Birgit Sauer: Gesellschaftstheoretische Überlegungen zum europäischen Rechtspopulismus; Idem.: Rechtspopulismus als maskulinistische Identitätspolitik, in: Dorothee Beck/Annette Henninger (eds.): Konkurrenz für das Alphamännchen? Politische Repräsentation und Geschlecht, Roßdorf 2020, pp. 135–154.
17 Birgit Sauer: Gesellschaftstheoretische Überlegungen zum europäischen Rechtspopulismus, p. 2, fn 2.

tudes are only situated on the fringes of the political spectrum whereas, in the political centre, everything is alright. Yet, as I will show below, these attitudes originate from the political centre.[18] Although there are critical concepts of the term 'right-wing extremism',[19] I want to avoid any reference to the horseshoe metaphor. That is why I employ the term 'far right'—not least as the term 'new right', mentioned above, is a self-designation of far-right groups, who want to avoid being linked to the crimes committed by the German Nazis.[20]

The second reference group in this paper are masculists, also called masculinists. Robert Claus defines them as middle-class, partly conservative, and antifeminist adherents of men's politics. Masculi(ni)sm combines criticism of feminism, which is supposedly hostile towards men, with subtle or obvious misogyny and the call to strengthen traditional concepts of masculinity. It rejects feminist theories, addresses alleged oppression of males and wants to resovereign male self-confidence.[21] Yet, we can distinguish masculism from masculinism. Eva Kreisky and Georg Spitaler define masculinism as an ideology, which justifies and supports male and patriarchal supremacy, and which is quite resistant to change over time.[22] Andreas Kemper refers to masculism as a variation of masculinism.[23] According to him, its goal is to push back 'femocracie', i. e., alleged female domination. Thus, the core of masculi(ni)sm is antifeminism[24], defined as an antonym to an understanding of feminism that is critical of power and domination that refers to democracy and that is intersectional. This understanding of feminism aims at breaking down hierarchies, as well as at the liberalisation and deconstruction of norms of gender relations.[25] All this is rejected by masculists. Hinrich Rosenbrock states that masculist groups do not define masculinity at all. Yet,

18 See also: Margot Vogel Campanello: Männlichkeit und Nationalismus, Zürich 2015, pp. 18f.

19 Fabian Virchow: ‚Rechtsextremismus': Begriffe – Forschungsfelder – Kontroversen.

20 Martin Langebach/Jan Raabe: Die ‚Neue Rechte'in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Fabian Virchow/Martin Langebach/Alexander Häusler (eds.): Handbuch Rechtsextremismus, pp. 561–592.

21 Robert Claus: Maskulismus. Antifeminismus zwischen vermeintlicher Salonfähigkeit und unverhohlenem Frauenhass, Berlin 2014, p. 17, URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/dialog/10861.pdf (accessed on 4 March 2021).

22 Eva Kreisky/Georg Spitaler: Rechte Fankurve oder Fankurve der Rechten? Fußballfans, Rechtsextremismus und Männlichkeit, in: Robert Claus/Esther Lehnert/Yves Müller (eds.): Was ein rechter Mann ist… Männlichkeiten im Rechtsextremismus, Berlin 2010, p. 199.

23 Andreas Kemper: Die Maskulisten. Organisierter Antifeminismus im deutschsprachigen Raum, Münster 2012, p. 9.

24 Hinrich Rosenbrock: Die anti-feministische Männerrechtsbewegung, p. 26.

25 Juliane Lang/Christopher Fritzsche: Backlash, neoreaktionäre Politiken oder Antifeminismus? Forschende Perspektiven auf aktuelle Debatten um Geschlecht, in: feministische studien 36:2 (2018), pp. 335–346, at: https://doi.org/10.1515/fs-2018-0036 (accessed on 4 March 2021).

they lay claim to sole representation of all men. Thus, antifeminism on the one hand, functions as the leading ideology of otherwise heterogeneous groups.[26] On the other hand, it provides a link to far-right ideas.[27]

Masculinities in the Far Right and in Masculism: Interconnections and Tensions

At a rally in Erfurt in November 2015, Björn Höcke, the most influential representative of the fascist *Flügel* (wing) of the far-right party *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD, Alternative for Germany) stated: „We must rediscover our masculinity. Only if we rediscover our masculinity, will we become manful. And only if we become manful, will we be valorous, and we must become valorous, dear friends."[28]

The attributes "manful" (*mannhaft*) and "valorous" (*wehrhaft*)[29] refer to soldierly behaviour. Soldierly masculinity is a hegemonic discourse in the far right. In German society, it was hegemonic before the Second World War but lost this status after the total collapse of the Nazi-regime in 1945.[30] According to Raewyn Connell, hegemonic masculinity is a practice used to legitimise the dominant status of men. This dominant structure is twofold: it subordinates women and other genders, but also other males. Connell assumes one hegemonic masculinity in the society.[31] Contrary to this, I consider different hegemonic concepts in specific societal fields. Hence, I regard soldierly masculinity as hegemonic in the far right. In consequence, other masculinities, like, according to Connell, subordinated, marginalised or complicit ones, can also have a field-specific character.

26 Hinrich Rosenbrock: Die anti-feministische Männerrechtsbewegung, pp. 25f.

27 Alva Träbert: At the Mercy of Femocracy? Networks and Ideological Links Between Far-Right Movements and the Antifeminist Men's Rights Movement, in: Michaela Köttig/Renate Bitzan/Andrea Petö: Gender and Far Right Politics in Europe, Cham 2017, pp. 273–288.

28 „Wir müssen unsere Männlichkeit wiederentdecken. Denn nur wenn wir unsere Männlichkeit wiederentdecken, werden wir mannhaft. Und nur wenn wir mannhaft werden, werden wir wehrhaft, und wir müssen wehrhaft werden, liebe Freunde!" (translated by the author), at: https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Bjoern-Hoecke-in-sieben-Szenen-article19700681.html (accessed on 4 March 2021).

29 The German word *wehrhaft* means willing to and capable of bearing arms. Karen Hagemann translates it as "valorous", knowing that this is not absolutely exact. See Karin Hagemann: Of "Manly Valor" and "German Honor": Nation, War, and Masculinity in the Age of the Prussian Uprising Against Napoleon, in: Central European History 30:2 (2008), pp. 187–220, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008938900014023 (accessed on 4 March 2021).

30 Fabian Virchow: Tapfer, stolz, opferbereit – Überlegungen zum extrem rechten Verständnis ‚idealer Männlichkeit', in: Robert Claus/Esther Lehnert/Yves Müller (eds.): Was ein rechter Mann ist…, pp. 39–52.

31 Raewyn W. Connell: Masculinities, 2nd ed., Los Angeles 2005, pp. 76–81.

Soldierly masculinity is characterised by heterosexuality, formation of a traditional nuclear family, service to the nation, military attitude, unwillingness to compromise, as well as behaving like a leader. Military attitudes are hardness, willingness to make sacrifices, defiance of death, bravery, toughness, vim, and stamina.[32]

Central points of reference to soldierly masculinity are the nation, an external enemy and violence. State morality is imagined as masculine, whereas family morality is feminine, both in a naturalised and essentialised understanding.[33] As the procreator of the nation, the white autochthonous woman's body belongs to the nation. It symbolises the nation's border and must be protected.[34] 'Woman' in this context only means 'white woman'. Migrant women are de-gendered and rendered invisible[35], whereas migrant men are imagined as inescapably different, i. e., archaic with regard to gender and sexuality.[36] There is a close discursive link between crime, sexual assault, and migrant men.[37] The racialised and sexualised male 'other' is a threat not only to autochthonous women, but also to the nation as a whole. This 'external enemy' evokes a second representation of the nation's border, namely sexualised violence, by which the female body is threatened.[38] Therefore, autochthonous men do not only act as protectors of 'our' women, but also as guardians of racial purity of the nation[39], or as white border guard masculinities, as Suvi Keskinen calls it.[40] Using violence, for them, is justified. Gender-based personal violence within our society remains muted.

32 Fabian Virchow: Tapfer, stolz, opferbereit, p. 42.

33 Yves Müller: Gegen Feminismus und ‚Dekadenz' – die Neue Rechte in der Krise?, in: Robert Claus/Esther Lehnert/Yves Müller (eds.): Was ein rechter Mann ist…, p. 75.

34 Maja Sager/Diana Mulinari: Safety for whom? Exploring femonationalism and care-racism in Sweden, in: Women's Studies International Forum 68 (2018), pp. 150f.

35 Ibid., p. 153.

36 Suvi Keskinen: The 'crisis' of white hegemony, neonationalist femininities and antiracist feminism, p. 158.

37 Gabriele Dietze: Das ‚Ereignis Köln'; Maja Sager/Diana Mulinari: Safety for whom?, p. 152.

38 Suvi Keskinen: The 'crisis' of white hegemony, neonationalist femininities and antiracist feminism, p. 157.

39 Renate Bitzan: Research on Gender and the Far Right in Germany Since 1990: Developments, Findings, and Future Prospects, in: Michaela Köttig/Renate Bitzan/Andrea Petö: Gender and Far Right Politics in Europe, pp. 72f.; Hans-Gerd Jaschke: Strategien der extremen Rechten in Deutschland nach 1945, p. 118; Ulrich Overdieck: Der Komplex der ‚Rassenschande' und seine Funktionalität für Männlichkeitskonstruktionen in rechtsextremen Diskursen, in: Robert Claus/Esther Lehnert/Yves Müller (eds.): Was ein rechter Mann ist…, pp. 100–108; Fabian Virchow: Tapfer, stolz, opferbereit, p. 49.

40 Suvi Keskinen: Antifeminism and white identity politics. Political antagonisms in radical right-wing populist and anti-immigration rhetoric in Finland, in: Nordic Journal of Migration Research 3:4 (2013), pp. 225–232.

There are other, partly modernised, masculinities in political far-right groups.[41] There is the modern man of action, whom Jörn Hüttmann describes as another hegemonic model of masculinity.[42] Nils Schuhmacher identifies three types of far-right masculinities: first, the thug, who can be classified as subordinated masculinity, who wants to subjugate other subordinated masculinities. Second, the political soldier, who resorts to violence in an instrumental manner. Third, the performer, who displays assertiveness without necessarily exercising violence.[43] Renate Bitzan observes the prevalence of soldierly masculinity and, at the same time, a simultaneity of modernisation and re-traditionalisation of masculinities on the far right, causing inconsistencies.[44]

The same inconsistencies can be observed with regard to to femininity. The spectrum of discourses and policies on this topic in far-right parties and groups across Europe has become wider. There are well-known female far-right leaders, as well as young female activists.[45] Despite that, for Sauer, soldierly masculinity is one of the main driving forces behind the rise of right-wing-populism in Europe.[46] Soldierly masculinity as a manner of male resovereigning seems to be attractive especially for men who feel deprived of their vested privileges. In their view, this is due to equal opportunity policies for women as well as to the liberalisation of gender relations in society. According to Kurt Möller, attitudes of men on the far right of the political spectrum show a tension between a claim to a hegemonic status on the one hand, and experiences of marginalisation on the other.[47] Far-right men seem to see themselves as the embodi-

41 Renate Bitzan: Geschlechterkonstruktionen und Geschlechterverhältnisse in der extremen Rechten, in: Fabian Virchow/Martin Langebach/Alexander Häusler (eds.): Handbuch Rechtsextremismus, pp. 347–51; Andreas Heilmann: Normalisierung und Aneignung – Modernisierung und Flexibilisierung von Männlichkeiten im Rechtsextremismus, in: Robert Claus/Esther Lehnert/Yves Müller (eds.): Was ein rechter Mann ist…, pp. 53–66.

42 Jörn Hüttmann: Männlichkeitsdiskurse in der Deutschen Stimme, in: Ursula Birsl (ed.): Rechtsextremismus und Gender, Opladen 2011, pp. 147–169.

43 Nils Schuhmacher: ‚Mit den Leuten zusammen kann man wirklich schon was darstellen' Über verschiedene Wege in rechte Jugendcliquen, in: Ursula Birsl (ed.): Rechtsextremismus und Gender, pp. 265–280.

44 Renate Bitzan: Research on Gender and the Far Right in Germany Since 1990, pp. 72f.

45 Judith Goetz: „Postergirls" und „White Power Barbies". Zur ambivalenten Sichtbarkeit *identitärer* Frauen [italics in original text], in: Dorothee Beck/Annette Henninger (eds.): Konkurrenz für das Alphamännchen?, pp. 199–217; Maja Sager/Diana Mulinari: Safety for whom?; Suvi Keskinen: The 'crisis' of white hegemony, neonationalist femininities and anti-racist feminism, pp. 157–163; Michaela Köttig/Renate Bitzan/Andrea Petö: Gender and Far Right Politics in Europe.

46 Birgit Sauer: Authoritarian Right-Wing Populism as Masculinist Identity Politics; Idem.: Gesellschaftstheoretische Überlegungen zum europäischen Rechtspopulismus; Idem.: Rechtspopulismus als maskulinistische Identitätspolitik.

47 Kurt Möller: Männlichkeitsforschung im Rahmen von Rechtsextremismusstudien. Ausgangspunkte, Ansätze, Ergebnisse und Perspektiven, in: Robert Claus/Esther Lehnert/Yves Müller (eds.): Was ein rechter Mann ist…, pp. 25–38.

ment of "true masculinity".[48] Thus, activism in extreme right organisations would be a beneficial way for self-assertion.[49] In this respect, self-assertion might function as a link to masculist concepts of masculinity.

Historically, male patriarchal supremacy, mostly in the shape of soldierly masculinity, was the starting point for masculinism around the turn of the nineteenth century.[50] With the collapse of the Nazi-regime in Germany, soldierly masculinity fell into disrepute.[51] Nowadays, male supremacy has remained the vanishing point of masculist dreams in view of a perceived crisis of masculinity.[52] The assertion of this crisis entails a discourse of victimisation of men.[53]

This discourse of victimisation focuses on different groups. Boys are regarded as disadvantaged in education, regardless of intersectional influences like class or migration background. This discourse refers to the fact that the majority of teachers are female; their pedagogical methods are reproached for supposedly prioritising girls.[54] Unmarried and divorced fathers are said to be discriminated against in the assigning of child custody. Men in general are said to be discriminated against by equal opportunities policies for women, for example on the labour market.[55] These reforms have been introduced to improve women's inclusion in important sectors of society. In addition, there have been reforms to liberate the heteronormative gender order. Yet,

48 Eva Kreisky/Georg Spitaler: Rechte Fankurve oder Fankurve der Rechten?; See also Hedwig Dohm: Die Antifeministen. Ein Buch der Verteidigung, Frankfurt/Main 1976.

49 Fabian Virchow: Tapfer, stolz, opferbereit, p. 46.

50 Eva Kreisky/Georg Spitaler: Rechte Fankurve oder Fankurve der Rechten?; See also Hedwig Dohm: Die Antifeministen. Ein Buch der Verteidigung.

51 Fabian Virchow: Tapfer, stolz, opferbereit.

52 The term 'crisis of masculinity' refers to multi-dimensional changes in the gender order, above all the erosion of the earner-carer-model in the production and reproduction spheres, liberalisations of ways of living together, sexuality and desire, as well as the gendering of power and hierarchies in society, politics and economy. Although these dimensions may bear some critical aspects, there is no evidence to support the idea that the gender order in general is in a manifest state of crisis. Yet, masculists refer to these changes in terms of threat and breakdown. Their aim, according to Claus, is to maintain privileges and to prevent the loss of male power. Annette Henninger et al.: Krise der Geschlechterverhältnisse oder Krisenrhetorik? Antifeministische Bedrohungsszenarien aus regulationstheoretischer Perspektive, in: Annette Henninger/Ursula Birsl (eds.): Antifeminismen, pp. 355–386; Robert Claus: Maskulismus.

53 Elli Scambor/Daniela Jauk: ‚Mander es isch Zeit.' Antifeministische Positionen im österreichischen Männerrechtsdiskurs, in: Juliane Lang/Ulrich Peters (eds.): Antifeminismus in Bewegung. Aktuelle Debatten um Geschlecht und sexuelle Vielfalt, Hamburg 2018, pp. 159–188.

54 Thomas Viola Rieske: Bildung von Geschlecht. Zur Diskussion um Jungenbenachteiligung und Feminisierung in deutschen Bildungsinstitutionen, Frankfurt/Main 2011.

55 Hinrich Rosenbrock: Die anti-feministische Männerrechtsbewegung, pp. 67–82; Suvi Keskinen: The 'crisis' of white hegemony, neonationalist femininities and antiracist feminism, pp. 157–163.

in the masculists' view, the reforms resulted in the discrimination of men, either as an effect of excessive equal opportunities policies, or as a strategic aim of powerful femocratic lobbies.[56] In brief, the shared concept of the masculists' enemy is feminism (in general), as well as *the* feminists and *the* women's movement, presupposing that they are all identical and that there is only one powerful feminism and one powerful women's movement.[57] Self-defence, therefore, seems justified to them, even acts of violence like hate speech, verbalised phantasies of rape or the intention to publish the addresses of women's refuges.[58] The racist attacks in Halle, on 9 October 2019, and in Hanau, on 19 February 2020, must be seen in the same context. The assassins tried to legitimise their deeds, referring, amongst other things, to an alleged female domination.

In this context, the two discursive figures mentioned at the beginning of the present paper, can be recognised. According to the first one (equality as being achieved), in history, feminism was justified and fought for important rights. But today, equal opportunities policies are useless and lead to the discrimination of men.[59] The second figure assumes male supremacy in a gender hierarchy that is built on the idea of gender characteristics as being natural. In this concept gender inequalities are legitimised by nature, by the order of creation or by god.[60]

In far-right groups, the alleged crisis of masculinity and the discourse of victimisation are not as dominant as in masculist contexts. Yet, there is a certain relevance. As in masculist discourse, boys are regarded as educationally disadvantaged. There are narratives of men emasculated by gender mainstreaming[61] or feminism.[62] The supremacy of 'true German masculinity' is said to be threatened by racialised masculinities.[63] Today's (male) youth is blamed for their lack of masculinity.[64] Thus, the discourse of crisis is used for male resovereigning and to fight the pluralisation of masculinities.[65]

56 Ibid.
57 Kurt Möller: Männlichkeitsforschung im Rahmen von Rechtsextremismusstudien, p. 80.
58 Hinrich Rosenbrock: Die anti-feministische Männerrechtsbewegung, pp. 15–16, pp. 134–151; Robert Claus: Maskulismus, p. 13.
59 Robert Claus: Maskulismus, p. 52.
60 See also Karin Hausen: Die Polarisierung der ‚Geschlechtscharaktere' – Eine Spiegelung der Dissoziation von Erwerbs- und Familienleben, in: Werner Conze (ed.): Sozialgeschichte der Familie in der Neuzeit Europas, Stuttgart 1976, pp. 363–393.
61 Hinrich Rosenbrock: Die anti-feministische Männerrechtsbewegung, pp. 131f.
62 Suvi Keskinen: The 'crisis' of white hegemony, neonationalist femininities and antiracist feminism, pp. 157–163.
63 Robert Claus/Esther Lehnert/Yves Müller: Einleitung, in: Idem. (eds.): Was ein rechter Mann ist…, p. 15.
64 Fabian Virchow: Tapfer, stolz, opferbereit, p. 43.
65 Renate Bitzan: Geschlechterkonstruktionen und Geschlechterverhältnisse in der extremen Rechten, pp. 350f.; Yves Müller: Gegen Feminismus und ‚Dekadenz' – die Neue Rechte in der Krise?, pp. 67f.

One could argue that far-right groups actually need the crisis discourse to perform supremacy and to legitimise men's role as protectors of the family and the nation.

As discussed above, there are three important links between the far right and masculist groups: first, the claimed male supremacy, predominantly in the shape of soldierly masculinity, second, the discourse of crisis and victimisation and, third, the legitimacy of violence. But these issues are approached from two completely different perspectives: in far-right contexts, soldierly masculinity is performed as a characteristic of a self-proclaimed elite. Yet, there is an inherent contradiction to this construct. Far-right populist arguments stress the contrast between 'us', i. e., 'the people', and an 'elite', be it in politics, in the media or feminists ('femocrats').[66] At the same time, regarded as hegemonic masculinity, soldierly masculinity itself is constructed with elitist aspects. As I have already outlined, far-right men imagine themselves as protectors, guardians, or saviours of the nation's purity.[67]

In masculist groups, soldierly masculinity functions as a vision which leads out of the crisis of masculinity and the victimisation of males. That is to say, far-right concepts of masculinity represent what masculists aspire to. The purpose of the crisis discourse, in both groups, can be judged as legitimisation of soldierly masculinity and male resovereigning. Yet, in far-right contexts, violence is justified as a means of defence of white autochthonous women or the nation as a whole against foreign 'enemies'. Thus, far-right actors, in practice of their alleged soldierly masculinity, claim to use violence to protect their beloved (family or nation). On the contrary, masculists, as victims, accept violence for alleged self-defence or to threaten feminists. Yet, between both perspectives there are grey areas.

Although these aspects function as bridges between the far right and masculism, they simultaneously bear a certain tension. The relation of far right and masculist masculinities permanently oscillates between superiority and inferiority, between assertion and aspiration. By constructing an external threat, this tension can be neglected by both groups. The migrant man's representation as the racialised and sexualised male 'other' who threatens the white autochthonous woman, serves to this end, and legitimises the use of violence. This externalisation of violence and threat constructs a homogenous nation, which is to be protected. This also helps to back male resovereigning and stabilises white masculine hegemony.[68] In this manner, the wide-spread gender-based personal or sexualised violence within the German society is suppressed in discourse. The imagination of the white, strong, and autonomous woman, who nonetheless must be protected against external threat, creates an inescapable double

66 Suvi Keskinen: Antifeminism and white identity politics.

67 Renate Bitzan: Research on Gender and the Far Right in Germany Since 1990, pp. 72f.

68 Suvi Keskinen: Antifeminism and white identity politics; See also Michael Kimmel: Angry White Men. Die USA und ihre zornigen Männer, Bonn 2013, pp. 225–231.

bind. While gender equality is emphasised as an achievement of modern Western European societies, it is, at the same time, undermined by white masculine hegemony.

In the next section I discuss in how far some of the findings in the print and online media sample of the project *'Genderism' in Media Debate* are related to these conceptualisations.

'Genderism' in Media Debate: Valorous Masculinity

Studies of gender aspects in the media coverage have repeatedly revealed far-right gender stereotypes that are reproduced in the media. Using the example of the National Socialist Underground (NSU), Michaela Köttig analyses in how far media added to the image of women as being incapable of political action. These stereotypes could be referred to by the female offenders and supporters of the NSU for self-defence.[69] Consequently, the visibility of women in the so called identitary movement (*identitäre Bewegung*) was constructed as absolutely new, although there have been female far-right activists and intellectuals at least since the end of the Second World War. Still, the media continue to depict these women as naïve, harmless and unpolitical, as Judith Goetz states.[70] Together with Markus Sulzbacher, Goetz gives an overview of the media coverage of the far right, analysing this media representation as unintentional complicity and as far-right self-dramatisation in the media, and their playing their games with the media.[71] In two case studies, Ricarda Drüeke and Corinna Peil investigate the meaning and relevance of antifeminist narratives in internet shitstorms.[72]

In the project *'Genderism' in Media Debate*, a focus on masculinity emerges. In this project, a qualitative content analysis, as well as a frame analysis of leading quality news media, was conducted. Four outlets were selected by the criterion of reach: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ), *Die Welt* (both conservative), *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ) and *Spiegel Online* (SPON) (both liberal). For pragmatic reasons, I left aside tabloids like *Bild-Zeitung*. The sample for the content analysis comprised 389 articles

69 Michaela Köttig: Gender Stereotypes Constructed by the Media: The Case of the National Socialist Underground (NSU) in Germany, in: Michaela Köttig/Renate Bitzan/Andrea Petö: Gender and Far Right Politics in Europe, pp. 221–234.

70 Judith Goetz: „Postergirls" und „White Power Barbies". Zur ambivalenten Sichtbarkeit *identitärer* Frauen, in: Dorothee Beck/Annette Henninger (eds.): Konkurrenz für das Alphamännchen?, pp. 199–217.

71 Judith Goetz/Markus Sulzbacher (eds.): Rechtsextremismus Bd. 4: Herausforderungen für den Journalismus, Wien 2021.

72 Ricarda Drüeke/Corinna Peil: Haters gonna hate. Antifeministische Artikulationen in digitalen Öffentlichkeiten, in: Marion Näser-Lather/Anna Lena Oldemeier/Dorothee Beck (eds.): Backlash?! Antifeminismus in Wissenschaft, Politik und Gesellschaft, Roßdorf 2019, pp. 191–212.

published between 2006 and 2016 that included compounds of the term 'gender'. For the frame analysis, the sample was reduced to 59. Nine frames could be identified, one of which was *questioning masculinities*. In this section I only discuss findings of this frame.

One of the project's main results was that the media act autonomously in discourses on 'gender'. They are not neutral reporters that react to specific events, but instead set their own agenda, for example by inviting guest authors with a certain political opinion, and by setting their own thematic priorities. This means that media do not only provide for a specific political public sphere. Rather, they take up the discourse in their own account and with their own interests in accordance with their political tendency. For example, mainly the liberal SZ took up the discourse on the crisis of masculinities. By contrast, the conservative FAZ, according to the media sample of the project, took part to only a small degree in discourses about masculinities, while the (also conservative) newspaper *Die Welt* strengthened heteronormativity and gender hierarchy in a variety of texts with different topics referring to masculinity and gender.

In all, 35 out of the total sample of 389 gender-related articles that were published between 2006 and 2016 in the leading political print news media in Germany (see fn 9) fit into the thematic area of masculinity. For the frame analysis, the overall sample was reduced to 59 articles. 12 of them fitted the frame *questioning masculinities*. During the first half of the investigation period, articles prevailed which addressed diverse topics of masculinity as well as men's or boys' lives. Then these topics disappeared and turned up again in 2016 in the aftermath of the Cologne incidents with the rather restricted thematic focus of 'valorous masculinity'. The specific combination of the issues of masculinity, migration and violence was solely to be found in the four articles in three media outlets that were analysed for the present paper (see next paragraph). This small number might be due to the sampling strategy referring to the term *gender*. Yet, there were texts in other frames that appropriated gender equality and feminism to construct culturised 'others'.[73] Consequently, the empirical basis of this paper is restricted; however, the news media I analysed are quite influential in the German public debate, and further research with a focus on masculinity may identify additional contributions.

In February 2016, there was an article in the conservative daily newspaper *Die Welt*, written as a plea for bravery in view of violence exerted in absence of the police.[74] In May 2016, the conservative journalist Jan Fleischhauer published an article with a similar focus in his column on *Spiegel online* (SPON, liberal). He discussed the

73 Dorothee Beck: Arenen für Angriffe oder Arenen der Akzeptanz?

74 Eckhard Fuhr: Ballt das Händchen doch mal zur Faust, in: Die Welt, 11 February 2016.

alleged effeminacy of German men, as an effect of non-violent upbringing.[75] Monika Frommel, a professor of legal studies writing as a guest author in the liberal daily newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ), reflected upon the delinquency of young male Muslim migrants as a matter of the sub-culture of their peer groups.[76] There was one counterpoint in this set of articles: the writer and men's rights activist Ralf Bönt regarded delinquency and violence exerted by men as "hypermasculinity", as resulting from the absence of a biological father in the nuclear family.[77]

Two articles, explicitly, demand bravery and preparedness for defence. The author in *Die Welt*, a member of the editorial board, warns that the "comfort zone" in Central Europe would disintegrate, because millions of refugees and migrants are supposedly on their way to intrude upon this comfort zone. This would cause violence, exerted by migrants as well as by xenophobic native hordes. The text in SPON is not as explicit as this. Fleischhauer only states that pacified societies would collapse, if they were confronted with violence coming from outside. Their inability to defend themselves, in Fleischhauer's opinion, is caused by non-violent upbringing, which he regards as one of the most important values of many parents. *Die Welt* points out gender mainstreaming as the cause of the lack of bravery. The author wonders whether, "in a feeling of elation for gender mainstreaming, we have too briskly devalued masculine connoted virtues like defence readiness and physical assertiveness".[78] According to him, therefore, one would have to be concerned for the country. The solution offered in both articles is similar. The *Welt*-author claims that boys must learn to be brave men. Fleischhauer states that a slight militarisation of children's rooms would be useful.

In both articles, violence is constructed as a threat from outside that endangers society as a whole. Yet, society is not prepared for this intrusion, as men's and boys' physical assertiveness has been trained down. This is claimed to be the work of women, as mothers, as teachers or as nursery schoolteachers. So, women are accused of being guilty of the effeminacy of males.[79] Therefore, the authors construct two concepts of the enemy that have to be fought: first, the violence intruding from abroad (used by Muslim migrant men), and second, women who effeminate men and boys. Although gender mainstreaming is only mentioned in one article, the wording in both texts

75 Jan Fleischhauer: Aua, Papa!, in: Spiegel Online, 30 May 2016.

76 Monika Frommel: Legal, illegal, alles egal, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 February 2016.

77 Ralf Bönt: Neue Väter, neue Männer, in: Die Welt, 13 February 2016.

78 „[…] ob wir im Hochgefühl des Gender-Mainstreaming ‚männlich' konnotierte Tugenden wie Verteidigungsbereitschaft oder körperliche Durchsetzungsfähigkeit nicht allzu forsch entwertet haben." (translated by the author).

79 Regardless of the topic, the complaint about women's guilt for men's every problem, is a common statement in many of the articles in the frame *questioning masculinities*, in the first part of the investigation period, as well.

connotes that it is leftist (and ecology conscious)[80] women or feminists who must be blamed.

Although both authors state that they would prefer non-violent solutions to conflict, they do not elaborate on this alternative. However, the use of violence is not explicitly verbalised, either. Instead, it is circumscribed with terms like 'bravery', 'physical assertiveness', 'manly valour', or readiness for defence. The adverse alternative to this is described as 'effeminacy', 'fury and fear', or 'rabbits paralysed by the snake' (to translate the German idiom). Nor is the legitimacy of the use of violence discussed. Rather, it is presupposed by the threat intruding from abroad and by the alleged lack of action or complete absence of the police. The arguments culminate in the request that boys should learn to defend themselves (and their beloved ones) physically. In fact, both authors mention the necessity of girls' self-defence. Yet, in the line of arguments this only has the notion of a fig-leaf, as it is not elaborated upon.

Both articles combine far right and masculist arguments. They refer to the man as protector of the family and the (autochthonous) woman. This can be characterised as an aspect of male resovereigning and is reminiscent of soldierly masculinity. They blame women for having caused the men's inability to defend themselves and others. This accusation can serve as a link to the discourse on the crisis of masculinity. In contrast, gender-based violence within the society is ignored.

Fleischhauer's column was the only article with 241 readers' comments within the small selection of texts which are the basis of this paper. This notwithstanding, I include these comments in the analysis, as they show how readers approve of, reject or modify the author's line of argument. In the following, the nicknames used by commentators are added in parentheses as a means of reference. For pragmatic reasons, in the project *'Genderism' in Media Debate*, only the first 20 of these comments could be included in the analysis. A starting point of the comments was the statement that non-violent upbringing would leave children defenceless. Instead, boys should learn how to defend themselves. In this respect a physical difference between boys and girls was stated. Most commentators' only concern were the boys. Other than Fleischhauer himself, the commentators explicitly shifted the blame to women, either the proponents of non-violent upbringing, or "disorientated mothers" (*Tienanmen*)[81], and girls in day care facilities, who would exert verbal violence, because their linguistic capacity is said to be more developed than the boys' (*dr.joe66*). This can be seen as an effort to equate male and female acts of violence.[82]

80 Mothers who pay attention to healthy food, non-violent conflict solution and ecological needs are cartooned as patsies in some conservative and liberal milieus.

81 Readers' comments to Jan Fleischhauer: Aua, Papa!, in: Spiegel Online, 30 May 2016.

82 Critical: Monika Schröttle: Kritische Anmerkungen zur These der Gendersymmetrie bei Gewalt in Paarbeziehungen, in: GENDER (1/2010), pp. 133–151; Holly Johnson: Degendering Violence, in: Social Politics 22:3 (2015), pp. 390–410.

The legitimacy of violence was broadly discussed in the comments. In most commentators' opinion, this sort of street justice is justified to defend one's family, as well as one's wife, one's girlfriend or oneself against violence. Some stated that individuals should be entitled to resort to violence when institutional protection, above all by the police, is lacking. In several comments, violence was regarded an *ultima ratio*. There were also some references to the discourse of victimisation. Nobody should be forced to make oneself a victim (*Leser.161*). In this case, one would have a right to self-defence and an obligation to help (*Katzazi*). Yet, many would not dare to intervene, because they would be afraid to be hurt or even killed (*huger56, tuedelich*). *Suppenkoch* stated that those who protect their family would risk being taken to court, whereas the perpetrator would be regarded as the victim. Two commentators described their own physical interventions. Their explanations were dominated by complacency and the performance of male supremacy. This can be characterised as personal efforts of male resovereigning.

There were three explicit references to the Cologne incidences. A fourth commentator referred to "sections of the population, in which people act more churlish"[83] (*licht2009*), without specifying, which sections this person was referring to. Apart from that, violence remained abstract, yet intruding from the outside. Thus, violence, in many comments, was externalised and men were imagined in the role of the protector. Some repeatedly pointed out that boys should be prepared for this task.

Most of the comments strengthened Fleischhauer's arguments about the man as protector and explicitly blamed women. Yet, there was a broad and surprisingly differentiated discussion about the legitimacy of violence. Although nobody entirely rejected the use of violence, many aspects were addressed: violence as *ultima ratio*, legitimate self-defence, or an obligation to help in the case of threat. Some differentiated between conflicts which can be solved without violence and aggressive attacks that demand defence. In all comments, violence was regarded an external threat that demanded a (violent) response. Gender-based violence within society, again, was ignored.

An article in the liberal daily newspaper SZ represented a more differentiated way of externalising violence. Monika Frommel, a professor of legal studies, rejected the idea of an archaic Muslim culture as the background of the Cologne incidents. Muslim societies might not regard women as equals, she writes. Nonetheless, young men would not learn to attack women. Yet, the members of Maghrebian gangs in Germany would not want to integrate themselves into society. Rather, they would raise as much money as possible, return to their countries of origin and have good lives. As they do not want to stay here, they would resort to sexualised violence without any scruples, like they do in upheavals in their countries of origin. For, in phases of upheaval, acts

83 „Bevölkerungsschichten, da gehts halt eben rustikaler zu" (translated by the author).

of sexual assault would occur more frequently. As upheavals in these countries would not lead to peace and democracy, but instead to just another military or autocratic regime, the police would not protect women against sexual assault. Besides, in criminal sub-cultures, young men would only be able to perform marginal masculinity. Belonging to a gang would give them some sort of precarious power, which could only be stabilised by scaring others and by subordinating them. In this line of argument, Frommel does not relate to the experience of marginalisation in our society to understand migrants' delinquency. Instead, she focuses on aspects of culture and the political system in their countries of origin. Therefore, in Frommel's opinion, their resorting to violence has nothing to do with problems within the German society.

Frommel's arguments are more differentiated than the articles in SPON and *Die Welt*, as she does not blame 'all' male refugees from Muslim, Arab and North African countries. Yet again, violence as a gender-based problem within our society is ignored. Furthermore, Frommel states that sexualised violence is decreasing, which, as a blanket statement, is not tenable.[84]

In the frame *questioning masculinities*, there was one article by men's rights-activist and writer Ralf Bönt. It was published in the conservative daily newspaper *Die Welt*, forming a blatant contrast to the texts just analysed. Bönt regards violence, exerted by the far-right as well as by migrant men in Cologne or even IS-terrorists, as an expression of the crisis of masculinity and a senseless defence of hypermasculinity. Hypermasculinity, in Bönt's opinion, is what boys and (young) men perform, when they overcompensate for growing up without a male role model. Yet, Bönt does not elaborate upon the desirable attitudes of this role model. Instead, he reveals a naturalised understanding of gender. And his complaint of boys lacking a male role model (in the nuclear family) indirectly puts the blame for the men's boost of violence on mothers, i. e., on women.

Bönt does not externalise violence in the sense of accusing migrant Muslim men of attacking 'our' women. Instead, he states that the refugees would have made up their minds to escape violence in their countries of origin by migrating to Europe. It cannot be denied that refugees try to escape violence. Yet, Bönt, too, constructs a contrast between the violence elsewhere and the absence of violence in German society, and, again, male violence within our society is concealed and hidden behind the term "hypermasculinity".

Although Bönt rejects the use of violence, he indirectly adds to its externalisation as well as to the neglect of gender-based violence within the society and to the blaming of women for the violence of men.

84 See by contrast police data BKA: Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Jahrbuch Wiesbaden: 2017.

Media Discourses as Discursive Bridges?

The findings discussed above can help us understand in which respects taboos in societal debates are being broken by 'expressing the unsayable', to popularise and reinforce far-right narratives. I use the metaphor of a *discursive bridge* to illustrate this process.

In the sample analysed for this paper, news media, conservative or liberal, take up masculist narratives and arguments. Implicitly or explicitly, they reproduce the placing of blame upon women for the supposed crisis of masculinity. They support hegemonic masculine values. And they reassert heteronormative gender hierarchies. Thus, they add to male resovereigning. This can relate to other media analyses, which highlight the reproduction of gender stereotypes. Yet, liberal as well as conservative media in general do not refer to far-right political stance directly. Far-right opinions only rarely permeate mainstream media, and if so, only via the overlaps with masculist views. This is especially evident in the case of the two articles in *Die Welt* and on SPON, which deal with soldierly masculinity and the externalisation of violence. The positive references to a concept of masculinity that had been discredited since the end of the Nazi regime can be regarded as a breach of taboo. I argue that this would not have been possible without the reference to masculist narratives.

Some of the print media in the sample almost serve as platforms for masculists. For example, both the sociologist and masculist activist Gerhard Amendt, as well as Ralf Bönt, are frequent authors in the daily newspaper *Die Welt*. Jan Fleischhauer, until 2019 conservative figurehead in the columns on SPON, is frequently cited on masculist webpages like *Genderama*, *man tau* or *Sons of Perseus*.[85] SPON runs one of the most frequently visited internet forums in Germany. Here, masculists can reach far more readers than in their own media. That is why the webpage www.wgvdl.de[86] lobbied among their fellows to comment in the SPON-forum.[87] As a consequence, in the discussion of some topics, there is a majority of masculist positions, although masculism represents only a tiny, albeit extremely vocal, minority of men in German society as a whole.[88]

Hence, thematic consistency, as well as commenting strategies, provide evidence for a *discursive bridge*—initially between masculist views and the news media analysed in the foregoing. Yet, regarding the issue of soldierly masculinity and (the externalisation of) violence, this bridge reaches further. Indeed, these two discourses do not just link two societal spheres, or—more drastically—bridge the gap to the political

85 In 2019, Jan Fleischhauer left SPON to write columns for *Focus online*.

86 The abbreviation *wgvdl* means "how much equal rights does the country tolerate?" or, in German "Wieviel Gleichberechtigung verträgt das Land?" (translated by the author).

87 Hinrich Rosenbrock: Die anti-feministische Männerrechtsbewegung, pp. 142–144.

88 Ibid., p. 8.

far right. The phenomenon is more complex than this. As I have shown, the political print and online news media, which I have analysed in my project, add to the mainstreaming of masculist views. As I have argued, masculist views have strong links to far-right discourses, for example, by referring to soldierly masculinity and the externalisation of violence. Hence, it is not the news media that build a discursive bridge to the far right. Rather, they serve as one bridgehead reaching out towards masculist political views at the centre of the bridge. On the other end, the political far right, regarded as the other bridgehead, does the same. This discursive bridge only works with masculism as the central pillar. Thus, one can conclude, breaking taboos in democratic discourse needs catalysts such as masculist narratives.

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Feyda Sayan-Cengiz and Selin Akyüz

Performances of Populist Radical Right and Political Masculinities: A Comparative Study of Orbán and Wilders

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the study of populism, with increasing scholarly attention to the discursive, stylistic and performative aspects of different populisms. This study discusses the "discursive and stylistic turn"[1] in populism studies and highlights the centrality of performances of masculinities to the populist repertoire. Upon this framework, we explore the ways in which masculinities play out in shaping the discursive, stylistic and performative repertoires of European populist radical right (PRR). The conceptualisation of political masculinities is used as an analytical lens that helps us see the gendered structure of discourses and performances in two dissimilar cases of PRR leaders, namely Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary and Geert Wilders, the leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV) of the Netherlands. We employ a comparative perspective so as to identify how performances of masculinity work in radical right populisms of dissimilar historical trajectories in terms of the location of gender in culture. We focus on Orbán's and Wilders' narrations of themselves; of their understanding of 'the people' whom they claim to represent; and of their relation with 'the people'. A re-reading of the use of narratives, metaphors, gestures, emotions through an analysis of the two leaders' interviews, speeches, texts and media performances reveal their masculinist 'brave bad boy' performances, the ways they draw boundaries between 'outsiders and insiders', and the ways in which they claim to embody the people, and to be 'men of the people'.

Keywords: *populist radical right*; *political masculinities*; *populist repertoire*; *Viktor Orbán*; *Geert Wilders*

1 Rogers Brubaker: Why Populism?, in: Theory and Society 46 (2017), pp. 357–385, here p. 360.

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Introduction

'Being under threat' has always been a powerful discursive tool for nation-states. Invoking a discourse of the 'nation being under threat' has been utilised by 'founding fathers' especially in the aftermath of nation-building processes. For decades, the discourse of fighting against a variety of 'enemies' such as communism, capitalism, terrorism, contributed to processes of re-configuration of the nation-state and in the nationalist discourse, especially, it found ready acceptance. In contemporary European politics, radical right-wing populism has been gaining ground, especially during the past three decades, and has been mainstreaming its political stance through an anti-immigrant discourse that constitutes immigrants—particularly Muslim immigrants—as threats to the integrity of the nation, as well as to European culture. Thus, nativism surfaces as the host ideology of radical right-wing populism, situating the 'pure people' in ethnic and cultural terms. Such construction and positioning have also re-revealed masculinist codes that glorified virility, toughness, patriotism and bravery. As Nagel aptly highlighted "the intimate historical and modern connection between manhood and nationhood", which is constructed through "the interplay between masculine microcultures and nationalist ideology"[2], become more crystallised in the discourses of Europe's populist radical right (PRR hereafter) parties, as well as in the political styles and performances of PRR leaders.

This study takes the discursive, stylistic and performative aspects of the PRR as interrelated, and explores these aspects with a particular focus on the performances of political masculinities by PRR leaders. The scholarship on the PRR has produced a substantial amount of work on their gendered discourses, particularly in two registers that reveal a profound contradiction of these discourses: First, the literature underlines the PRR's instrumentalisation of an ostensibly liberal defence of women's rights and gender equality in the attempt to mainstream Islamophobic, anti-immigrant and exclusionary views[3]; and second, it demonstrates the PRR's approach to issues such as politics of family, reproduction, and the roles attributed to 'native' women, usually

2 Joane Nagel: Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of Nations, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies 21:2 (1998), pp. 242–269, here p. 242.

3 Ulrike M. Vieten: Far Right Populism and Women: The Normalization of Gendered anti-Muslim Racism and Gendered Culturalism in the Netherlands, in: Journal of Intercultural Studies 37:6 (2016), pp. 621–636, here pp. 621–625; Catherine Kinvall: Borders and Fear: Insecurity, Gender and the Far Right in Europe , in: Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23:4 (2015), pp. 514–529; Sara R. Farris: Femonationalism and the 'Regular' Army of Labor Called Migrant Women, in: History of the Present 2:2 (2012), pp.184–199; Liz Fekete: Enlightened Fundamentalism? Migration, Feminism and the Right, in: Race and Class 48:2 (2006), pp. 1–22.

with anti-feminist undertones.[4] However, the gendered and embodied performances of PRR politicians have received less scholarly attention. Exceptional studies which take such performances as central to understanding the PRR, have focused on the paternalistic conceptual metaphors that they use to amplify their authority[5], their bodily performances of masculinity[6], and the role of masculinities in the leaders' narrations of themselves and the nation.[7]

This study aims to contribute to the literature by comparatively exploring the ways in which masculinities play out in shaping the discursive, stylistic and performative repertoires of European PRR. We look into two cases of PRR politicians, Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary and Geert Wilders, the leader of Party for Freedom (PVV), in comparative perspective so as to identify gendered discursive, stylistic and performative aspects of radical right-wing populisms of different historical trajectories, in different social and political contexts which display profound dissimilarities in terms of the location of gender in culture. We choose these two cases because even though both Orbán and Wilders adopt the main tenets of nativist, exclusionary PRR discourses, such as provoking anti-immigrant and Islamophobic sentiments, and constructing antagonistic groups of 'insiders' and 'outsiders'; they are profoundly different with regard to the ways in which they incorporate gender into their narratives of 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. Orbán is explicitly anti-feminist and against LGBTI[8] rights, hence feminists and LGBTI individuals are excluded from his imagination of the pure, authentic Hungarian nation, whereas traditional gender roles are endorsed in

4 Cas Mudde: Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, New York 2007. Stefanie Mayer/Edma Ajanovic/Birgit Sauer: Intersections and Inconsistencies. Framing Gender in Right-Wing Populist Discourses in Austria, in: NORA – Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research 22:4 (2014), pp. 250–266; Tjitse Akkerman: Gender and the Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Policy Agendas, in: Patterns of Prejudice 49:1–2 (2015), pp. 37–60; David Paternotte/Roman Kuhar: Disentangling and Locating the "Global Right": Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe, in: Politics and Governance 6:3 (2018), pp. 6–19.

5 Ov Christian Norocel: Romania is a family and it needs a strict father: Conceptual metaphors at work in radical right populist discourses, in: Nationalities Papers 38:5 (2010), pp. 705–721.

6 Ruth Wodak: The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean, London et al. 2015; Marion Löffler: Populist attraction: The symbolic uses of masculinities in the Austrian general election campaign 2017, in: NORMA 15:1 (2020), pp. 10–25.

7 Betül Ekşi/Elizabeth Wood: Right-wing populism as gendered performance: Janus-faced masculinity in the leadership of Vladimir Putin and Recep T. Erdogan, in: Theory and Society 48:5 (2019), pp: 733–751, here p.741.

8 Acronym for lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex people. While Queer Theory is re-reading heteronormative norms and discusses how sexuality is fluid and fragmented, queer is still a challenging term for many LGBTI persons. For more information, see: https://www.ilga-europe.org/resources/glossary/letter_q. (accessed on 3 March 2021).

his nativism. On the other hand, Wilders incorporates the defence of gender equality, women's rights and freedoms, and LGBTI rights into his anti-immigrant and Islamophobic discourse by constantly claiming that these inherently belong to European and Dutch cultures, and should be defended against 'threats' coming from Muslim immigrants. In other words, Wilders' 'insiders' include those who defend a transformation in gender roles and fluid gender identities. Our research looks into the political performances of these two PRR politicians and investigates whether, despite their different perspectives on gender, there are commonalities in their performances of political masculinity. By doing so, we attempt to locate the role of political masculinity in the European PRR's discursive, stylistic and performative repertoires.

This study first attempts to re-read the intersection of radical right-wing populism and political masculinities. Second, it defines the rationale behind the case selection and methodological background. The third part discusses the contextual background and analyses different populisms in Hungary and the Netherlands. This study, then, examines the tripartite structure of analysis of

1. the leaders' narrations of themselves;
2. 'the people'; and
3. their relation to 'the people'.[9]

The Intersection of Radical Right-Wing Populism and Political Masculinities

Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the study of populism, yet the concept itself is a contested one. Some scholars define populism as an ideology, albeit a thin-centered one[10], hosted by and combined with thicker ideologies. Accordingly, populism "almost always appears attached to other ideological elements".[11] Yet, there is a core, defining content common among different populisms: conceptualizing society in two antagonistic groups as 'the pure people' vs. the 'corrupt elite', and politics as the expression of the "general will" of the people.[12] According to this approach, the ways in which "pure people" are defined change according to the ideological elements

9 We borrow the idea for this tripartite analysis from Betül Ekşi/Elizabeth Wood: Right-wing populism as gendered performance.

10 Cas Mudde: The Populist Zeitgeist, in: Government and Opposition 39:4 (2004), pp. 541–563, here p. 544.

11 Cas Mudde/Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser: Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda, in: Comparative Political Studies 51:13 (2018), pp. 1667–1692, here p. 1669.

12 Cas Mudde: The Populist Zeitgeist, p. 543.

to which a given version of populism is attached. For example, in radical right-wing versions of populism, nativism has predominated the political arena, which has increasingly been the case, particularly in Europe, considering the surge of anti-immigrant discourse among Europe's PRR.[13]

This flexible and popular definition of populism has proved useful in terms of accounting for populisms of different ideological orientations. However, there has recently been a "discursive and stylistic turn"[14] in the study of populism that draws attention to the form, rather than the ideological content of populism, in an attempt to understand different manifestations of populism in different contexts, and to conceptualise it beyond ideological orientations.[15] This "turn" entails the conceptualisation of populism as a stylistic discursive repertoire[16], and as a "political style"[17] that underlines its performative aspects. Benjamin Moffitt, who takes populism as a style that is "performed, embodied and enacted"[18], defends the significance of understanding the performative aspects of populism, as contemporary political landscape is increasingly defined by styles, images and performances rather than ideological divisions. He further contends that populist 'performance' is not merely a shallow act of trying to look like 'the people', but it is also an attempt to define and construct 'the people' that populist leaders claim to represent. Therefore, looking into the stylistic and performative aspects of populism also helps us understand the content of populist politics. According to the discursive-stylistic thread in the populism literature, the core aspects of populist repertoire[19], in broad strokes, can be grouped as follows: First,

13 Cas Mudde/Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser: Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective, p. 1669. For an analysis of the exclusionary dimensions of populist radical right in Europe, see: Cas Mudde/Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser: Exclusionary versus inclusionary populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America, in: Government and Opposition 48:2 (2013), pp. 147–174.

14 Rogers Brubaker: Why Populism?, p. 360.

15 Benjamin Moffitt: The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation, California 2016.

16 Rogers Brubaker: Why Populism?, p. 360.

17 Benjamin Moffitt/Simon Tormey: Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political Style, in: Political Studies 62:2 (2014), pp. 381–397, here p. 387; Michael Bossetta: Fighting Fire With Fire: Mainstream Adoption of The Populist Political Style in the 2014 Europe Debates between Nick Clegg and Nigel Farage, in: The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19:4 (2017), pp. 715–734, here pp. 717–722; Benjamin Moffitt: The Global Rise of Populism.

18 Benjamin Moffitt: The Global Rise of Populism, p. 3.

19 Even though focusing on these aspects of the discursive frames and performative repertoire is useful for tracing the commonalities among different populisms, populism research should also be sensitive to the flexible ways in which populist discourses and performances can respond to different political, cultural and social contexts. For a discussion of the significance of capturing such flexibilities, see: Mats Ekström et al.: Right-wing populism and the

populists locate themselves as close to the 'ordinary people', the 'silent majority', protecting them against the dominance of 'the elite' and the "marginal minorities", which can take various forms. In nativist forms of PRR, the "marginals" are usually defined as immigrants who are constructed as ethnically and culturally different from, and threatening to, an alleged native majority.[20] Second, in their claim to be close to 'the people', populists perform direct and raw communication, uninhibited by political correctness or regard for nuanced, complex argumentation. This may sometimes take the form of 'bad manners', such as use of slang[21] and/or highly dramatised stances for emotional appeal.[22] The third main aspect of the populist performative repertoire is the emphasis on crisis and threat, that calls for urgent and direct action as opposed to intricate debate and policy negotiation.[23]

The studies that are invested in a conceptual defence of the stylistic and performative approach to populism have acknowledged the role of performances of masculinity in the populist repertoire, however, they have avoided locating such performances as a central aspect of this repertoire. For example, Rogers Brubaker, while enlisting the elements of this repertoire, mentions the "bad boy" demeanor performed by populist politicians in their attempt to constitute themselves as "authentic".[24] Benjamin Moffitt elucidates how populist leaders, of different ideological convictions, adopt certain performances of masculinity in their attempt to prove that they embody 'the people', to show that they are the reflection of the strength of the people.[25] Moffit further explains how populist leaders perform "bad manners" in the form of virility, and machismo, even to the point of using inappropriate sexual comments about female political rivals.[26] However, he still avoids taking the performance of masculinity as a central aspect of populist performances, apparently in an attempt to account for the performances of female populist leaders, who have combined "girlish" performances of sexual appeal[27] (that is, appeal to the male electorate) with an emphasis on mother-

dynamics of style: A discourse-analytic perspective on mediated political performances, in: Palgrave Communications 4:1 (2018), pp. 1–11.

20 Rogers Brubaker: Why Populism?, p. 365; Benjamin Moffit/Simon Tormey: Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political Style, p. 391; Mats Ekström et al.: Right-wing populism and the dynamics of style, p. 4.

21 Benjamin Moffitt/Simon Tormey: Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political Style, p. 392.

22 Mats Ekström et al.: Right-wing populism and the dynamics of style, p. 3.

23 Benjamin Moffitt/Simon Tormey: Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political Style, pp. 381–397; Michael Bossetta: Fighting Fire With Fire, p. 721; Mats Ekström et al.: Right-wing populism and the dynamics of style, p. 3.

24 Rogers Brubaker: Why Populism?, p. 367.

25 Benjamin Moffitt: The Global Rise of Populism.

26 Benjamin Moffitt: The Global Rise of Populism, p. 73.

27 Ibid., p. 74.

hood, "to reinforce an image of themselves as vessels of national renewal".[28] Contrary to Moffitt, we contend that such performances of femininity do not contradict the centrality of masculinity to populism. They even further confirm it because female populist leaders are carving themselves out a place in the masculine stylistic repertoire of populist politics by appealing to the assumed masculine desires and approval.

Upon this framework, we explore the ways in which masculinities play out in shaping the discursive, stylistic and performative repertoires of European PRR. We argue that nativist ideological content, and stylistic and performative repertoires are both useful and complementary to understanding the PRR. In line with taking performativity as a "constant reiteration of expressions"[29] we operationalise it as a tool to re-read their reproduction of identities. Echoing Dorit Geva, we aim to look beyond the discussion of whether populism is an ideology or a style, by focusing on gendered symbolisms and performances.[30] In line with Geva, we maintain that these symbolisms and performances—through displays of virile power—link nativist discourses of the PRR that claim superiority of national identities and cultures, to the performances of populism embedded in the claim to embody and protect the 'ordinary people'[31].

Focusing on the performative aspect of 'doing politics' marks the significance of the interplay between micro cultures of masculinities and macro political processes. In this study, we take political masculinity in a broad sense, as an analytical lens that helps us see the gendered structure of political processes, networks, discourses, institutions and performances. Starck's and Sauer's definition of political masculinity encompasses

> any kind of masculinity that is constructed around, ascribed to and/or claimed by political players. These shall be individuals or groups or persons who are part of or associated with the political domain, i. e. professional politicians, party members, members of the military as well as citizens and members of political movements claiming or gaining political rights.[32]

28 Robert Mason: Pittbulls and Populist Politicians: Sarah Palin, Pauline Hanson and the Use of Gendered Nostalgia in Electoral Campaigns, in: Comparative American Studies: An International Journal 8:3 (2010), p. 190 (cited in: Benjamin Moffitt: The Global Rise of Populism, p. 74).

29 Ov Christian Norocel/Tuija Saresma/Tuuli Lahdesmaki/Maria Ruotsalainen: Performing 'us' and 'other': Intersectional analyses of right-wing populist media, in: European Journal of Cultural Studies (2020), p. 6.

30 Dorit Geva: Daughter, Mother, Captain: Marine Le Pen, Gender, and Populism in the French National Front, in: Social Politics 27:1 (2020), pp. 1–26.

31 Ibid.

32 Kathleen Starck/Birgit Sauer (eds.): A Man's World? Political Studies in Literature and Culture, Newcastle Upon Tyne 2014, p. 6.

This broad definition takes politics as a dynamic gendered field of power relations in which agents seek positions of legitimation through gendered narratives. The different constructions and performances of masculinities, as well as the interactions among different types of masculinities, structure the gendered field of politics. Indeed, the literature on political masculinities enables us to discuss not only performances of the 'male body' in politics, but also shows us the power interplay in the encounters of male, female and queer bodies. Hence, employing a 'political masculinity' lens is not only useful for analysing masculine performances, or how masculinist body politics works. It has a much broader scope, as it also helps us see the relational gendered power dynamics at play in the field of politics and develop analyses sensitive to "*bodily emotions*—shame, humiliation, timidity, anxiety, guilt—or *passions* and *sentiments*—love, admiration, respect"[33] (emphasis original), which, according to Bourdieu, normalises the relations between the dominant and the dominated.

As Starck and Luyt aptly argue "the concept of political masculinities can usefully be applied in instances in which power is explicitly either being (re)produced or challenged".[34] Hence, the conceptual lens of political masculinities can be applied to different political and social contexts. The hierarchical power relations, networks, actors and discourses in politics is inherently connected to masculine themes of virility, patriotism, toughness. As masculinism is "an ideological expression of excessive masculine values, of masculine hegemony, and male-centered view of social relationships"[35], the discursive ground of radical right-wing populism offers a crystallised example, as it is based on masculinist concepts of domination, hegemony and uniformity that manifest themselves in the (re)construction of nation[36], family[37], the people[38] etc.

Yet, the normative conceptualisations of masculinities do not remain static, but are rather created and re-created in an active process "through (…) the articulation of masculine micro (everyday) and macro (politics) cultures".[39] Radical right-wing populisms actually contribute to the construction of new hegemonic masculinities while

33 Pierre-Yeves Bourdieu: Masculine domination, Stanford et al. 2001, p. 38.

34 Kathleen Starck/Russell Luyt: Political Masculinities, Crisis Tendencies and Social Transition: Toward Understanding of Change, in: Men and Masculinities 22:3 (2019), pp. 421–443, p. 435.

35 Ibid.

36 Ov Cristian Norocel: "Give us back Sweden!" A Feminist Reading of the (Re)Interpretations of the Folkhem Conceptual Metaphor in Swedish Radical Right Populist Discourse, in: NORA – Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research 21:1 (2013), pp. 4–20.

37 Ov Christian Norocel: Romania is a family and it needs a strict father, pp. 705–721, passim.

38 Betül Ekşi/Elizabeth Wood: Right-wing populism as gendered performance, pp.733–751, here pp. 739–743; Marion Löffler: Populist attraction, pp. 10–25, here pp. 12–14.

39 Joane Nagel: Nation, in: Michael S. Kimmel/Jeff Hearn/Robert W. Connell (eds.): Handbook of studies on men and masculinities, Thousand Oaks et al. 2005, pp. 397–413, here p. 397.

challenging the dominance of other forms of masculinities. In other words, while right-wing populist masculinities claim to defend their constructions of 'the people' against 'the elite', they perform a certain type of masculinity, and build their discursive and stylistic repertoire in relation to this performance. Some tenets of PRR masculinities may be the positioning of a charismatic/extraordinary leader[40], identification with the nation through the metaphor of the father of the state[41], an overtly virile performance[42], and aggression.[43] For instance, according to Löffler "populist political masculinity thus is characterized by aggressive rhetoric, breaking taboos and pushing the boundaries of the politically sayable and thinkable."[44] On the other hand, other (alternative) forms of masculinities may be revealed in different populisms, as well. For instance, most of the populist masculinities possibly tap into a heteronormative hegemonic structure while some others may manifest themselves in a discourse of defending (sexually diverse) others.[45]

Case Selection and Methodological Background

In this study, we attempt to read the gendered political performances and discourses of European radical right-wing populisms through the broad lens of political masculinities in two cases. We focus on Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary and Geert Wilders, the leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV) of the Netherlands. Even though both leaders employ discourses of anti-immigration and Islamophobia, which are usually common among European PRR, they also display profound differences that become more crystallised with a gender lens. For instance, whereas Orbán is well-known for his anti-feminism, hostility to discourses of gender equality and LGBTI rights; Wilders, on the contrary, positions himself as the defender of gender equality,

40 Ruth Wodak: The politics of fear, pp. 157–161; Marion Löffler: In Defense of Democracy? Masculinist Reasoning, Homophobia, and the Impossibility of Gender Democracy in Thomas Mann's Mario and the Magician, in: Masculinities: A Journal of Identity and Culture 9:10 (2018), pp. 6–29, here pp. 10–13.

41 Ov Cristian Norocel: Romania is a family and it needs a strict father, pp. 705–721, passim; Kathleen Starck/Russell Luyt: Political Masculinities, Crisis Tendencies and Social Transition, pp. 421–443, passim.

42 Valerie Sperling: Sex, politics, and Putin: Political legitimacy in Russia, Oxford et al. 2014; Betül Ekşi/Elizabeth Wood: Right-wing populism as gendered performance, pp. 733–751, passim.

43 Marion Löffler: Populist attraction, pp. 10–25, here pp. 16.

44 Ibid., p. 12.

45 Ov Cristian Norocel: "Give us back Sweden!", passim; Ov Cristian Norocel et al.: Discursive constructions of white Nordic masculinities in right-wing populist media, in: Men and Masculinities (2018), pp. 1–22, here p. 51.

women's rights and LGBTI rights against the 'threat' of Islam, which he portrays as being the enemy of all liberties that are allegedly inherent to Western civilisation. Hence, tracing the performances of masculinity by these two PRR politicians, who promote substantially different ideologies and policy agendas on the issue of gender, helps us flesh out different trajectories in which political masculinities unfold in European radical right-wing populisms. By sampling these two cases, we explore the commonalities and differences between the performances of masculinities by radical right-wing populist leaders of two different social, political and cultural contexts. What is the place of gendered discourses, performances, and metaphors in their narratives of themselves, their political position, and 'the people' whom they claim to represent?

In order to answer these questions, we analyse the two PRR politicians' discursive and stylistic repertoires and explore their constructions of masculinities in these repertoires through a discourse analysis of their speeches, interviews, written documents and media performances. It is widely argued that masculinity is constructed through discourse, and "language lies at the heart of understanding men and masculinity".[46] In line with Ernesto Laclau, we understand discourse not just as written and spoken text, but as an "ensemble of the phenomena in and through which social production of meaning takes place".[47] In this framework, it is significant to account for the political context and also the existing cultural repertoires at work. Hence, our analysis includes performances that manifest themselves through the use of metaphors, gestures, and emotions displayed by the two PRR politicians under scrutiny, as well as written and spoken text. In addition to their stylistic and performative manifestations, the interviews and speeches are re-read to trace their constructions of political masculinities. In the case of Wilders, we focus on his years between 2006 and 2017, starting from the year in which he established his party, PVV, turned towards radical right populism, and accentuated his crude and provocative position against Islam until the election in 2017. For Orbán, we focus on his period as a Prime Minister after 2010, when his populist tone and his construction of a 'nurturant/benevolent parent' became more apparent. We ended our textual analysis regarding Orban in 2018, when the last national election was held. A caveat is in order: We do not read Dutch or Hungarian, so our data is limited to those written documents originally in English, and also speeches and televised performances of the leaders for both national and international audiences for which it is possible to find subtitles in English. In order to compensate for this

46 Nigel Edley: Analysing masculinity: Interpretative repertoires, ideological dilemmas and subject positions, in: Margaret Wetherell/Stephanie Taylor/Simeon J. Yates (eds.): Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis, London/California/New Delhi 2001, pp. 189–229, here p. 191.

47 Ernesto Laclau: Populist Rupture and Discourse, cited in: Paris Aslanidis: Is populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective, in: Political Studies 64 (2015), pp. 88–104, here p. 98.

caveat, and to keep our work up-to-date with recent empirical developments, we also use secondary sources, such as scholarly analyses of each case, as well as biographies, newspaper articles and blogs. In our analysis, we focus on the two leaders' narrations of themselves; of their understanding of 'the people' whom they claim to represent and identify with; and of their relation with 'the people'.[48]

Contextual Background

The development of radical right-wing populism in the Netherlands has been built on the critique of multiculturalism, which has been entangled with a discourse of defending gender equality and sexual freedoms against Islam.[49] The far-right politician Pim Fortuyn, who was murdered in 2002, is argued to have "played a central role in entangling antipathy towards Islam with the politics of sexual freedom".[50] As a self-identified gay politician, he established sexual freedoms and gay rights as an inherent part of Dutch national culture, which should be protected against 'backward' Muslim culture, legitimating an Islamophobic discourse through an emphasis on civil liberties. Geert Wilders built his rhetoric on Fortuyn's heritage, only to carry it further in terms of giving it a cruder anti-Islamic edge.[51] Wilders has turned to a radical right populism after he left the conservative-liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) in 2004 (over his refusal to accept the possibility of Turkey's membership in the EU) and established the PVV in 2006. Koen Vossen argues that Wilders' radical right populism is underpinned by radical Islamophobia, anti-immigrant rhetoric, dislike of supra-national cooperation, emphasis on national pride, and defence of more direct forms of democracy as opposed to the dominance of the political elite.[52] In terms of the performative and stylistic aspects of his leadership, he has been resorting to a more vulgar rhetoric since 2006, to the point of calling for a ban of the Qur'ān and insulting his political opponents and the government as being "bonkers", for "having a spine of whipped cream" on the issue of immigration.[53] Even though Wilders uses discursive and stylistic tropes that are common in radical right-

48 Betül Ekşi/Elizabeth Wood: Right-wing populism as gendered performance.

49 Paul Mepschen et al.: Sexual Politics, Orientalism and Multicultural Citizenship in the Netherlands, in: Sociology 44:5 (2010), pp. 962–979; Rogers Brubaker: Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies 40:8 (2017), pp. 1191–1226, passim.

50 Paul Mepschen et al.: Sexual Politics, Orientalism and Multicultural Citizenship in the Netherlands, p. 968.

51 Rogers Brubaker: Between Nationalism and Civilizationism, p. 1197.

52 Koen Vossen: Classifying Wilders: The Ideological Development of Geert Wilders and His Party for Freedom, in: Politics 31:3 (2011) pp. 179–189.

53 Ibid., p. 185.

wing populisms, his defense of diverse sexualities, gay rights, same-sex marriages, and abortion rights makes him an outlier with regard to the PRR family in various other national contexts.[54] PVV, the party that Wilders leads, has entered the Dutch Parliament as the second largest party represented in the House of Representatives in the 2017 elections.

Unlike Wilders, who is speaking from a point of opposition to the government, Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, has been in power since 2010. His term has been defined as a process of de-democratisation[55], referring to the series of changes he brought to Hungary's political regime, such as limiting the power of the Constitutional Court, bringing the Electoral Commission under government control, and curbing media freedom, which have effectively weakened the checks on the power of the government.[56] He openly expresses his will to build an illiberal state based on a "special national approach to democracy."[57] Orbán has been a well-known figure of Hungary's political scenery since 1989, due to the speech he gave at the reburial ceremony for Imre Nagy and those who were killed in the 1956 uprisings, in which he demanded that Soviet troops leave Hungary. He was among the founders of the Fidesz Party, which he has steered in a nativist, conservative direction since he became its leader in 1993. When Fidesz won 53 per cent of the votes and came to power under his leadership in 2010, he labelled his electoral success as a "revolution"[58], and claimed that this success was a demonstration of the people's desire for a fundamental re-organisation of the state.[59] Similar to Wilders, Orbán also taps into a criticism of the European Union (EU), implying a collaboration between "the corrupt elite" and "Brussels bureaucrats".[60] He has also been invested in an Islamophobic position, especially after the 2015 mass migration to Europe following the forced displacement

54 Tjitse Akkerman: Gender and the Radical Right in Western Europe, pp. 46f.

55 Matthijs Bogaards: De-democratization in Hungary: Diffusely Defective Democracy, in: Democratization 25:8 (2018), pp. 1481–1499, passim.

56 Miklós Bánkuti et al.: Hungary's Illiberal Turn: Disabling the Constitution, in: Journal of Democracy 23:3 (2012), pp. 138–146, passim.

57 Attila Mong: Amid government crackdown, Hungary's journalists look for new ways to work, at: Committee to Protect Journalists, 9 October 2014, URL: https://cpj.org/2014/10/amid-government-crackdown-hungarys-journalists-loo/ (accessed on 12 March 2020); Honor Mahony: Orbán wants to build 'illiberal state', at: euobserver, 28 July 2014, URL: https://euobserver.com/political/125128 (accessed on 12 March 2020).

58 Anna Szilágyi/András Bozóki: Playing It Again in Post-Communism: The Revolutionary Rhetoric of Viktor Orbán in Hungary, in: Advances in the History of Rhetoric, 18:sup1 (2015), pp. S153-S166, here p. S164.

59 András Körösényi/Gábor Illés/Attila Gyulai: The Orbán Regime: Plebiscitary Leader Democracy in the Making, New York 2020.

60 Robert Csehi: Neither episodic, nor destined to failure? The endurance of Hungarian populism after 2010, in: Democratization 26:6 (2019), pp. 1011–1027, here p. 1016.

of the Syrian population. According to Cathrine Thorleifsson, "an Islamophobic layer emerged in the (Hungarian) radical right's grammar of exclusion that traditionally has targeted the country's Roma minority and Jews".[61] Yet, whereas Wilders bases his anti-Islamic stance on a discourse of defending "secular and liberal Western values", Orbán emphasises a defense of traditional Christian values.[62] This profound difference between the two PRR political actors also manifests itself in their approaches to the issue of gender. Wilders recurrently claims that Islam is essentially oppressive of women and sexual minorities. He uses this claim to bolster his argument that Islam is threatening to Western civilisation, hence endorses sexual freedoms through a "civilizational" rhetoric[63] rather than promoting nativist or religious stances on the issues of gender and sexuality. On the other hand, anti-LGBTI rhetoric and the promotion of "traditional family values" rooted in Christian ideology[64], are central to Orbán's nativist politics.

Despite their differences, Wilders' and Orbán's commonalities manifest themselves in three dimensions that are defined by the performative aspects of their political style. First, they both construct their image on the basis of a claim of courage and bravery to be 'politically incorrect', to act without regard for conventions, to "speak people's minds", and to take risks to 'tell it like it is'. Second, they draw boundaries between 'ordinary people' whom they claim to represent, as opposed to 'outsider' immigrants and insider 'corrupt elites' collaborating with the EU elites. They galvanise this anti-immigrant position by stressing an urgent direct threat from immigration that they metaphorise as a 'flood' and 'invasion', against which they stand as 'heroic' defenders. Third, they define themselves as the embodiment of the ordinary people, and perform ordinariness by claiming to have first-hand knowledge of ordinary people's struggles. These three registers relate to performances of masculinity as they play on notions of bravery; emphasise their 'bad boy' demeanour; and claim to be protectors of national (Orbán) and civilisational (Wilders) boundaries. In analysing these three dimensions, we adopt the tripartite structure of analysis suggested by Betül Ekşi and Elizabeth Wood[65], and look into Wilders' and Orbán's narrations of themselves, of 'the people', and of their relation to 'the people' respectively in the following sections.

61 Cathrine Thorleifsson: Disposable Strangers: Far-right securitisation of forced migration in Hungary, in: Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale 25:3 (2017), pp. 318–334, here p. 318.

62 Mijat Kostic: Civilizationism and European Identity: Two Arguments for Anti-Immigrant Mobilization (unpublished Master's Thesis), Budapest 2019.

63 Rogers Brubaker: Between Nationalism and Civilizationism, pp. 1191–1226, passim.

64 Borbála Juhász: Orbán's politics – a gender perspective, in: Friedrich Ebert Foundation Budapest (March 2012), at: http://www.fesbp.hu/common/pdf/Nachrichten_aus_Ungarn_1_2012.pdf (accessed on 12 March 2020).

65 Betül Ekşi/Elizabeth Wood: Right-wing populism as gendered performance, pp. 733–751, here p. 735.

Narratives of the Self: Performing 'brave bad boys'

Benjamin Moffitt, who takes the populist leader as "the central performer of populism"[66], argues that populist leaders need to strike a balance between performances of ordinariness and extraordinariness, in order to present themselves both as one of 'the ordinary people', and also as their leader.[67] Both Wilders and Orbán, while presenting themselves as close to the ordinary people, perform extraordinariness through claiming extraordinary courage, and frame courage as the element of continuity in their narratives of the self.

Wilders presents the narrative of his life as the crystallised example of the 'threat' posed by Islam and Muslim immigrants to Dutch—even European—populations. What forms the backbone of his self-presentation is having personally experienced the 'dangers' of Muslim immigration and having been targeted by radical Islamists and *Marked for death*, as the title of his book declares, along with the subtitle *Islam's War Against the West and Me*. After the Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh was murdered by a radical Islamist in 2004, Wilders was given full time police protection and has been living in safe houses since then. Drawing analogies between his condition and imprisonment, Wilders persistently argues that he is selflessly paying a price for 'speaking out', and portrays himself as a beacon of self-sacrifice and courage:

> I do not pretend to be a man who knows no fear, but when I heard about Van Gogh's murder, I can honestly say that I felt anger, not fear. I defiantly proclaimed to the journalists that I would not allow anyone to intimidate me into silence […] [the international media] portrayed us[68] as having run away like cowards […] In reality, we had found ourselves practically imprisoned in our own country for the mere fact that we had spoken out against the enemies of the West.[69]
>
> I live in a government safe house. I am driven every day to my office in an armoured police car. I have even lived in army barracks and prison cells just to be safe from assassins. I am threatened because I am a critic of Islam.[70]

66 Benjamin Moffitt: The Global Rise of Populism, p. 55.

67 Ibid., p. 57.

68 By "us", Wilders refers to former Member of Parliament, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who was also put under police protection due to death threats.

69 Geert Wilders: Marked for Death: Islam's War Against the West and Me, Washington, D.C. 2012, pp. 15f.

70 Geert Wilders: Islamification of Western societies threatens everyone's freedoms, at: The Australian, 18 February 2013. URL: https://www.theaustralian.com.au/subscribe/news/1/?offerset=ta_4for4_premium&sourceCode=TAWEB_WRE170_a_GGL&dest=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theaustralian.com.au%2Fnational-affairs%2Fopinion%2Fislamification-of-western-societies-threatens-everyones-freedoms%2Fnews-story%2F7a94cbc73bcb82e242ed4a28c414935-

Similarly, Orbán frequently refers to the notion of bravery as a masculine value. This notion functions as an element of continuity in his narrative of transformation from a young activist who stood up against Soviet troops in the name of freedom, to an incumbent politician known for curbing freedoms, and enlisting Russia and China as inspirations.[71] His contemporary performance of bravery relies on the image of himself as daring to speak what other conservative right-wing politicians in Europe cannot:

> When I stand up and say something, I don't make any compromise just because I have a coalition partner or limited media background. I am the only lucky man among European politicians, among conservatives who can say what I think […] They are at the same level committed to national pride, to national sovereignty, and freedom and so on, like me, or like us, so there is no difference. But […] they simply cannot afford to say what they think. […] In Hungary we were lucky enough in 2010 to get a two-third majority, having a background from the anti-communist resistance movement, which results in a natural inclination to say what we think […] [T]he number one precondition to be successful in politics is braveness. Bravery to take the risk. If you don't stand up and don't say what you think whatever the consequences may be, you will never be a leader, and you will never have a big party.[72]

In Orbán's self-presentation, bravery meets a 'bad boy' demeanour at the intersection of speaking what he thinks and being the "black sheep"[73] of Europe, which he seems to take pride in. He keeps a very confident and relaxed body language even in tense confrontations with other leaders of the EU. For example, when Guy Verhofstadt confronts him at the European Parliament in a speech full of fervent accusations of dam-

a&memtype=anonymous&mode=premium&adobe_mc_sdid=SDID%3D1B58E23A-D570E64A-3E6FAF5863E2689D%7CMCORGID%3D5FE61C8B533204850A490D-4D%40AdobeOrg%7CTS%3D1614811534&adobe_mc_ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com (accessed on 1 June 2020).

71 Viktor Orbán's speech in the Tusvanyos Free University in Romania on 26 July 2014 marks an important milestone in his political career and is also known as the 'illiberalism speech'. Full text of the speech at: Budapest Beacon, URL: https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-s-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/ (accessed on 1 June 2020).

72 Viktor Orban: Interview at International National Conservatism Conference, Rome (Interviewer: Christopher DeMuth), February 2020, published at: Remix News, URL: https://rmx.news/article/article/full-interview-viktor-orban-at-the-national-conservativism-conference-in-rome (accessed on 12 March 2020).

73 Ibid.

aging democracy in 2017.[74] Or when he is openly, (in jest) called "dictator" in front of the cameras by the (then) President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker in 2015, followed by an unusual slap in the face (in jest, again), instead of a handshake.[75]

Wilders, on the other hand, presents himself as the sole political leader in his country who openly voices "the threat of Islam", who has the courage to be politically incorrect and "break the mold" of constitutional guarantees on religious freedom in his country[76], as opposed to other leaders whom he blames for being cultural relativists, and cowards. A grammatical analysis of Wilders' speeches suggests that he uses a very clear and direct language, permeated with strong adjectives and claims to speak plain, objective facts[77], which coincides well with a masculinist repertoire. His language takes an extremely harsh and crude tone in both written and spoken text when he attacks Islam. His directness in communication, and his unabashed Islamophobic language forms his 'bad boy' attitude. He is otherwise a very reserved figure in terms of displaying emotions, and usually performs a cool, calm and collected image of a career politician in televised performances, even in the face of harsh criticism, exemplified in his performance on BBC's "Hard Talk".[78] His tone, while re-constituting himself as a "dominating"[79] leader, also reproduces a "civilized masculinity protecting the submissive dependents from masculine other[s]."[80]

74 RenewEurope: Guy Verhofstadt 26 Apr 2017 Pleanary speech about the situation on Hungary (video on YouTube), 26 April 2017, URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MsjM-Js39bFY (accessed on 20 May 2020).

75 Euronews (in English): 'Here comes the dictator' Juncker's cheeky welcome for Hungarian PM (video on YouTube), 22 May 2015, URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hl-83Jpd_OI (accessed on 20 May 2020).

76 Geert Wilders debate with Christian Union leader Gert-Jan Segers in 2017, before the parliamentary election. See: Paul Nielsen: Dutch Freedom Party Geert Wilders Final Debate ENGLISH SUBTITLES (video on YouTube), 14 March 2017, URL: https://youtu.be/ma2Tbkk8lZc (accessed on 20 May 2020).

77 Maarten Van Leeuwen: 'Clear' vs. 'Woolly' Language Use in Political Speeches: The Case of the Controversial Dutch Politician Geert Wilders, in: Online Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Poetics and Linguistics Association (PALA) 28 (2009), Middelburg, URL: https://www.pala.ac.uk/uploads/2/5/1/0/25105678/vanleeuwen2009.pdf.

78 Geert Wilders on BBC Hardtalk, part 1 (video on YouTube), 26 January 2009, URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o6cFKQNBH3s (sccessed on 20 May 2020).

79 For a discussion on dominating masculinity in global world order, see: James W. Messerschmidt: Hidden in Plain Sight: On the Omnipresence of Hegemonic Masculinities, in: Masculinities: A Journal of Identity and Culture 12 (2019). Keynote Address at: 2nd Symposium on Men and Masculinities, Istanbul (September 2019).

80 Ov Christian Norocel: Constructing Radical Right Populist Resistance: Metaphors of Heterosexist Masculinities and the Family Question in Sweden, in: Nordic Journal for Masculinity Studies – NORMA 5:02 (2010), pp. 170–183, here pp. 179f.

Drawing Boundaries: 'Outsiders and Insiders'

Among the core defining aspects of populism, perhaps the most significant one is the conceptualisation of society in dichotomous terms, and taking the liberty to define "insiders" to be "included" in the fold of the pure, ordinary people versus "outsiders" who are to be excluded.[81] Both Wilders and Orbán present ample examples of exclusionary populism[82] in drawing boundaries between outsiders and insiders. Yet, their designated insiders are configured differently.

In the case of Wilders, the metaphoric boundaries between insiders and outsiders are drawn along axis of 'Islamic' versus 'Judeo-Christian' civilisations. As Rogers Brubaker argues, Wilders' populism is an example of populisms that are "distinctive in construing the opposition between the self and the other not in narrowly national but in broader civilizational terms. This partial shift from nationalism and "civilizationism" has been driven by the notion of civilizational threat from Islam".[83] Moreover, Wilders associates himself with Western mainstream conservative historical figures, such as Winston Churchill and Ronald Reagan. In doing so, he does not limit his political stance to Dutch nativism, but rather portrays himself as part of a broader civilisational 'defence bloc' of Western civilisation: Churchill as the leader of defence against Nazis, Reagan against communism, and now, himself, against Islam.[84]

Unlike Wilders, who portrays himself and the 'Dutch people' as part of broader Western civilisation, Orbán uses a nativist discourse with his "designated insiders" consisting of ethnic Hungarians, whom he defines as "a nation without any relatives in Europe" and as "culturally alien" to neighbouring countries[85], thus portrays the population of Hungary as exceptional and alone in Europe. While framing the de-democratization process that he has been cultivating since 2010 as a transformation from "liberal freedom" to "Christian freedom", he clearly asserts who is "inside" and who remains "outside" of his imagination of the nation:

> Christian freedom is not something abstract. It is very specific, understandable and tangible: patriots instead of citizens of the world; love of country instead of internationalism; marriage and family instead of popularising same-sex relationships; protecting our children instead of drug liberalisation; Hungarian children instead

81 Cas Mudde: The Populist Zeitgeist, p. 543; Rogers Brubaker: Why Populism?, passim.
82 Cas Mudde/Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser: Exclusionary versus Inclusionary Populism, passim.
83 Rogers Brubaker: Between Nationalism and Civilizationism, p. 1191.
84 Geert Wilders: Marked for Death: Islam's War Against the West and Me, p. 77.
85 Viktor Orbán: Interview at International National Conservatism Conference, Rome (Interviewer: Christopher DeMuth).

> of immigrants; Christian culture instead of a multicultural confusion […] In Hungary today all this is seen as self-evident—and is almost taken for granted.[86]

Obviously, Orbán's nativist construction of 'the people' is a highly gendered one, as he gives a central role to the notion of traditional family, and actively excludes various gender identities, sexual preferences and different lifestyles from the fold of the nation. This exclusion does not remain at the level of discourse, but has been reflected in his policies, such as defining the contours of marriage in the Constitution[87], ending the legal recognition of trans people[88], and rejecting the ratification of the Istanbul Convention[89]. In contrast, Wilders, who speaks to a social and cultural context defined by the inclusion of LGBTI individuals, not only avoids promoting notions of the traditional family, but actively defines respect for sexual freedoms as an inherent part of Dutch culture.[90] Furthermore, by attributing gender inequality, oppression of women and violence against LGBTI individuals to Islam, he legitimises his Islamophobic discourse in ostensibly secular and liberal terms.

Embodying and Protecting 'the people'

Despite profound differences in their constructions,—particularly gendered constructions—of the 'insiders', the 'pure people' as outlined above, what unites the two PRR politicians is the way they narrate their relation to these 'insiders'. In narrating their relation to the people, both leaders display performances of masculinity as 'heroic protectors', as well as claiming to embody the people, to be 'men of the people'. Whereas the 'heroic protector' performance constitutes the aspect of extraordinariness, the claim to be close to the people hints at the performance of ordinariness.

86 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speech at the 28th congress of Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union, at: About Hungary, 2 October 2019, URL: http://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-speech-at-the-28th-congress-of-fidesz-hungarian-civic-union/ (accessed on 3 March 2021).

87 Borbála Juhász: Friedrich Ebert Foundation Working Paper: Orbán's Politics – a Gender Perspective, p. 3.

88 Shaun Walker: Hungary votes to end legal recognition of trans people, at: The Guardian, 19 May 2020, URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/19/hungary-votes-to-end-legal-recognition-of-trans-people (accessed on 1 June 2020).

89 Kafkadesk: Hungary rejects Istanbul Convention on gender equality and women's rights, at: Kafkadesk, 7 May 2020, URL: https://kafkadesk.org/2020/05/07/hungary-rejects-istanbul-convention-on-gender-equality-and-womens-rights/ (accessed on 1 June 2020).

90 Paul Mepschen et al.: Sexual Politics, Orientalism and Multicultural Citizenship in the Netherlands, passim.

With regard to the performance of heroic protectors, both Orbán and Wilders present themselves as leaders determined to protect the boundaries of their nation and civilisation against immigration. In doing so, both leaders resort to a configuration of political masculinity which marks a 'protective' father figure, who urges direct action in the face of crisis to protect 'their own'. Both underline 'urgency' and the significance of stopping immigration and keeping borders closed to immigrants. While Wilders fervently argues that "the floodgates are open"[91] and Muslim immigration puts "the survival of Netherlands and Western civilization at stake"[92], Orbán, who uses the metaphor of immigrants "breaking down the door", claims that building a fence was of absolute urgency to "hold back the tide"[93].

When it comes to performances of ordinariness, the claim to be the embodiment of the 'ordinary, pure people', is common to both cases. Orbán, who presents himself "as the righteous voice of the people and the sole protector of the nation"[94], identifies with 'the people' in his frequent use of "we", instead of "I", implying that he is speaking in the name of the national collective. In defining himself as a "country boy"[95], as a "street fighter", he conveys an image of the "common Hungarian". Just as he imagines Hungarian society as "alone in Europe", he underlines his "single" and particular stance *vis a vis* other leaders in the EU, and performs the role of the leader who represents the exceptional, particular Hungarian nation *vis a vis* Europeans:

> When the prime ministers of the European Union meet with each other regularly, I am the only prime minister who doesn't understand the languages of anybody else. The majority of the prime ministers understands the language of at least one

91 Cassius: Geert Wilders 2017 Campaign Ad "Make The Netherlands Ours Again" English Subtitles (video on YouTube), 7 March 2017, URL: https://youtu.be/V_fYn0dN9u4 (accessed on 1 June 2020).

92 Paul Nielsen: Dutch Freedom Party Geert Wilders Final Debate ENGLISH SUBTITLES (video on YouTube), 15 March 2017, URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ma2Tbkk8lZc (accessed on 3 March 2021)

93 Viktor Orbán: Those who are overwhelmed cannot offer shelter to anyone, at: Website of Hungarian Government, 3 September 2015, URL: https://ceskapozice.lidovky.cz/forum/viktor-orban-those-who-are-overwhelmed-cannot-offer-shelter-to-anyone.A150903_161154_pozice-forum_lube (accessed on 3 March 2021).

94 Cas Mudde: Populist Radical Right parties in Europe, Cambridge 2009, cited in: Cathrine Thorleifsson: Disposable strangers, p. 323.

95 Prime Minister Viktor Orban's acceptance speech after receiving the "Person of the Year" award (Krynica-Zdrój), at: About Hungary, 7 September 2016, URL: http://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-acceptance-speech-after-receiving-the-person-of-the-year-award-full-text-in-english/ (accessed on 3 March 2021).

> or two other countries, but I am the one who is alone always, because we Hungarians got here in a miracle way.[96]

Orbán's ardent supporters affirm his image as a leader who looks out for the nation. "Orbán showed his mettle again. The government has not only improved the situation for people today. The government provided the future of our nation."[97], says a voter immediately after the election victory in April 2018, showing his approval of Orbán's claim of political masculinity that is "constructed around, ascribed to and/or claimed by"[98] himself.

Wilders, on the other hand, builds his narration of closeness to the Dutch people by emphasising that he, like the ordinary Dutch, has first-hand experience of the 'troubles' that he claims to be caused by Muslim immigrants. He presents himself as a common man who knows 'the streets', and thus understands the struggles of ordinary Dutch citizens. In narrating his experiences, he recurrently underlines that he used to live in the Kanaleneiland district of Utrecht, a district that was increasingly inhabited by Muslim immigrants. He describes the district as formerly having been a neighbourhood of "native-born, blue collar and middle-class Dutch residents"[99], which was 'taken over' by Muslim immigrants later on. He stresses his experience of having been physically assaulted and robbed by Arab youths in the past, thus underlining that he physically shares the plight of the ordinary Dutch. He takes pride in having lived in this neighbourhood, and presents it as an experience that shows his closeness to ordinary people and his distinction from other politicians, whom he claims "looked [at him] as if [he] was talking about another planet"[100] whenever he talked to them about the problems in Kanaleneiland, and asked "why the hell do you stay in that neighborhood?".[101] By underlining his experience of Kanaleneiland, he stresses his loner position in Dutch politics, being 'one of the people', and not one of the elite politicians who are removed from ordinary people's problems.

His performance of the 'lone fighter for the common people' is even more apparent in the story he recounts about an elderly Dutch woman who sent him 10 euros with a letter of support. She claimed to support Wilders because she is the last Dutch

96 Viktor Orbán: Interview at International National Conservatism Conference, Rome (Interviewer: Christopher DeMuth).

97 Vice News: Hungary's Anti-Migrant Prime Minister Is Crushing the Opposition (HBO) (video on YouTube), 18 April 2018, URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rD_Q3n-Q0V_o (accessed on 1 June 2020).

98 Kathleen Starck/Birgit Sauer (eds.): A Man's World? Political Studies in Literature and Culture, p. 6.

99 Geert Wilders: Marked for Death, p. 82.

100 Ibid., p. 83.

101 Ibid.

person on her street, and he is "the only one speaking on [her] behalf". "I hung her letter on the wall to remind me who I am fighting for", he declares.[102]

In other words, as a politician of the opposition, Wilders presents himself as both the protector and a member of the ordinary Dutch people, whom he claims are lonely, as they cannot find representatives among other Dutch politicians. The performance of his own 'loneliness' in politics parallels his narration of the loneliness of the Dutch people: He, just like them, claims to be sidelined by the elite politicians, against whom he is fighting in the name of the common people. Orbán also performs the 'protector' and embodiment of the people, but as he has been in power for a decade, his performance underlines the loneliness of the Hungarian people *vis a vis* the rest of the world.

Concluding Remarks

Messerschmidt argues that "hegemonic masculinities often are simultaneously hidden in plain sight, operating in a disguised way while concurrently securing an overwhelmingly legitimating influence; that is, hegemonic masculinities are so obvious that people do not actually "see" them".[103] The fact that masculinism is taken for granted in politics hinders the visibility of hegemonic masculine practices. It can be argued that an over-emphasis of masculinity around right-wing populism, ironically, contributed to the opaqueness of masculinity. A nuanced gender lens that reads configurations of power in a context-dependent structure, is needed to wipe away the opaqueness, the taken-for-grantedness of masculinity in PRR politics.

Through the analysis of the PRR leaders' discourse, style and performance, forms of political masculinities shaped by domination, aggression and attestation of manliness become more apparent. This study, by comparing two PRR leaders, analysed the gendered processes of interactions fostered through the reproduction of masculinist values in juxtaposition to the discursive and stylistic repertoires of PRR. A comparative reading of the performances of political masculinity by Orbán and Wilders reveals the common ground in terms of the stylistic and performative aspects of their populism, without missing their ideological and discursive differences. Even though both politicians display the main tenets of populist radical right such as nativism, anti-immigrant discourses, and populist conceptualisations of society in two antagonistic groups, these cases also bear profound differences. For example, while the hegemonic practices of Orbán re-draw the boundaries of the nation, Wilders uses Western civilisational rhetoric and justifies his Islamophobic, anti-immigrant position based on a claim to protect not just the Dutch nation but Judeo-Christian civilisation. The

102 Ibid., p. 92.
103 James W. Messerschmidt: Hidden in Plain Sight, p. 17.

concepts of 'pure people' in Wilders' and Orbán's constructions differ especially in terms of the exclusion or inclusion of people identified by non-hegemonic gender identities and sexual preferences. Contrary to Orbán, who naturalises gendered power relations under the banner of defending traditional family values, Wilders presents himself as a defender of gender equality, women's rights and LGBTI rights, which he claims to be inherent parts of Dutch culture. Yet, ironically, despite their differences related to gender politics, their gendered political performances show remarkable commonalities. They both claim to be the embodiments of the nation's ordinary people. They both assume the authority to define and draw lines between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' of the nation. They display common performances of 'brave bad boys' who dare to challenge the politically speakable and thinkable. They both perform 'heroic protectors' of their constructed 'insiders' through a crisis narrative, claiming that the nation is under acute threat.

According to Moffitt, the notion of populism as a political style has analytical strength for the understanding of the ways in which populism travels across different contexts. It also shows us the role of affective and passionate performances in populism as opposed to technocratic, emotionally neutral political performances.[104] This study shows that looking at radical right-wing populism through the lens of gendered symbolisms, and reading populist style with a special focus on performances of masculinities, further contributes to the understanding the affective capacities of populism. We suggest that analysing populist political styles through the performances of masculinities is invaluable to the understanding of the common ground on which different populisms are constructed. We also suggest that a research agenda which analyses the gendered performances of woman populist politicians, and performances of left-wing populist politicians, would further expand our understanding of the place of gender in populist style and performance.

104 Benjamin Moffitt: The Global Rise of Populism.

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Julia Roth

Gender, Populism and Anti-Immigration: Ethno-Sexist, Femonationalist and Femoglobal Alliances

Abstract

In current struggles over cultural hegemony, conservative and right-wing populist discourse is marked by an omni-presence of topics related to gender and sexuality. This article examines the ways in which diverse actors of what will be called the 'right-wing populist complex' use gender in order to catapult a variety of arguments into the public sphere with particular focus on actors in the Americas and Germany. Suggesting a first set of *Right-Wing Populist Patterns of Gendering*[1], the article pursues the question how seemingly emancipatory arguments function in right-wing discourse, especially in performing a modernisation paradigm, while simultaneously, and in often paradoxical ways, promoting a program of re-traditionalisation. Therefore, often, gender arguments—like the sexual freedom of 'autochtonous' women—are used to justify anti-immigration and racist politics. One's own society can thus be depicted as supposedly already fully emancipated in contrast to the alleged 'backward' social order of immigrants. Through this ethno-sexist twist, the article argues that gender provides right-wing populist discourse a useful tool for affectively bridging seemingly paradoxical arguments and transferring diverse social hierarchies shaped by late neoliberalism onto the gender hierarchy of a society. Since gender as a discursive element is foundational for right-wing discourse, an analytical, systematic and intersectional gender lens—or a critical gender theory—is crucial in right-wing populism research in order to grasp patterns of gendering and their entanglements with racialisation and racist structures.

Keywords: *right-wing populism and gender*; *anti-migration*; *ethno-sexism*; *antifeminism*; *sexual exceptionalism*; *reverse anti-colonialism*; *Donald Trump*; *Jair Bolsonaro*; *U.S.A.*; *Brazil*; *AfD*

1 See my suggestion for such patterns in Julia Roth: Can Feminism Trump Populism? Right-Wing Trends and Intersectional Contestations in the Americas, Trier 2021.

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When Brazilian president Jair Messias Bolsonaro paid his first visit to U.S. president Donald Trump in March 2019, he emphasised their common struggle as being one against "fake news", "political correctness", and "the gender ideology".[2] Both Trump and Bolsonaro had caused scandals when their sexist and racist attitudes were revealed during their candidacy, and both won the elections regardless of these scandals. Both have mobilised against immigrants or internal racialised groups and count on the support of predominantly White women supporters. Also, in European multi-party systems such as the German one, where right-wingers usually form part of the opposition, an increased focus on gender and antifeminism can be observed, often in relation to anti-immigration, racism, and Islamophobia. An election campaign poster of the 2016 election campaign by the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) read: "Our women remain free"[3] beneath a portrait of a woman wearing a Burqa. Another AfD 2016 election campaign poster provocatively claimed "New Germans? We prefer to make them ourselves"[4] above a photograph of a pregnant women's body, whose face is not shown. The phrase 'New Germans' (*neue Deutsche*) mocks the self-definition of migrant Germans who confront racist exclusions and insist on 'being German' and on belonging to German society. On 16 May 2018,[5] AfD chairwoman and opposition leader, Alice Weidel, in a speech during the 2018 budget debate at the lower house of parliament (the Bundestag) in Berlin, Germany warned against "state-sponsored knife men," and "headscarf girls" who would "not protect our wealth, our economic growth and above all our welfare state".[6] AfD spokeswoman Beatrix von Storch has launched a campaign against gender studies, which in Hungary have already been abolished under the Orbán administration. Abortion is on the agenda (again) and divides opinions and societies in many countries, such as Poland, the U.S., or Argentina.

2 Michelle Goldberg: The Heartbreak of the 2019 Women's March, in: The New York Times online edition, 18 January 2019, at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/18/opinion/womens-march-antisemitism.html (accessed on 19 March 2019).

3 In the original: "Unsere Frauen bleiben frei". Translated by the author.

4 In the original: "Neue Deutsche? Machen wir selber". Translated by the author.

5 Reuters: AfD-Fraktionschefin löst mit ausländerfeindlicher Rede Tumulte aus, in: Reuters online, 16 May 2018, at: https://de.reuters.com/article/deutschland-bundestag-afd-id-DEKCN1IH0QU (accessed on 30 March 2020).

6 In the original: "alimentierten Messermännern", "Kopftuchmädchen", "unseren Wohlstand, das Wirtschaftswachstum und vor allem den Sozialstaat nicht sichern". Translated by the author.

Gender and the 'Right-Wing Populist Complex', the Lack of a Systematic Intersectional Gender Lens

As these introductory random examples indicate, right-wing populist discourses almost everywhere are marked by an omnipresence of issues related to gender and sexuality—even though in very diverse and context-specific ways.[7] Such issues range from the alleged defence of women's (and sometimes gays') rights to the opposition to and contestation of women's, gender and reproductive rights, such as marriage for all, or access to free and safe abortion.[8] However, as the examples also show, aspects such anti-immigration attitudes, access to resources and welfare, or demography, are simultaneously being negotiated within particularly gendered frames. Most of these policies support traditional heteronormative family models and gender orders and oppose feminist and LGBTQI (Lesbian Gay Bisexual Trans Queer Intersexual) notions that support sexual diversity and pluralist forms of cohabitation. Most actors also seemingly support alleged pro-women's and gender rights arguments, often combined with anti-neoliberal or decidedly liberal-egalitarian arguments (based on negative notions of "freedom as freedom from"). The notion of a mere 'backlash' against emancipatory achievements thus does not seem sufficient to adequately grasp current workings of notions of gender and sexuality in right-wing populist discourse. While the field of research into right-wing populism is now quite established and is expanding very quickly, research on populism has been lacking a systematic inclusion of gender as a central dimension of right-wing populist logics, so far.[9] We argue that the use of

7 See Sarah L. De Lange/Liza M. Mügge: Gender and Right-Wing Populism in the Low Countries. Ideological Variations across Parties and Time, in: Patterns of Prejudice, 49:1–2 (2015), pp. 61–80, DOI: 10.1080/0031322X.2015.1014199.

8 See Gabriele Dietze/Julia Roth (eds.): Right-Wing Populism and Gender. European Perspectives and Beyond, Bielefeld 2020.

9 With exceptions such as: Birgit Sauer: Gesellschaftstheoretische Überlegungen zum europäischen Rechtspopulismus. Zum Erklärungspotenzial der Kategorie Geschlecht, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 58:1 (2017), pp. 3–22; Gabriele Dietze/Julia Roth (eds.): Right-Wing Populism and Gender. European Perspectives and Beyond, Bielefeld 2020; S. Abi-Hassan: "Populism and Gender", in: C. Rovira Kaltwasser/P. Taggart/P. Ochoa Espejo and P. Ostiguy (eds.): The Oxford Handbook on Populism, Oxford, UK 2017, pp. 2–22, p. 48 claims that gender in right-wing populism research "remains largely understudied". See also Sarah L. De Lange/Liza M. Mügge: Gender and Right-Wing Populism in the Low Countries: Ideological Variations across Parties and Time, in: Patterns of Prejudice, 49:1–2, (2015), pp. 61–80; Juliane Lang/ Christopher Fritzsche: Backlash, Neoreaktionäre Politiken oder Antifeminismus. Forschende Perspektiven auf Aktuelle Debatten um Geschlecht, in: Feministische Studien (2/2018), pp. 335–346, emphasise that the academic debate around the right-wing turn and gender has so far remained "heterogenous" and explorative, still lacking common terms and concepts.

gender notions in discourse is no side effect, but rather foundational to conservative, extremist and right-wing populist actors, who utilize it to catapult diverse arguments into the public discourse. This article suggests the notion of a "right-wing populist complex"[10] which serves to refer to more diverse actors than parties, movements, or organisations. Rather, it also addresses media discourses, narratives, and forms of action, such as women participating in right-wing projects, or parts of the bourgeois camp that have shifted to the right. To fully capture formations of this right-wing populist complex, it is also crucial to focus on the intersections of gender with other categories of social stratification, such as race, ethnicity, class and religion. Thereby, gender issues are structurally connected to globalisation and the effects of gendered neoliberal transformations and encompass questions pertaining to the international division of labour. The ways in which right-wing agents orchestrate the current shift to the right that can be observed in many contexts by evoking strong emotions provide a further decisive aspect of the mentioned complex. Also, the notion of a 'complex' enables us to include the impact of neoliberal logics and their structural similarities with neoconservatism in our argument,[11] as well as intersectional aspects, such as the interrelatedness of gender and racialised hierarchies. Moreover, right-wing populism is considered a logic, a discourse, and a "thin-centered ideology".[12] As such, populism is necessarily attached to other ideologies and it can take many shapes and relate to other concepts, forming context-specific interpretive frames to promote the respective political projects. Additionally, gender is understood as a field term in relation to the described "obsession with gender"[13] in discourses within the right-wing populist complex, and the role that women's and gender rights as well as antifeminism[14] play in these discourses. Following a populist logic, society is ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, 'the pure people' (or, in the U.S., the 'heartland') and 'the corrupt elite', against which populist actors claim to express and em-

10 See Gabriele Dietze/Julia Roth (eds.): Right-Wing Populism and Gender. European Perspectives and Beyond.

11 Ailynn Torres: Latin American Neoconservatisms and Antifeminism: Freedom, Family, and Life, Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, International Research Group on Authoritarianism and Counter-Strategies, 2021, at: https://www.irgac.org/2021/02/04/latin-american-neoconservatisms-and-antifeminism-freedom-family-and-life/ (accessed on 18 March, 2021).

12 See Margaret Canovan: Two Strategies for the Study of Populism, in: Political Studies 30:4 (1982), pp. 544–552; Cas Mudde: The Populist Zeitgeist, in: Government and Opposition 39:4 (2004), pp. 541–563.

13 Gabriele Dietze/Julia Roth: Right-Wing Populism and Gender: A Preliminary Cartography of an Emergent Research Field, in: Gabriele Dietze/Julia Roth (eds.): Right-Wing Populism and Gender: European Perspectives and Beyond, Bielefeld 2020, pp. 7–22, p. 7.

14 Understood here as an analytical term, see Juliane Lang/Christopher Fritzsche: Backlash, neoreaktionäre Politiken oder Antifeminismus? Forschende Perspektiven auf aktuelle Debatten um Geschlecht, p. 339.

body a presumed 'general will' (*volonté generale*) of the people.[15] In times of crises and excessive demands, they rely on simple messages and emotional and affective appeal to provide simple answers to complex situations, often oriented towards a supposedly better past. For that matter, the construction of internal—such as the corrupt 'elite', media, feminists—and external enemies—such as immigrants, Muslims, international organisations—is crucial. Against this backdrop, the article in the following outlines five different right-wing populist "Patterns of Gendering"[16] that can be observed and carved out in right-wing discourses,[17] based on a review of the literature and an exemplary and qualitative discourse-analytical and semiotic analysis of media articles from a cultural-studies perspective:[18]

Pattern I: Gender as Affective Bridge in Mass Media

In mass media—and, increasingly, in social media—topics around gender and sexuality serve to break taboos, produce scandals and thereby attention. Gender is useful for that matter, because gender is still perceived as a 'natural' hierarchy by many and moreover, everyone feels gendered in a certain way and thus reacts affectively to the respective topics.

Pattern II: Appropriation of Women's Politics, Femonationalist Alliances

In right-wing conservative and populist discourse, we can see an increasing trend to justify anti-immigration politics as a defence of women's rights. Thereby, Others (immigrants) are gendered as more 'backwards' when it comes to gender equality. Through this 'outsourcing' of sexism (and homophobia) and the transference of gender issues to the 'racial'/'ethnic' (and/or 'religious') level, certain women and feminists increasingly side with right-wing claims.

Pattern III: White (Re)Masculinisation: Against 'Genderism' and Affirmative Action

By projecting feminists and gender studies/the so-called 'gender ideology'—as an existential threat (to children and the (heterosexual) family, and, ultimately, the nation) White, hegemonic masculinity can reclaim its position as 'the norm'.

15 See Cas Mudde/Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser: Populism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

16 See Julia Roth: Intersectionality Strikes Back: Right-Wing Patterns of En-Gendering and Feminist Contestations in the Americas, in: Dietze Gabriele/Julia Roth (eds.): Right-Wing Populism and Gender. European Perspectives and Beyond, Bielefeld 2020, pp. 257–273.

17 Ibid.

18 Parts of my argument go back to my long essay entitled Can Intersectional Feminism Trump Populism? Right-Wing Trends and Intersectional Contestations in the Americas, and our introduction and my contribution to the book Right-Wing Populism and Gender: European Perspectives and Beyond, Bielefeld 2020.

Pattern IV: Reverse Anti-Colonialism: 'Gender Ideology' as 'Ideological Colonisation'

The Pope has called gender 'Ideological Colonisation', forged by feminists and international organisations, directed against poor countries. Through this reversal/appropriation of the victim's position (of the 'colonised'), otherwise unthinkable alliances between various actors can be organised against this threat which is perceived as 'global' and 'colonial'.

Pattern V: Ethno-sexism, Exclusive Intersectionality

Through shifting social inequalities, such as racial and class hierarchies, to the gender level (e.g. by depicting immigration as a threat to—'autochtonous'—women), respective fears can also be transferred from the socio-political and economic level to the gender plane. Sexism is projected onto others (perceived as 'external'), while one's own community can be depicted as emancipated.

'Sex Sells': Gender as an 'Affective Bridge' in (Mass) Media (*Pattern I*)

Despite their outright opposition to and defamation of classical journalism and media as part of the hostile 'elite', the (mass) media (including social media) play a fundamental role in right-wing populist discourses. As a "political logic"[19] and a "communicative scheme"[20] or "communicative pattern"[21], right-wing populism gains from its entanglements with the workings of mass media. Gender serves a particular function as a means to mobilise politics and catapult them into the public sphere. Often purporting to be saying what, supposedly, 'everyone was thinking", and "shunning the politically correct', current right-wing populists like Jair Bolsonaro and Donald Trump offer a new, or revived, exclusionary narrative. Such populist actors usually condemn the media as the enemy, regardless of the fact that they depend on media and take advantage of the shared logics of populism and media regarding attention economies and emotionality.[22] Since gender is still mostly perceived as a 'naturalised' hierarchy and most

19 Ernesto Laclau: On Populist Reason, London/New York 2005, p. 117.

20 Bernd Stegemann: Das Gespenst des Populismus. Ein Essay zur politischen Dramaturgie, Berlin 2017, p. 22.

21 Sérgio Costa: Im brasilianischen Wahlkampf ist Verleumdung Programm, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung online edition, 19 October 2018, at: https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/brasilien-wahlkampf-bolsonaro-1.4173643 (accessed on 30 March 2020).

22 See Paula Diehl: Why Do Right-Wing Populists Find So Much Appeal in Mass Media?, in: The Dahrendorf Forum, 20 October 2017, at: https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/why-do-right-wing-populists-find-so-much-appeal-in-mass-media/ (accessed on 30 March 2020).

people are affectively addressed by issues surrounding gender (and sexuality), gender provides a particularly useful arena for right-wing "affective governmentality".[23]

Proceeding from the observation that populism and mass media share a variety of similar logics and systemic affinities, mass media—and, increasingly, social media—play a crucial role for the current right-wing populist creations of echo chambers or 'bubbles'. Since (particularly commercial) media depend on large audiences, populist actors help them gain viewers through their continuous disregard for taboo, which the employ to cause scandal and thus attention. These actors also draw recipients' attention to media through the affective appeal and simplicity of their arguments. Gender—expressed in paradoxical patterns ranging from sexist and misogynist 'locker room talk' for causing scandals, to 'anti-genderism' against feminists and gender studies and 'sexual exceptionalism' against immigrants—is increasingly interpolated by numerous right-wing populist actors. It serves to affectively bridge the contradictions caused by seemingly emancipatory arguments in favour of 'women's rights' (against immigrants) and a re-traditionalisation paradigm in favour of revised gender roles and family models—or "dynamic paradoxes"[24]—that are constitutive of right-wing populist discourses. Moreover, the use of gender as a platform in mass and social media by right-wing populists is crucial for their racist and anti-immigrant mobilisations.

Appropriating Women's Politics for Femonationalist Alliances (*Pattern II*)

Numerous right-wing populist actors transfer the political hierarchy to the gender hierarchy through the defence of a particular, hegemonic, masculinism. During the election campaigns of Trump in the U. S. 2016 and Bolsonaro in Brazil 2017, women formed a considerable part of the electorate, despite the candidates' outright sexist and misogynist remarks. In both contexts, groups of (predominantly White) women spoke out publicly and campaigned for the candidates, e. g. the 'Women for Trump' in the U. S. or the 'Mulheres com Jair Bolsonaro Presidente' (Women with President Jair Bolsonaro) in Brazil. A common argument among these groups is that gender equality has already been achieved, and the different roles taken are the result of individu-

23 Birgit Sauer: Authoritarian Right-Wing Populism as Masculinist Identity Politics. The Role of Affects, in: Gabriele Dietze/Julia Roth (eds.): Right-Wing Populism and Gender. European Perspectives and Beyond, Bielefeld 2020, pp. 25–43.

24 Gabriele Dietze: Why Are Women Attracted to Right-Wing Populism? Sexual Exceptionalism, Emancipation Fatigue, and New Maternalism, in: Gabriele Dietze/Julia Roth (eds.): Right-Wing Populism and Gender: European Perspectives and Beyond, Bielefeld 2020, pp. 147–166.

al choices and values, while feminism discriminates against men. Moreover, female groups often 'gain' (e. g. recognition and political positions) through their alliances with nationalists. The right-wing populist demographic argument that (White/'autochtonous') women are crucial for the (reproduction of) the nation increases this support.

A recent study by the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) demonstrates how right-wing populist parties present themselves as defenders of women's rights (particularly White women) and simultaneously advocate anti-emancipatory positions.[25] The comparative study shows that while men still dominate most populist parties, the number of women is increasing and women are also becoming more and more prominent in leadership positions. Often, these women are among the strongest supporters of anti-feminist and anti-genderist politics while supporting their parties' politics to limit immigration or affirmative action programs and emphasise a distinct cultural identity. In Trump's rhetoric, as expressed in his argument that his wall at the Mexican border served to keep "Mexican rapists"[26] out, he defended the 'freedom' of (White) American women, while repeatedly stating that he supported traditional marriage. However, Trump was well aware that he needs to react to certain emancipatory ideas and at least create paradoxes and deflect attention from a clear line of his gender and sexual politics. This is evident in the fact that he did not—or at least not publicly—condemn feminists, but vaguely stated "I wouldn't say I'm a feminist", "I'm for women, I'm for men, I'm for everyone"[27]. His strategy implies the appropriation of femininity for the (re)enforcement of masculinity and patriarchy while 'selling' this appropriation as happening with the consent of women, as some sort of emancipatory politics. This appropriation can also serve to promote racist nativist and anti-immigrant politics (in favour of the White women of the 'heartland'). Trump's daughter Ivanka, who represents a strong, independent, neoliberal feminist type, helps Trump to attenuate and cushion his scandals.[28] The fact that Trump seemingly 'needed' Ivanka in order to make his masculinist sexist stance palatable to his female and

25 Elisa Gutsche (ed.): Triumph of the Women? The Female Face of the Populist & Far Right in Europe, Berlin 2018.

26 "Trump Planned 'Rapists' Comments About Mexicans", by Christina Wilkie, The Huffington Post, Sept. 30, 2016, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-mexicans-rapists_n_57eeb77ce4b082aad9bb342d (accessed on 18 March, 2021).

27 "Trump: 'I wouldn't say I'm a feminist'", CNN, by Caroline Kenny, January 29, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/28/politics/president-trump-not-feminist-piers-morgan-interview/index.html, (accessed on 18 March, 2021).

28 Will Worley: Donald Trump 'reduced Ivanka to tears' by refusing to apologise fully for 'grabbing women' comments, in: The Independent online edition, 2 May 2017, at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-ivanka-tears-grabbing-women-comments-refuse-apology-first-daughter-oval-office-white-a7713616.html (accessed on 30 March 2020).

conservative voters, however, indicates that the workings of gender as an epistemic field within right-wing discourse must be read as a pattern that is more complex than a simple pushback.

Bolsonaro chose the (female) evangelical pastor and severe anti-feminist Damares Alves as minister of family affairs, human rights and indigenous people (of a new ministry for these three fields, for which he abolished the human rights ministry). Alves, who is decidedly "Pro-life" and has emphasised that "women are born to be mothers"[29], has been met with concern by indigenous representatives and feminists. Interestingly, Alves defended same-sex marriage, which is legal in Brazil, and declared her support for LGBT movements. However, she is also opposed to sexual education in schools, reflecting Bolsonaro's will to scrap sexual education from public schools and forbid the use of concepts such as "gender perspective"[30]. The new ministry led by Alves will also be in charge of the National Foundation of the Indigenous (FUNAI), a previously independent institution that regulates issues related to the indigenous communities in the country. FUNAI is in charge of protecting the areas inhabited by indigenous groups and is one of Brazil's last lines of defence against extractivist projects in the territory. Tying it to the ministry will put it at Alves's and Bolsonaro's hands, who are against reservations because of the limitations they impose on private companies' interests. They thus continue racist anti-indigenous politics that colonial power structures have kept intact for centuries.

Religiously motivated conservative women like Alves in many places identify with naturalised traditional gender roles, justifying their support of right-wing politics with their interest in the well-being and protection of children, family, and the nation, as well as, often, 'Pro-life' politics. They gain power by aligning themselves with men through racism. Thus, in the same manner in which women are important for male populists, racialised Others are important for right-wing women. By demonising feminism as 'anti-male', 'sexist', and exclusive, the 'Women for Trump' and 'Women for Bolsonaro' movements further represent a form of Occidentalist (or 'Western') self-reassurance. Claiming to be in the possession of a better, more advanced gender regime enables the participating women to see themselves as fully emancipated and not affected by structural discrimination. While sexism and gender discrimination is projected onto and reduced to other (Muslim, indigenous, non-Western etc.) women

29 Dom Phillips: Bolsonaro to abolish human rights ministry in favour of family values, in: The Guardian online edition, 10 September 2018, at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/06/outcry-over-bolsonaros-plan-to-put-conservative-in-charge-of-new-family-and-women-ministry (accessed on 30 March 2020).

30 Ibid.; Telesur: Bolsonaro Abolishes Human Rights Ministry For 'Family Values', in: Telesur English online edition, 7 December 2018, at: https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Bolsonaro-Abolishes-Human-Rights-Ministry-For-Family-Values-20181207-0021.html (accessed on 30 March 2020).

and 'cultures', White/'autochtonous' women can feel advantaged through their "femonationalist"[31] alliances with White men against immigrants.

Both the Trump and the Bolsonaro presidency follow the progressive, pluralist governments by Lula da Silva and Barack Obama and the (relative) success of the first female presidential candidates: Dilma Rousseff, who ran Brazil from 2011 to (her impeachment in) 2016 and Hillary Clinton, the first woman to run for the U.S. presidency. Gender played a decisive role in both campaigns, since the opponents of both female candidates condemned their femininity and ridiculed their left-wing predecessors as 'weak' and feminised. In Obama's case it was his racialised masculinity—Trump famously sought to prove that Obama was no U.S. American citizen due to his second name "Hussein"—through which the candidates positioned themselves. Similar gendered strategies were used by the political Right against presidential candidate Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election campaign, during which Trump and his supporters focused much of his campaign on delegitimising and criminalising Hillary Clinton.[32] When political differences, as well as racial and class hierarchies are transferred to the gender hierarchy, the binary becomes legible and affectively accessible in terms of the gender binary. Misogynist descriptions, and thus 'gender', not only served to disparage Rousseff, but it also formed the cognitive and "affective bridge"[33] between accusations. In both cases, through the openly misogynist hatred for the oppositional women politicians who were cast as members of the ruling elite, the right-wing populist candidates constructed the alternative candidate as the return of the strong patriarchal White leader.

AfD chairman Björn Höcke in Germany followed a similar pattern by projecting immigrant males as a threat against which White German males had to re-discover their manhood (and protect 'their' women).[34] Birgit Sauer has thus described right-

31 See Sara R. Farris: Femonationalism and the 'Regular' Army of Labor Called Migrant Women, in: History of the Present: A journal of Critical History 2:2 (2012), pp. 184–199; Idem.: In the Name of Women's Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism, Durham 2017.

32 See Amanda Hess: How a Fractious Women's Movement Came to Lead the Left, in: The New York Times online edition, 7 February 2017, at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/magazine/how-a-fractious-womens-movement-came-to-lead-the-left.html (accessed on 30 March 2020).

33 Gabriele Dietze: Sexueller Exzeptionalismus. Überlegenheitsnarrative in Immigrationsabwehr und Rechtspopulismus, Bielefeld 2019.

34 In his speech at the convention of the German extremist right-wing party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in 2015, the chairman of the party's parliamentary group in the federal state of Thuringia, Björn Höcke, claimed that "we have to re-discover our manhood. Because only if we rediscover our manhood, will we be manly. And only if we're manly we will be well-fortified, and we have to become well-fortified, dear friends!" Translation by the author.

wing populist rhetorics as White "masculinist identity politics"[35], a pattern that we can also see in the discourses of Alt-Right ('Alternative Right') male activists, online and offline.[36] The Alt-Right is a far-right, loosely connected, White-supremacist, nationalist movement based in the U.S.A. that mainly organises men. They mainly organise online, thereby reaching followers on a global scale. The mass murderers of the attacks by Anders Breivik in Utoaya (Norway) in 2011, by Brenton Tarrant in Christchurch (New Zealand) in 2019, and by Stephan Balliet in Halle (Germany) in 2020, as well as by Tobias Rathjen, in Hanau (Germany) in 2020 have been associated with these circles. However, less radical defenders of such nativist ideologies can no longer afford to exclude women. Rather, they rely on the solidarity and support of *particular* women. The mentioned FES study demonstrates that right-wing populist logics recently pursue a politics of "for women, against feminists"[37], and, one might add, against "genderism"/"gender ideology" and LGBTQI activism.[38]

Against 'Gender Ideology' and Affirmative Action (*Pattern III*)

Through the opposition to gender politics and left-wing agendas—which reconnects to long-standing historic exclusionary ideologies—right-wing populists have managed to unite and create alliances between a number of actors, including religious groups from Christian churches, fundamentalist Muslims and Jews, as well as far right parties and conservatives. Often, the agendas of these groups include either the opposition to neoliberal devastation of welfare programs and state protection and individualisation (i. e. through the idealisation of the heteronormative family as a bulwark against the threats of globalization and precarization), or a structurally similar logic (i. e. freedom

35 Birgit Sauer: Authoritarian Right-Wing Populism as Masculinist Identity Politics. The Role of Affects, in: Gabriele Dietze/Julia Roth (eds.): Right-Wing Populism and Gender. European Perspectives and Beyond, Bielefeld 2020, pp. 25–43.

36 See Simon Strick: The Alternative Right, Masculinities, and Ordinary Affect, in: Gabriele Dietze/Julia Roth (eds.): Right-Wing Populism and Gender. European Perspectives and Beyond, Bielefeld 2020, pp. 233–259.

37 Elisa Gutsche (ed.): Triumph of the Women? The Female Face of the Populist & Far Right in Europe. See also Ailynn Torres: Latin American Neoconservatisms and Antifeminism: Freedom, Family, and Life, Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, International Research Group on Authoritarianism and Counter-Strategies, 2021, at: https://www.irgac.org/2021/02/04/latin-american-neoconservatisms-and-antifeminism-freedom-family-and-life/ (accessed on 18 March, 2021).

38 See Julia Roth: Can Feminism Trump Populism? Right-Wing Trends and Intersectional Contestations in the Americas; Idem.: Intersectionality Strikes Back: Right-Wing Patterns of En-Gendering and Feminist Contestations in the Americas, pp. 257–273.

as freedom from state intervention.[39] Furthermore, affirmative action is often opposed because it is perceived to privilege the "undeserving" ones—such as feminists and African Americans or immigrants—while others have to continue to stand in line.[40] Immigrants are projected as being a predominantly 'external' menace to the national citizens, particularly to 'autochtonous' women (imagined as mothers, educators, carers) and the nation, but also as competitors where access to resources and mobility is concerned. Complementary to this, many right-wing actors have increasingly constructed 'gender ideology', 'the gender craze', or 'genderism' as one of the central society-internal threats to children, families, and thus as an existential threat to (the reproduction of) the nation. The Trump administration has sought to stop transgender people from serving in the army and has legally challenged civil rights protections for trans individuals embedded in the nation's health care law, insisting on defining gender as strictly biologically determined.[41] The Trump administration even attempted to delete questions about gender identity from a 2020 census survey and a national survey of elderly citizens and to remove 'gender' from United Nations (UN) human rights documents. Several agencies have also repealed policies that recognised gender identity in schools, prisons and homeless shelters.[42] Thereby, Trump has met the demands of conservative Christian actors like the former director of the DeVos Center for Religion and Civil Society at the Heritage Foundation (a think tank in Washington), Roger Severino, who was among the conservatives who strongly opposed the Obama administration's expansion of sex to include gender identity.

Having been a congressman for 28 years, Bolsonaro looks back on a long career in politics, during which he already promoted racist positions he can now push with more force. Bolsonaro was a fierce opponent to the 2011 Supreme Court decision that legalised the recognition of same-sex couples, supported by the evangelical parliamentary block which seeks to undermine the expansion of sexual and reproductive rights, same sex marriage and the right to legal, free and safe abortion and was also crucial

39 Weronika Grzebalska et al.: Gender as symbolic glue: How 'gender' became an umbrella term for the rejection of the (neo)liberal order, in: Luxemburg magazine, 2018, p. 34 at: https://www.zeitschrift-luxemburg.de/lux/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/LUX_Breaking_Feminism_E-Paper.pdf (accessed on 30 March 2020).

40 See Arlie Russell Hochschild: Strangers in their Own Land. Anger and Mourning on the American Right, New York 2016.

41 Erica L. Green et al.: 'Transgender' Could Be Defined Out of Existence Under Trump Administration, in: The New York Times online edition, 21 October 2018, at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/us/politics/transgender-trump-administration-sex-definition.html (accessed on 30 March 2020).

42 Julian Borger: Trump administration wants to remove 'gender' from UN human rights documents, The Guardian online edition, 25 October 2018, at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/24/trump-administration-gender-transgender-united-nations (accessed on 30 March 2020).

for his successful presidential candidacy. Demonising them as a "gay kit", Bolsonaro led a campaign against inclusionary educational materials developed by the Ministry of Education, which were to challenge discrimination and violence against LGBTQI groups.[43] After Bolsonaro castigated the program as a menace to the sexual binary and to Brazilian children and families, the materials were abandoned by the Ministry. And yet, seemingly paradoxically, Bolsonaro also denied being a homophobe, when confronted with a video by U.S. journalists showing two gay men having sex in public, which he had posted during the carnival. The Trump administration in the U.S.A. and several European governments have recently developed a similar anti-gender rhetoric, as can be observed with the AfD in Germany, Victor Orbán's anti-gender crusade in Hungary, as well as similar movements in Poland, Spain, or Austria. Already since the 1990s, similar narratives had been circulated in conservative Catholic and conservative intellectual circles.[44]

Through the idea of a globally spread menace of 'gender ideology', this perceived permanent threat is projected onto the global scale and given a religious dimension. It is discussed and framed as a fundamental and all-encompassing menace.

Reverse Anti-Colonialism: 'Gender Ideology' as 'Ideological Colonisation' (in Radical Religious and Femoglobal Alliances) (*Pattern IV*)

Following a populist logics, global elites are demonised and the 'ordinary people' defended by equating gender egalitarianism with colonisation. Thus, through the appropriation of an anti-colonialism frame, or the anti-colonial frame envisioned by the right, the opposition to the empty signifier gender provides them with a 'new language'. In the form of a "Reverse Anti-Colonialism", notions of gender are used to present religious conservatives as an embattled minority.[45] This pattern also relies on the notion of 'Other' sexual and gender regimes against which the supposedly superior order (upholding the 'right' moral/religious values) can be imagined. Right-wing populism accordingly functions as a relief and a reactionary gesture in the complex

43 The Conversation: 2019. How Jair Bolsonaro used 'fake news' to win power, in: The Conversation online, 8 January 2019, at: https://theconversation.com/how-jair-bolsonaro-used-fake-news-to-win-power-109343 (accessed on 30 March 2020).

44 Mary Ann Case: Trans Formations in the Vatican's War on 'Gender Ideology', in: Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 44:3 (2019), pp. 639–664.

45 See Julia Roth: Can Feminism Trump Populism? Right-Wing Trends and Intersectional Contestations in the Americas.

world of (neo)liberalism, a relief which is expressed through hatred and construction of a perceived threat from the liberal/superior/emancipated world.[46]

The so-called 'gender ideology' and affirmative action are perceived as part of a 'left', 'liberal' discourse resulting from the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s (and the related 'sexual revolution') and demonised as privileging undeserving minorities. They are depicted as severely limiting social mobility and access to success for the 'native' majority which, in this mind set, rightfully, and naturally 'deserves' them. The term 'gender ideology' originated with the Vatican in the 1990s, when a strategy that came to be known as 'gender mainstreaming' entered politics as a means of progressive efforts to make gender equality a central focus of UN documents and policies. Without using the term 'gender' yet, the Ratzinger Report from the 1980s had already put together all of the elements of what conservative opponents would come to call the "ideology of gender" (significantly before the Beijing Conference on Women).[47] For the Vatican, the term 'gender' would serve to deconstruct sex differences and lead to the dismantling of traditional family values. Pope Francis introduced the notion of 'ideological colonisation' to condemn governments and NGOs (non-governmental organisations) from the EU and the U. S. or other multinational or supranational institutions that tie grants for the education of the poor to educational materials on sexual diversity. Together with the 'poor' victims of such measures, conservative Catholic gender hierarchies can thus be portrayed as forming part of a minority under attack. A similar pattern can also be observed among (predominantly but not exclusively White male) internet activists around the so-called 'Alt-Right', who see 'gender' as an oppressive regime and themselves not as aggressors, but in a condition of permanent danger. Through this position, Francis has gained approval far beyond the traditional conservatives, finding "resonance with the allegedly colonised, from the global South to Eastern Europe".[48] In East Eu-

46 For a more nuanced understanding, see Sarah L. De Lange/Liza M. Mügge: Gender and Right-Wing Populism in the Low Countries, p. 62, who distinguish between "national populist" and "neoliberal populist" parties whose programs, rhetorics/discourses and policies regarding gender differ respectively.

47 Mary Ann Case: Trans Formations in the Vatican's War on 'Gender Ideology', in: Signs: Journal of Women in Cul-ture and Society 44:3 (2019), p. 640.

48 Ibid., p. 650. See also Elżbieta Korolczuk/Agnieszka Graff: Gender as 'Ebola from Brussels': The Anticolonial Frame and the Rise of Illiberal Populism, in: Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 43:4 (2018), pp. 797–821, who trace the ways in which the "global Right" recently selectively borrows from liberal-left and feminist discourses for constructing a new, illiberal universalism by positioning the family as foundational unity of societies and presenting religious conservatives as a minority (p. 815). As Graff and Korolczuk argue, the respective actors do so based on an "anticolonial frame" as a discursive strategy for anti-feminist and anti-capitalist mobilisation, thus combining a critique of neoliberalism and globalisation in order to protect the "ordinary people", the poor and the marginalised from corrupt global elites (p. 798).

rope, the narrative of "gender ideology" as an imperial Western import prevails. Gender seems to serve a particular function within the Vatican's discourses as well as in the context of the increasing alliances between conservative Catholic actors, right-wing populist protagonists, and radical right-wing movements. The right-wing Catholic-inspired discourse offers such actors political representation, affirms their traditional views and ways of life, and defends them against the challenges they perceive. In Latin America, anti-gender campaigns have gained momentum against the backdrop of the rise of Pentecostal and Neo-Pentecostal religious groups and the simultaneous weakening of progressive—and partly female—presidencies in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Gender ideology, thus, has come to serve the function of an 'enemy within' and simultaneously as an 'outside' global threat. Gender, thus, provides a crucial arena within populist logics by constructing this enemy as a threat to the community and its (supposedly shared) moral values (the populist *volonté générale,* here interpreted as being in tune with certain religious values). Gender can constantly be re-signified and can create different projections against which there is a felt need to defend, for which the religiously motivated/justified "moral panic"[49] caused by sexual politics serves to turn "gender ideology" into as an existential threat (to the 'natural', nuclear, heteronormative family and the homogenous nation), and to what is perceived as 'order' per se.

'Ethno-Sexism' and 'Exclusive Intersectionality' (*Pattern V*)

If, as explained before, right-wing populists pursue a politics of "exclusive intersectionality"[50] or "intersectionality from above"[51] by denying the equality and rights of Others, they are provoking intersectional responses, since all minorities and emancipatory programs are attacked. 'Illegal' and unwanted immigration is mobilised as a central trope and as a severe threat to the very existence of the 'autochthonous culture' and population by many right-wing populists. Both Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro work toward strict immigration policies, through the policing and militarisation of their national borders. They both also mobilise seemingly feminist (or pro-women) ar-

49 Gayle Rubin: Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in: Carole S. Vance (ed.): Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality, London 1984, pp. 267–293.

50 See Monika Mokre/Birte Siim: European Public Spheres and Intersectionality, in: Birte Siim/Monika Mokre (eds.): Negotiating Gender and Diversity in an Emergent European Public Sphere, Basingstoke2013, pp. 22–40.

51 Birgit Sauer: Intersectionality from Above – Framing Muslim Headscarves, in: European Policy Debates, Paper Presented at the ECPR General Conference Sciences Po, Bordeaux, September 4–7, 2013 (unpublished).

guments and frames which they rid of their emancipatory content to negotiate topics like demography, citizenship, belonging and immigration. Right after his inauguration, Trump began to dismantle the DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) program for temporary protection from deportation and the right to live, study and work in the USA for migrants' children which had been granted under the Obama administration. He implemented his 'Muslim ban' prohibiting visas for citizens of seven predominantly Muslim countries, and he promised to build a militarised wall between the U.S. and Mexico to curb illegal immigration. Furthermore, Trump has continuously emphasised his goal to give up the current *jus solis* of U.S. citizenship law. He has often argued that this law motivated Mexican migrant women to come to the U.S. to have children in order to secure U.S. citizenship, as expressed in the discourse on so-called "anchor babies".[52] His statement emphasises the interdependence and entanglements of gender and racist anti-immigration paradigms in right-wing discourse and logics. Evoking a similar ethno-sexist stereotype as the one that was at work in the so-called 'New Year's Events' in Cologne, Germany, in 2015/16, Trump, in his rhetoric figure of the 'Mexican rapist', projected the threat of sexual violence onto an outside enemy: immigrant, non-white men, from whom 'women' had to be protected. On the one hand, this form of "ethno-sexism"[53]could be used to justify restrictions in immigration policies. On the other hand, the 'proper' society could be imagined as free from sexual violence.

Bolsonaro, like Trump, has repeatedly rhetorically drawn parallels between the nation and a family home, in phrases such as "our house […] our Brazil".[54] Directly after his inauguration in January 2019, Bolsonaro withdrew from the UN pact on migration—which the Trump government had refused to sign to begin with.[55] He also implemented strict border regimes, particularly in the North of Brazil and currently at the

52 See Manuela Boatcă/Julia Roth: Unequal and Gendered: Notes on the Coloniality of Citizenship Rights, in: Current Sociology 64:2 (2016), pp. 191–212; Manuela Boatcă/Julia Roth: Women on the Fast Track? Coloniality of Citizenship and Embodied Social Mobility, in: Samuel Con/Rae L. Blumberg (eds.): Power of the Purse: Global Causes and Consequences of Women's Economic Power, Los Angeles 2019, pp. 162–174.

53 Gabriele Dietze: Rechtspopulismus und Geschlecht. Paradox und Leitmotif, in: Femina Politica 27 (2018), pp. 34–46.

54 Marcia Vera Espinoza/Leiza Brumat: Brazil elections 2018: how will Bolsonaro's victory affect migration policy in Brazil and South America?, in: LSE Latin America and Caribbean blog , 25 October 2018, at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2018/10/25/brazil-elections-2018-how-will-a-bolsonaro-victory-affect-migration-policy-in-brazil-and-beyond/ (accessed on 30 March 2020).

55 Francesca Paris: Brazilian President Bolsonaro Withdraws from U.N. Compact on Migration, in: NPR online edition, 9 January 2019, at: https://www.npr.org/2019/01/09/683634412/brazilian-president-bolsonaro-withdraws-from-u-n-compact-on-migration?t=1594980645621 (accessed on 30 March 2020).

border to Venezuela.[56] Tellingly, during his March 2019 visit with Trump, Bolsonaro promised to remove the visa 'restrictions' for U.S. citizens (which are/were actually reciprocal, since Brazil is/was the only country to introduce the same rules for obtaining visa for U.S. citizens that the U.S. requires from that country's own citizens).

To different extents, representatives of the pro-Trump or pro-Bolsonaro movements or figures like openly gay politician Alice Weidel of the AfD party in Germany represent the phenomenon of such forms of exploitation and co-optation of feminist themes by anti-Islam and xenophobic campaigns which Sara R. Farris describes as "femonationalism".[57] Similar arguments can also be found in the rhetoric of certain gay and LGBTQI groups who join a nationalist discourse with racist and xenophobic arguments and are often co-opted by right-wing groups, a phenomenon Jasbir Puar has referred to as "homonationalism".[58] Farris analyses how this practice also serves an economic function, as neoliberal civic integration policies and feminist groups include Muslim and non-Western immigrant women into the segregated domestic and care industries, all the while claiming to promote their emancipation. Thus, through the ethno-sexist narrative of the immigrant or Muslim sexual perpetrator, purportedly oppressed and silenced masculinities can imagine themselves as 'protectors', once again. For right-wing populists, the transgression of the naturalised gender and ethnic/cultural/national borders threatens the community's/nation's alleged homogeneity. Through the strategic use of gender and ethnicity for processes of Othering dynamics or the exclusion of the transgressor of this order/community and the suspension of marginalised groups such as immigrants can be justified.[59] In analogy to the posture of an 'American exceptionalism' (positioning the U.S. as the best and most 'completed' version of all societies and democracies), Gabriele Dietze has defined a discourse of negative external ascription intended to produce a sense of one's own superiority and to distract from one's own emancipatory deficits (and misogyny and sexism) as "sexual exceptionalism"[60], which Trump's politics have illustrated very clearly.

The paradox consists in the *simultaneity* of traditional core convictions and an "emancipation performance" which is used to modernise right-wing gender models

56 Marcia Vera Espinoza/Leiza Brumat: Brazil elections 2018: how will Bolsonaro's victory affect migration policy in Brazil and South America?, in: LSE Latin America and Caribbean blog, 25 October 2018, at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2018/10/25/brazil-elections-2018-how-will-a-bolsonaro-victory-affect-migration-policy-in-brazil-and-beyond/ (accessed on 30 March 2020).

57 Sara R. Farris: Femonationalism and the 'Regular' Army of Labor Called Migrant Women, pp. 184–199; Sara R. Farris: In the Name of Women's Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism.

58 Jasbir K. Puar: Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. Durham, London 2007.

59 Julia Roth: Intersectionality Strikes Back: Right-Wing Patterns of En-Gendering and Feminist Contestations in the Americas, pp. 257–273.

60 Gabriele Dietze: Das Ereignis Köln, in: Femina Politica 1 (2016), pp. 93–102.

and to uncouple them from radical right-wing stigma. These contradictions are not resolved, but are in motion and are being re-negotiated constantly.[61]

Outlook

Since right-wing discourse has become more complex, as we can also see in the mentioned introductory examples, this article has shown that the narrative of a mere 'backlash' towards prior conservative gender hierarchies is insufficient to explain the current dynamics. Aware that they need to cater to a broad range of possible supporters, right-wing actors often trigger 'dynamic paradoxes' such as the alleged mobilisation to protect women's sexual liberties. For the most part, such mobilisations simultaneously promote an anti-immigration paradigm, depicting immigrant males as oppressors and as a threat to 'autochtonous' women (and sometimes LGBTQIs) and their rights. Such more intricate arguments also require more complex analysis and critique in order to adequately address the recent articulation of right-wing manners of gendering.

The outlined right-wing populist 'Patterns of Gendering' demonstrate how gender (and sexuality) serves as a platform, an arena, and an affective bridge in the respective discourses which are used to mobilise diverse topics. Consequently, the alleged defence of women's rights — mostly against thus-proclaimed 'alien' aggressors — provides the basis for 'femonationalist' alliances of certain women against immigrants. Through the construction of 'genderism' or a 'gender ideology' as an existential threat to ('normal') women and the nation, White/hegemonic masculinity can, in many cases, be justified again (mostly in the form of the strong, masculine populist leader). This becomes even easier through the ethno-sexist projection of sexism and homophobia onto racialised Others, whereby one's own position is perceived as free from sexual and gender violence, to justify the exclusion of the transgressor of this order and the suspension of marginalised groups such as immigrants.

The mentioned examples have demonstrated how gender serves a twofold function in right-wing populist discourse: on the one hand, gender is particularly useful for mobilising a new common sense and a "new hegemonic compromise"[62] based on the long-standing sexual binary that still marks people's habits and appeals to the everyday experiences of most people. Since gender is incorporated into "chains of equivalence"[63] between different requests, gender topics are an especially valuable field

61 Gabriele Dietze: Rechtspopulismus und Geschlecht. Paradox und Leitmotiv, pp. 35–36.
62 Birgit Sauer: Gesellschaftstheoretische Überlegungen zum europäischen Rechtspopulismus. Zum Erklärungspotenzial der Kategorie Geschlecht, p. 14.
63 Ernesto Laclau: On Populist Reason, p. 84.

for creating hegemony, turning these requests into demands or to "name all wrongs"[64]. By rendering the gender orders of Others problematic if not unacceptable, right-wing discourses on the other hand 'prove' their Occidental superiority. Imaginations of the 'untamed masculinity' of "other" men are part and parcel of this imaginary. These gender stereotypical and racist ascriptions are instrumentalised for the outsourcing of emancipatory issues within a nation's borders and simultaneously create a threat that justifies the exclusion of perceived aggressors. The borders and/or limits of citizenship and belonging are also negotiated through this division, while downplaying the group's own emancipation deficits and maintaining the traditional binary and heterosexual/-normative gender order. Moreover, those who have been fighting for and insisting on these rights, such as feminists and LGBTQI activists, are demonised as representing a threat to (heteronormative) families and the sexual binary, as well as to the (reproduction of the) nation. Additionally, through a sense of community and superiority and the outsourcing of the perceived threat to both 'gender ideology' and 'external rapists', attention is deflected from the effects of globalisation and social inequalities.

As we have also seen, gender issues and arguments serve to push racist and nativist arguments forward. An intersectional gender perspective—or, a "critical feminist theory of populism"[65] on gender patterns evoked by the right-wing populist complex reveals the tensions and contradictions within the right-wing populist discourse, such as those between class, nationality, and gender, which can then be critically examined and hence serve to make the anti-pluralistic and anti-liberal project of right-wing populism visible and workable. Thus, the entanglements of racism, ethno-sexism and sexism in right-wing populist discourses render feminist, queer, anti-racist and intersectional scholarship urgently required tools in the field of right-wing populism research. They are essential to grasping the different dimensions of the workings of gender for complex right-wing populist discourses.

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64 Birgit Sauer: Gesellschaftstheoretische Überlegungen zum europäischen Rechtspopulismus. Zum Erklärungspotenzial der Kategorie Geschlecht, p. 14.

65 Julia Roth: The Gendered Politics of Right-Wing Populism and Intersectional Feminist Contestations, in: Michael Oswald/Elena Broda (eds.): The Palgrave Handbook of Populism, Basingstoke 2021 (in print).

Caner Tekin

Anti-Immigration Propaganda in the Northern League and the Freedom Party of Austria: Discursive Changes with Reference to Gender, Muslim Migrants, Ethnicity and Class

Abstract

Over the past two decades, populist-radical parties of Western Europe arguably revised their propaganda towards the rejection of Muslim migrants with gender-sensitive arguments. Among these parties, the Northern League (LN) and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) achieved their electoral breakthrough thanks to their anti-migration campaigns, which, *inter alia*, aligned peculiar gender perspectives with long-term attitudes towards ethnicity, welfare and Islam. Drawing on the LN's and FPÖ's election programmes, visuals and leader statements from the early 2000s, the present article discusses the common assumptions regarding the populist radical right's discursive changes towards anti-Islamism. The paper argues that the two parties in the mentioned period forged their propaganda against the rejection of Muslim migrants in religious and gender-sensitive terms, but their ethnic and class-oriented exclusions equally remained. The documents in question also revealed that these parties recently softened their attitudes towards migrant caregivers to preserve traditional gender images in Austria and Italy. The LN's and FPÖ's long-term preoccupations with Italian and Austrian women's roles in worklife, family and reproduction are likely to bring about changes in the conceptions of female migrants in the care sector. The question still remains whether the parties began to tolerate Muslim female workers, since their propaganda, in contrast to the literature, did not suggest the acknowledgement of Muslims in any of the labour fields.

Keywords: *populist radical right*; *gender*; *Muslim migrants*; *Freedom Party of Austria*; *Northern League*; *election campaigns*

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Introduction

In the face of the religiously-motivated terrorist attacks in the Western world, increasing migration from Muslim countries and Turkey's EU membership bid, populist radical-right parties have come to modify their migration discourses towards anti-Islamism since the early 2000s. British Sociologist Gerard Delanty noted as early as 2008 that terrorism and economic crises traumatised Europe and intensified the common anxiety of Europeans as well as "the currents of xenophobia".[1] Most of the populist radical right parties of Western Europe then spoke to this growing anxiety and channelled it into hatred and fear of Muslims.[2] Gender became particular element of their exclusionary propaganda: populist radical right parties increasingly targeted the female representation in Islam, in an attempt to prove Muslim migrants' incompatibility with gender equality in Western societies. These parties, most of which were known for their support for patriarchal culture in their countries, turned out to be defenders of women's rights against Muslims. A large number of publications locate this 'gender turn' in the statements of party elites[3] but only few studies discussed it in relation to election campaigns.

Recent publications on the far-right oppositions' last two decades converge on three assumptions: populist radical-right parties increasingly centred their propaganda on the rejections of Islam and Muslim migrants, they stereotyped certain gender roles as e. g. 'victimised' Muslim women and 'criminal' Muslim men, and they instrumentalised these images of supposed victims to 'save' Muslim women and integrate them into the national labour market. The present article discusses the validity of these three assumptions with the propaganda (programmes, visuals and leader statements) of the Northern League (LN) and Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) from the early 2000s. A broad discussion of these assumptions, in the following, contextualises how the populist radical right camps of Western Europe have recently come to terms with gender equality, in particular women's rights, in their oppositions to Muslim migrants. The article then discusses the LN's and FPÖ's official propaganda and orients them *vis-à-vis* the salient points of the given three arguments, namely ethnic, gender-protective and class-oriented conceptualisations of Muslim migrants.

1 Gerard Delanty: Fear of Others: Social Exclusion and the European Crisis of Solidarity, in: Social Policy & Administration 42:6 (2008), pp. 676–690.

2 Filip Milačić/Ivan Vuković: The Rise of the Politics of National Identity: New Evidence from Western Europe, in: Ethnopolitics 17:5 (2017), pp. 443–460.

3 Oliver Geden: Diskursstrategien im Rechtspopulismus: Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs und Schweizerische Volkspartei zwischen Opposition und Regierungsbeteiligung, Wiesbaden 2006, pp. 74–77; Roger Brubaker: Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective, in: Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies 40:8 (2017), pp. 1191–1226.

Attitudes of populist radical right parties towards migration are neither irrelevant to each other, nor are they independent from the evolution of European politics and economy. Populism, defined as a 'thin ideology' that creates moral binaries between 'the people' and 'others', often borrows themes and arguments from mainstream ideologies such as nationalism or liberalism.[4] Against the changing conception of migration in Western Europe, populist radical right parties accordingly revised their oppositions. On the one hand, globalising economic activities and communication promoted international norms and institutions concerned with migration and made it an uncontested fact and need for skilled workers.[5] On the other hand, populist radical right movements could not reject outsiders convincingly in terms of the working class and welfare protectionism.[6] Instead, they raised cultural conflicts, stereotyped non-EU migrants as inherently 'unintegrated' people inclined towards crime, and stipulated criteria for their 'civic integration' into society.[7] With the presence of globally increasing religious conflicts, they turned to rejecting some migrant communities in seemingly liberal and secular terms.[8] Far-right parties and movements of Western Europe thus represented Islam as the arch-enemy of European and national cultures and at the same time maintained their protective emphasis on ethnicity from the early 2000s.[9]

4 Cas Mudde/Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser: Populism: A Very Short Introduction, New York 2017, p. 6; Jan-Werner Müller: What is Populism?, Philadelphia 2016, pp. 24f.

5 Randall Hansen: Globalization, Embedded Realism, and Path Dependence: The Other Immigrants to Europe, in: Comparative Political Studies 35:3 (2002), pp. 259–283; Robert Ford/Will Jennings/Will Somerville: Public Opinion, Responsiveness and Constraint: Britain's Three Immigration Policy Regimes, in: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41:9 (2005), pp. 1391–1411; Emmanuel Comte: The History of the European Migration Regime: Germany's Strategic Hegemony, Abingdon and New York 2018, p. 182.

6 Ferruh Yilmaz: How the Workers Became Muslims: Immigration, Culture, and Hegemonic Transformation in Europe, Ann Arbor 2016.

7 Marc Morjé Howard: The Impact of the Far Right on Citizenship Policy in Europe: Explaining Continuity and Change, in: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36:5 (2010), pp. 735–751; Andrej Zaslove: Closing the door? The ideology and impact of radical right populism on immigration policy in Austria and Italy, in: Journal of Political Ideologies 9:1 (2004), pp. 99–118, p. 113.

8 Magnus E. Marsdal: Loud Values, Muffled Interests: Third Way Social Democracy and Right-Wing Populism, in: Ruth Wodak/Majid Khosravinik/Brigitte Mral (eds.): Right Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse, London 2013, pp. 39–55, p. 52; Jan W. Duyverdak/Menno Hurenkamp/Evelien Tonkens: Culturalization of Citizenship in the Netherlands, in: Ariane Chebel d'Appolonia/Simon Reich (eds.): Diversity after 9/11: Integration, Security and Civil Liberties in Transatlantic Perspective, New Brunswick 2010, pp. 233–253, p. 233.

9 John E. Richardson/Monica Colombo: Continuity and Change in Anti-immigrant Discourse in Italy: An Analysis of the Visual Propaganda of the Lega Nord, in: Journal of Language and Politics 12:2 (2013), pp. 180–202; Alberto Spektorowski: Ethnoregionalism: The Intellectual New Right and the Lega Nord, in: Ethnopolitics 2:3 (2003), p. 56.

In marginalising Muslim communities as threats against liberal and stable European communities, these camps in fact sought to justify the superiority of their perceived national culture.[10]

As a result of the cultural oppositions to migration, populist radical right parties came to repudiate Muslim migrants with gender equality. In anti-immigration discourses the native woman emerged as a 'civil' individual encumbered with production, sexuality and bearing and transmitting ethnic culture.[11] Muslim men were in return represented as uncivil aggressors against the national women, and Muslim women remained the victims, who had to be freed from male domination and Islamic patriarchy. In contrast to the marginalisation of Muslim men, the integration of Muslim female migrants into society became a much-debated issue. Several scholars led by Sara Farris and Francesca Scrinzi accordingly note that conservative and radical right camps in the Western World began to argue for Muslim women's integration and in favour of their employment in low-paid sectors, such as care work in public and in the home.[12] All in all, in the last two decades, secular rejections of migrants from Muslim countries were entangled with terms related to ethnicity, class, and gender in a Western Europe impacted by globalisation and religious conflicts.[13]

10 Martina Avanza: The Northern League and its 'Innocuous' Xenophobia, in: Andrea Mammone/Giuseppe A. Veltri (eds.): Italy Today: The Sick Man of Europe, London 2010, pp. 131–142; Merijn Oudenampsen: Explaining the Swing to the Right: The Dutch Debate on the Rise of Right-Wing Populism, in: Ruth Wodak/Majid Khosravinik/Brigitte Mral (eds.): Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse, London 2013, pp. 191–209; Catherine Kinvall: Borders and Fear: Insecurity, Gender and the Far Right in Europe, in: Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23:4 (2015), pp. 514–529; Ulrike M. Vieten: Far Right Populism and Women: The Normalization of Gendered anti-Muslim Racism and Gendered Culturalism in the Netherlands, in: Journal of Intercultural Studies 37:6 (2016), pp. 621–636.

11 Floya Anthias: Transactional Mobilities, Migration Research and Intersectionality, in: Nordic Journal of Migration Research 2:2 (2012), pp. 102–110; Joan Wallach Scott: Gender and the Politics of History, New York 1988, p. 55.

12 Sara R. Farris/Francesca Scrinzi: 'Subaltern Victims' or 'Useful Resources'? Migrant Women in the Lega Nord Ideology and Politics, in: Jon Mulholland/Nicola Montagna/Erin Sanders-McDonagh (eds): Gendering Nationalism: Intersections of Nation, Gender and Sexuality in the 21st Century, Cham 2018, pp. 241–257; Sara R. Farris: Femonationalism and the "Regular" Army of Labor Called Migrant Women, in: History of the Present 2:2 (2012), pp. 184–199; Sara R. Farris: In the Name of Women's Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism, Durham 2018.

13 Roger Brubaker: Between Nationalism and Civilizationism, pp. 1191–1226; Aurelien Mondon/Aaron Winter: Articulations of Islamophobia: From the Extreme to the Mainstream?, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies 40:13 (2017), pp. 2151–2179; Francesca Scrinzi: A 'New' National Front? Gender, Religion, Secularism and the French Populist Radical Right, in: Michaela Köttig/Renate Bitzan/Andrea Petö (eds.): Gender and Far Right Politics in Europe, New York 2017, pp. 127–140.

In regard to this discursive change, three assumptions emerge in recent literature. First, over the past two decades, the populist radical parties of Western Europe increasingly built their discourses against migration on the rejection of Islam; second, they came to criminalise Muslim men and to present Muslim women as the victims of Islam's 'patriarchal culture'; third, they tend to internalise Muslim women to national labour markets and low-paid industries. These three arguments in return respectively suggest changes in party propaganda regarding religious, ethnic, gender-based and class-oriented exclusions of migrants.

Textual and visual propaganda of the Northern League and the Freedom Party of Austria constitute significant cases contextualising the literature tropes given above. First, the two parties were exceptional among the populist radical right parties of Western Europe in the sense that they respectively participated in governmental politics during the 2000s. They represented part of the public opinion and played significant roles in shaping national migration policies.[14] Second, the two parties resorted to gender-sensitive arguments against Muslim migrants mainly for electoral interests[15], but how their election campaigns (including election programmes and visuals) changed has so far not attracted sufficient research interest. Third, although both parties recently masked their racist attitudes to enlarge their voter bases, their propaganda still revealed particular examples of ethnic exclusions of migrants.[16] How ethnic references remained in their oppositions to Muslim migrants thus demands attention. Finally, the LN and FPÖ had protective attitudes towards national labour markets in the early 2000s: they partook in the governments forging migration and integration laws in 2002, which sought to curb migration of semi-skilled and unskilled workers.[17] Despite these attempts, a debate emerged in the literature about whether these parties showed exceptional tolerance towards migration in particular sectors: the FPÖ accordingly called for further regulations to facilitate employment of foreign seasonal workers in the agricultural and service sectors during the 2000s, whereas the LN was

14 Andrej Zaslove: Closing the door?, pp. 99–118.

15 Leila Hadj-Abdou: 'Gender(ed) nationalism' of the populist radical right: An extreme typicality, in: Gregor Fitzi/Juergen Mackert/Bryan Turner (eds.): Populism and the Crisis of Democracy, New York 2019, pp. 94–110.

16 Tjitske Akkerman: Gender and the radical right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Policy Agendas, in: Patterns of Prejudice 49:1–2 (2015), pp. 37–60; Valerio Renzi: La politica della ruspa: La Lega di Salvini e le nuove destre europee, Rome 2015.

17 Gabriele Abbondanza: Italy's Migration Policies Combating Irregular Immigration: from the Early Days to the Present Times, in: The International Spectator 52:4 (2017), pp. 76–92; Paola Bonizzoni: Looking for the Best and Brightest? Deservingness Regimes in Italian Labour Migration Management, in: International Migration 56:4 (2018), pp. 47–62; Andrej Zaslove: Closing the door?, pp. 99–118.

part of the coalitionary government enacting amnesty to illegal care workers in 2008.[18] Despite these exceptions in specific fields, their attitudes towards the employment of Muslim migrants and particularly Muslim female workers remain unclear. A comparative approach to the LN's and FPÖ's contemporary history and their propaganda devised for the elections held in the last two decades thus provides insight into the shifting relevance of religion to ethnic, gender-based, and class-oriented exclusions.[19]

Religious and Ethnic Exclusions of Muslim Migrants

Founded in 1991 as an electoral confederation of some regionalist movements in Northern Italy, the Northern League, under Umberto Bossi, first and foremost called for local autonomy and tax reform for the region, which the party called Padania. Its policy was then essentially characterised by ethnic nationalism regarding the region, as the party targeted the Italian governments and the 'corrupt' South, on the one hand, and immigrants to Northern Italy, especially the Roma people, on the other. During the mid-1990s, this policy was radicalised towards separation from the motherland.[20] Despite its separationist ideology, the LN chose to participate in coalitionary politics

18 Michael Samers: Strange Castle Walls and Courtyards: Explaining the Political Economy of Undocumented Immigration and Undeclared Employment, in: Georg Menz/Alexander Caviedes (eds.): Labour Migration in Europe, Basingstoke 2010, pp. 221f.; Kenneth Horvath: Securitisation, Economisation and the Political Constitution of Temporary Migration: The Making of the Austrian Seasonal Workers Scheme, in: Migration Letters 11:2 (2014), pp. 154–170.

19 A large group of publications discussed the national gender roles emerging from far-right parties or their critics in detail. Floya Anthias: Transactional Mobilities, Migration Research and Intersectionality, pp. 102–110; Marion Löffler: Maskulinismus: Der ganz normale "Gender-Wahnsinn", in: Brigitte Bargetz/Eva Kreisky/Gundula Ludwig (eds.): Dauerkämpfe: Feministische Zeitdiagnosen und Strategien, Frankfurt am Main and New York 2017, pp. 185–194; Carina Klammer: Imaginationen des Untergangs: zur Konstruktion antimuslimischer Fremdbilder im Rahmen der Identitätspolitik der FPÖ, Münster 2013, pp. 91f.; Edma Ajanovic/Stefanie Mayer: Mann, oh Mann… Wenn der Schutz ‚unserer Frauen' die Antwort ist, was war noch mal die Frage?, in: Brigitte Bargetz/Eva Kreisky/Gundula Ludwig (eds.): Dauerkämpfe: Feministische Zeitdiagnosen und Strategien, Frankfurt am Main and New York 2017, pp. 195–204; Gabriella Hauch: Politik mit der Geschlechterkarte: Historische Ambivalenzen in Frauenfreund-Konjunkturen, in: Brigitte Bargetz/Eva Kreisky/Gundula Ludwig (eds.): Dauerkämpfe: Feministische Zeitdiagnosen und Strategien, Frankfurt am Main 2017, pp. 27–37, pp. 32f.; Carina Klammer/Judith Goetz: Between German Nationalism and Anti-Muslim Racism: Representations of Gender in the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), in: Michaela Köttig/Renate Bitzan/Andrea Petö (eds.): Gender and Far Right Politics in Europe, New York 2016, pp.79–93. They addressed gender roles attributed to Muslim migrants only to a certain extent.

20 Frida Bordon: Lega Nord im politischen System Italiens, Wiesbaden 1997, p. 195

between 2001 and 2006 and later between 2008 and 2011, maintaining its emphasis on the region's security and economic protection.[21] In the face of the 9/11 attacks in the United States and Turkey's emerging EU bid, the LN's migration policy began to target migrants from Muslim countries.[22] During the first governmental period, the party intended to introduce a harsh immigration law and other constitutional reforms granting new powers to local authorities, which were jointly rejected in the 2006 referendum.[23] The LN held onto power through another coalitionary government in 2008, and its member Roberto Maroni, interior minister of the period, managed to enact restrictions against non-EU migrants and Roma people who mostly dwelled in the Northern regions.[24]

The LN's propaganda during the 2000s increasingly targeted Muslim migrants, Roma people and refugees from Africa. Before of the 2009 European elections, the party promised to reject refugee boats, establish camps for nomads or request referenda for the foundation of local mosques.[25] Their election posters correspondingly were aimed at mobilising the public against Muslim and Roma migrants and featured anti-Islamic and racist representations. One of these election visuals was notorious, as it depicted a vessel full of people shot from above, implying a massive group of refugees arriving by sea, and was captioned "we stopped the invasion".[26] Posters such as

21 Lega Nord: Cronistoria Della Lega Nord Dalle Origini ad Oggi, Sesta Parte (History of the Northern League From Its Origins until Today, Chapter Six), 2001, , at: https://www.leganord.org/phocadownload/ilmovimento/storia_ln/06_lega_nord_storia2001.pdf (accessed on 9 March 2021), p. 40); Cronistoria Della Lega Nord Dalle Origini ad Oggi Capitolo 10 (History of the Northern League From Its Origins until Today, Chapter 10), 2005–2006, at: https://www.leganord.org/phocadownload/ilmovimento/storia_ln/10_lega_nord_storia2005.pdf (accessed on 9 March 2021), p. 15.

22 Sara R. Farris/Francesca Scrinzi: 'Subaltern Victims' or 'Useful Resources'?, pp. 241–257; John E. Richardson/Monica Colombo: Continuity and Change in Anti-immigrant Discourse in Italy: An Analysis of the Visual Propaganda of the Lega Nord, in: Journal of Language and Politics 12:2 (2013), pp. 180–202; Danielle Albertazzi/Duncan McDonnell: The Lega Nord Back in Government, in: West European Politics 33:6 (2010), pp. 1318–1340; Chiara Volpato/Federica Durante/Alessandro Gabbiadini/Luca Andrighetto/Silvia Mari: Picturing the Other: Targets of Delegitimization across Time, in: International Journal of Conflict and Violence 4:2 (2010), pp. 269–287.

23 Daniele Albertazzi: Addressing 'the People': A Comparative Study of the Lega Nord's and Lega dei Ticinesi's Political Rhetoric and Styles of Propaganda, in: Modern Italy 12:3 (2007), p. 330.

24 Shannon Woodcock: Gender as Catalyst for Violence against Roma in Contemporary Italy, in: Patterns of Prejudice 44:5 (2010), pp. 477–478.

25 Danielle Albertazzi/Duncan McDonnell: The Lega Nord Back in Government, p. 1326.

26 For the mentioned visual, see the party's official webpage: https://www.leganord.org/component/phocagallery/15-i-manifesti-lega-nord-2009/detail/894-i-manifesti-lega-nord-2009?tmpl=component&Itemid=1 (accessed on 15 September 2020).

the one described in return became the subject of harsh criticism in European politics. Donata Gottardi, former member of the European Parliament, raised a written question for the European Commission, asking whether it would take measures against the Northern League's election posters, since they were "clearly racist and xenophobic and spark(ed) fear among citizens concerning the immigration of people from third countries and European ethnic minorities".[27]

Matteo Salvini assumed leadership of the party in 2013, one year after Bossi's resignation, and reoriented the LN towards Italian nationalism, as he sought to mobilise voters in the entire country through propaganda against Muslim and African migrants.[28] The party's election documents from 2013 thus intensified the discourse criminalising non-EU migrants and refugees from Africa.[29] For example, before the European elections in 2015, Salvini promised to demolish Roma camps in Italy and offered his "final solution", namely razing them with bulldozers. [30] Since then, he has been using the metaphors "final solution" and "bulldozer" often in targeting not only Roma people but also refugees from Africa.[31] As another example, a poster devised for the 2019 local election in Tuscany featured two frames with Italians and their 'antithesis'. The first frame depicted a family of light complexion with the overlaid text "our Tuscany thinks of the Italians first", whereas the other showed seven Africans just sitting and talking cheerfully in a park, with the caption "the left Tuscany thinks of

27 Donata Gottardi: Written Question (PSE) to the Commission (E-3471/09), European Parliament, 12.05.2009, at:https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2009-3471+0+DOC+XML+V0//IT (accessed on 9 March 2021).

28 Ulrike M. Vieten/Scott Poynting: Contemporary Far-Right Racist Populism in Europe, in: Journal of Intercultural Studies 37:6 (2016), pp. 538–539; Daniele Albertazzi/Arianna Giovannini/Antonella Seddone: "No regionalism please, we are Leghisti!" The transformation of the Italian Lega Nord under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, in: Regional & Federal Studies 28:5 (2018), pp. 645–671; Michael Samers: Strange Castle Walls and Courtyards, pp. 221f.; Laura Cervi/Santiago Tejedor: Framing "The Gypsy Problem": Populist Electoral Use of Romaphobia in Italy (2014–2019), in: Social Sciences 9 (2020), pp. 1–17.

29 Lega Nord: Programma elettorale Europee 2014, pp. 8–9, at: https://www.leganord.org/phocadownload/elezioni/europee/Programma%20elettorale%20europee%202014.pdf (accessed on 9 March 2021); Lega Nord: Elezioni politische 4 Marzo 2018. Salvini Premier La Rivoluzione del Buonsenso, at: https://leganord.org/component/phocadownload/category/5-elezioni?download=1514:programma-lega-salvini-premier-2018 (accessed on 9 March 2021), p. 6, 8, pp. 22–23.

30 Bianca Terracciano: Il linguaggio della paura: la strategia social mediale di Matteo Salvini, in: Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 13:2 (2019), pp. 165–181; Laura Cervi/Santiago Tejedor: Framing "The Gypsy Problem": Populist Electoral Use of Romaphobia in Italy (2014–2019), in: Social Sciences , The Global Rise of the Extreme Right, 9:6 (2020), pp. 1–17.

31 Ibid.

immigrants first".[32] The poster intended to criminalise male migrants, but did nothing to make any allegation. Its concern was the existence of Africans in the social sphere, where Italians were supposed to be. The party's election promises against Africans materialised for a short while. Before the general elections of 2018, the LN proposed taking legal measures against rescue ships arriving with refugees.[33] After their victory in the election, the party joined a coalitionary government, which closed Italy's ports to migrant rescue ships.

To counter the accusations of racism directed against the Northern League, party elites also sought to disguise their racist tones and to reframe their migration policy with references to security. It was, for example, a common argument within the party to compare African migrants to animals, as senator Roberto Calderoli publicly stated that Italy's first African minister "look[ed] like an orangutan".[34] To prevent such blunders and potential erosion to the image of the party,, in 2014, Salvini authorised an immigrant with African migration history, Senator Toni Iwobi, to re-draft the party's anti-migrant policy. Iwobi then headed the group drafting the party's migration guidelines and sought to justify the LN's stance against migration with the country's welfare and security.[35] To summarise, in addition to growing opposition to Muslims, racial discrimination remained at the centre of the party's propaganda against migration.

The FPÖ underwent a comparable transition from the complete and staunch rejection of migration towards detailed propaganda directed exclusively against Muslim migrants.[36] From its foundation in 1956 until Jörg Heider's chairmanship in 1986, the party was an advocate of pan-Germanism. Heider then replaced German nationalism with what he called "Austrian patriotism" and represented the country as a historical union based on language, cultural freedom, and the nation's cultural self-determina-

32 Huffington Post: Lega, lo spot in Toscana: "Prima agli italiani", ma usano la foto di una famiglia americana, 08.01.2019, www.huffingtonpost.it/2019/01/08/lega-lo-spot-la-nostra-toscana-pensa-prima-agli-italiani-ma-usano-la-foto-di-una-famiglia-americana_a_23637264/ (accessed on 4 October 2020).

33 Lega Nord: Elezioni politische 4 Marzo 2018, p. 7.

34 Die Welt: Italien: Politiker vergleicht Ministerin mit Orang-Utan, Welt Online 14.07. 2013, www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article118036913/Politiker-vergleicht-Ministerin-mit-Orang-Utan.html (accessed on 12 September 2020).

35 Giorgia Bulli/Sorina Christina Soare: Immigration and Crisis in a New Immigration Country: The Case of Italy, in: Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava: časopis za teoriju i praksu javne uprave 18:1 (2018), pp. 127–156, pp. 141f.

36 Michal Krzyżanowski: From Anti-immigration and Nationalist Revisionism to Islamophobia: Continuities and Shifts in Recent Discourses and Patterns of Political Communication of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), in: Ruth Wodak/Majid KhosraviNik/Brigitte Mral (eds.): Right-Wing Populism in Europe, London and New York 2013, pp. 135–148, pp. 135f.

tion.[37] His conception of cultural self-determination still included xenophobic and anti-Semitic sentiments, and it eminently involved the right to exclude migrants from the country since they were not compatible with Austrian core cultural values.[38] In the early 1990s, when unemployment in specific sectors rose alarmingly in Austria, the FPÖ under Haider began to channel workers' fears into anti-immigration attitudes, attacked the central government and bluntly stood against the EU's enlargements.[39] This zero migration policy was indicative of changes in the 1999 and 2002 elections, in which the party began to accept limited migration from Austria's cultural hinterland excluding Muslims.[40]

Heinz-Christian Strache took over leadership of the party in 2004 and further added to its anti-migrant attitudes by placing security concerns at the core of his political campaigns.[41] He drastically turned the focus of the party's anti-migrant campaigns against Muslim migrants. Whereas the 2002 national election programme solely targeted the concept of 'migration', the programme for the first national election under Strache, in 2006, instead repudiated Muslim migration and 'any form of Islam'.[42] From that time on, the FPÖ increasingly set detailed, repetitive campaigns against Muslim migrants, rather than only speaking to security concerns of the local people.[43] The party launched campaigns for the national and local elections of 2008 and 2009

37 Thomas Fillitz: Being the Native's Friend Does not Make You the Foreigner's enemy! Neo-nationalism, the Freedom Party and Jorg Haider in Austria, in: André Gingrich/Marcus Banks (eds.): Neo-nationalism in Europe and Beyond: Perspectives from Social Anthropology, New York 2006, pp. 149–156; Farid Hafez: Anas Schakfeh: Das österreichische Gesicht des Islams, Wien 2012, pp. 53–55; Leila Hadj-Abdou: 'Gender(ed) nationalism' of the populist radical right, p. 97.

38 Birgit Sauer/Edma Ajanovic: Hegemonic Discourses of Difference and Inequality: Right-Wing Organisations in Austria, in: Gabriella Lazaridis/Giovanna Campani/Annie Benveniste (eds.): The Rise of the Far Right in Europe Populist Shifts and 'Othering', Basingstoke 2016, pp. 81–108, p. 87, p. 94; Reinhard Heinisch: Austria: The Structure and Agency of Austrian Populism, in: Danielle Albertazzi/Duncan McDonnell (eds.): Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, Basingstoke 2008, pp. 67–83; Walter Manoschek: FPÖ, ÖVP, and Austria's Nazi Past, in: Ruth Wodak/Anton Pelinka (eds.): The Haider Phenomenon in Austria, New Brunswick 2002, pp. 1–16.

39 Farid Hafez: Anas Schakfeh: Das österreichische Gesicht des Islams

40 Fraser Duncan: Immigration and integration policy and the Austrian radical right in office: the FPÖ/BZÖ, 2000–2006, in: Contemporary Politics 16:4 (2010), pp. 337–354, p. 342; Oliver Geden: Diskursstrategien im Rechtspopulismus, pp. 77–79.

41 Oliver Geden: Diskursstrategien im Rechtspopulismus, pp. 200–220.

42 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs: Wahlprogramm der FPÖ, Nationalratswahl 2006, p. 10.

43 Ruth Wodak: The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean, London 2015, p. 191; Michal Krzyżanowski: From Anti-immigration and Nationalist Revisionism to Islamophobia, pp. 135–148; Oliver Geden: Diskursstrategien im Rechtspopulismus, p. 151, pp. 200f.

with the mottos "At Home instead of Islam" or "Away from Mosques and Minarets".[44] In 2010, before the local elections in the Steiermark, the party launched a scandalous online game entitled "Moschee Baba", in which the players were tasked to shoot the minarets of mosques and their muezzins to score points.[45] As a sequel of the charges against mosques and minarets, the following year, Strache and his counterparts from the European Parliament visited Israel and sought an alliance with the Jewish conservatives against Muslim migrants. The FPÖ's elites were arguably referring to the Arab-Israeli conflicts and declaring Israel to be at the forefront of the so-called war against 'Muslim invasion'.[46] The anti-Semitism known with Heider had apparently disappeared from Strache's arguments.[47]

Ethnic stereotypes against Muslims, however, remained part of the election propaganda. The party programme adopted in 2011 contained a hazy conception of who could be Austrian: the 'integrated' immigrants, who accepted Austrian values and laws and "set aside their cultural roots".[48] This reference obviously targeted Muslim migrants, but the vocabulary used in the previous and later elections also implied a certain Austrian ethnicity. The campaigns for the local elections of 2010 and 2012 were thus launched with the mottos "More courage for our Viennese blood. too many foreigners does no one any good" or "Love of the country instead of Moroccan thieves".[49] Several election posters devised for the national election of 2013 were captioned "High time for 'brotherly love'", depicting white women from older and younger generations.[50] Overall the party's election propaganda promoted the ethnic unity of Austrians and marginalised Muslim migrants, not only in religious but also in racial terms.[51]

44 Michal Krzyżanowski: From Anti-immigration and Nationalist Revisionism to Islamophobia, p. 135.

45 Elisalex Henckel: Österreich über islamfeindliches FPÖ-Spiel empört, in: Die Welt, 02.09.2010.

46 Lorenz Jäger: Reise nach Jerusalem, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13.12.2020.

47 Omran Shroufi: The Gates of Jerusalem: European Revisionism and the Populist Radical Right, in: Race & Class 57:2 (2015), pp. 24–42, p. 33.

48 "Österreich zuerst", Parteiprogram der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs (passed by the Federal Party Congress of the Austrian Freedom Party on 17 July 2011 in Graz. Translated by the author.

49 Angela Köckritz: Bundespräsidentenwahl: Wiener Blut, in: Die Zeit 50, 01.12.2016; Die Welt Online: FPÖ wirbt mit „Heimatliebe statt Marokkaner-Diebe", 02.04.2012, www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article106148765/FPOe-wirbt-mit-Heimatliebe-statt-Marokkaner-Diebe.html (accessed on 10 September 2020). Translated by the author.

50 Franziska Marquart/Jörg Matthes: Campaigning subtle exclusionism: The effects of right-wing populist positive ads on attitudes toward foreigners in Austria, in: Studies in Communication and Media (SCM) 5:2 (2016), pp. 223–239, p. 231.

51 Franziska Marquart: Rechtspopulismus im Wandel. Wahlplakate der FPÖ von 1978–2008, in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft (ÖZP) 42:4 (2013), pp. 353–371.

In summary, the election campaigns of the LN and FPÖ from the 2000s suggest a growing emphasis on Islam and attempts to mobilise voters against migrants from Islamic countries. Although secular rejections of Islam remained at the surface of the campaigns directed against Muslims, election posters also carried references to ethnic differences. These religious and ethnic emphases in turn underpinned many visuals, the below section argues, that pigeonhole Muslim gender groups and thus constitute intersecting religious and gender images.

Religious and Gender-sensitive Exclusions

The emerging trope in the literature, namely that national populism in Western Europe differentiates migrant gender identities into criminal men and victimised women does not only concern Muslims. In her commentary, that "Gender and ethnicity are the twin constitutive discourses of modern European society, and racialized subjects are necessarily gendered", Shannon Woodcock pointed to the Italian government, which, in 2008, was poised to enact a security package against Roma people.[52] Indeed, during the discussions of this amendment, Berlusconi's media sought to legitimize security measures with the images of Roma people committing sexual crimes against Italian women. Criminalising Muslim gender identities is the continuation of this racist state of affairs and can be traced in the LN's and FPÖ's election campaigns.

During the 2000s, LN campaigns against Muslim migrants already included posters that stereotyped migrants according to gender groups. One recruitment poster released in 2005 by the Young Padanian Movement, the youth organisation of LN, depicted a woman in a burqa and read: "Now or never. Stop the Islamic invasion! Respect our laws or return to your own country. Defend your country, join the Young Padanians!".[53] A year later, the party reiterated its uncompromising attitude against Turkey's EU membership and published a poster showing two frames respectively featuring two Italian and one supposedly Turkish woman. The first frame depicted two white-skinned and black-haired women with some papers, supposedly high-skilled employees working on a project, with the overlay text reading: "we". The second frame showed a veiled woman behind bars, supposedly screaming or crying in the dark, with the overlay text: "they". The overlay text was: "Are you willing to risk it? No to Turkey in Europe". In 2006, at a time when Turkey commenced membership negotiations with the EU with its justified reform performance towards democratisation, this

52 Shannon Woodcock: Gender as Catalyst for Violence against Roma in Contemporary Italy, p. 469.

53 Damian Spruce: Empire and Counter-Empire in the Italian Far Right Conflicting Nationalisms and the Split between the Lega Nord and Alleanza Nazionale on Immigration, in: Theory, Culture & Society 24:5 (2007), pp. 99–126, p. 122.

poster suggested the stiff opposition of the Northern League to the candidate on the grounds of migration and Islamic persecution of women.[54]

With the growing influx of refugees into Europe, the Northern League differentiated its existing gender-based stereotypes. Muslim migrant women, on the one hand, remained the victims of Islamic persecution in the election campaigns and visuals. On the other hand, the party propaganda more systematically estranged Islam and Muslim migrants and visualised male migrants as persons of colour and as responsible for crime and sexual assaults on Italian women. The election documents thus began to depict encounters between Italian native women and Muslim male migrants. A poster released ahead of the presidential elections in 2013 similarly called for 'women's security' with the caption 'theft and violence just happening', and showed a dark-skinned, armed male who waits around a corner to attack two white-skinned women walking towards the corner from the other side.[55] Before the regional elections in Seregno in 2015, the party released an electronic poster on Twitter, which featured three immigrants disguised infar-Easternand African costumes, as well as another female immigrant holding an infant. The foreigners were dark and yellow-skinned, and one had a knife in hand. They waited in a queue before a door and hampered one white-skinned, aged, supposedly Italian male and one Italian child to move forward. The poster was captioned as: 'Guess who is last? For rights of homes, work and health'.[56] It thus reflected the party's official viewpoint, which marginalises non-European migrants, in religious, ethnic, gender and class-based terms, Assuming them responsible for destabilising social wellbeing that the government should provide for the Italians in need.

A similar transition was visible in the Freedom Party, which, from the beginning of Strache's term, created anti-migrant campaigns against Muslim migrants that increasingly focussed on gender groups.[57] The FPÖ's early campaigns equally attacked Turkey's EU bid, and its election programmes and visuals mirrored those of the Northern League discussed above. A very striking example for the party's propaganda addressing both gender and migration was a public campaign devised in 2004. Reminiscent of its Italian version, one FPÖ poster depicted a white-skinned woman covered in a hijab made of the EU's flag and was captioned: 'Should that be our future? Austrians

54 Chiara Bonfiglioli: Intersections of Racism and Sexism in Contemporary Italy: A Critical Cartography of Recent Feminist Debates, in: Darkmatter: In the Ruins of of Imperial Culture 6 (2010).

55 Il Secolo XIX: Armato e di colore: ecco il manifesto della Lega, 19.02.2013 www.ilsecoloxix.it/p/italia/2013/02/19/AP2rS8mE-armato_manifesto_colore.shtml (accessed on 12 July 2020).

56 Lega Nord Seregno: Indovina chi è l'ultimo nell'Italia del PD. Prima la nostra gente! Il 31 Maggio anche a Seregno vota Lega Nord!, 28.05.2015, at: https://twitter.com/LegaNordSeregno/status/603885690116579328 (accessed on 11 March 2021).

57 Michal Krzyżanowski: From Anti-immigration and Nationalist Revisionism to Islamophobia, pp. 135f.

say NO! Austria remains Free!'[58] With the influx of refugees, the FPÖ's anti-migrant campaigns, similar to those of the LN, came to describe Muslim men with stereotypes of gender persecution and migrant criminality.[59] The campaigns increasingly attributed crime such as drug trafficking or theft to male migrants from African and Middle Eastern countries.[60] A poster for Innsbruck, for example, read: 'Love of the country instead of Moroccan thieves'.[61] The FPÖ's visuals additionally depicted Muslim migrants as sexual criminals poised to harass Austrian women. In its official programme for the 2017 elections, the party attributed gender inequality in Austria to migrants from Muslim countries: "a new problem of women's discrimination emerges from the immigration of people from patriarchal cultures".[62] Relevant election visuals featured Austrian women, dressed in traditional or urban-modern costumes, to enjoy both their traditions and modern lives. In doing so, they were depicted as standing against Islamisation. One suggestive example is a poster made for the party's youth organisation. It depicted four young, white-skinned women in rural and urban costumes, who condemningly stared at the audience and made either defensive postures or 'stop' gestures with arms and hands. The caption, Hands off! Our women are not fair game, was written overhead in German and Arabic, targeting supposedly sexually aggressive Muslim migrants.[63] In brief, the FPÖ's election campaigns, reminiscent of the LN's propaganda, blamed Muslim men for sexual harassment against Austria's native, beautiful women.[64]

In summary, election campaigns in both parties evolved to differentiate Muslim migrants into gender groups, namely criminal men on the one hand and female victims of Islamic culture, on the other. Ethnic references to national and migrant gender groups notably remained visible in the visual examples. In the following, the LN's and FPÖ's propaganda partially reveal how these religious and gender-based stereotypes relate to the class-based exclusions of migrants.

58 Leila Hadj-Abdou/Birte Siim/Sawitri Saharso: The Limits of Populism: Accommodative Headscarf Policies in Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands, in: Sieglinde Rosenberger/Birgit Sauer (eds.): Politics, Religion and Gender: Framing and Regulating the Veil, New York 2012, pp. 132–149, p. 138.

59 Ruth Wodak: The Politics of Fear.

60 FPÖ: Österreich im Wort, Auswahl und Zusammenfassung inhaltlicher Ziele der Freiheitlichen Partei sterreichs für die neue Legislaturperiode, FPÖ Wahlprogramm 2008, p. 7; Franziska Marquart: Rechtspopulismus im Wandel, pp. 367–369.

61 Die Welt Online: FPÖ wirbt mit „Heimatliebe statt Marokkaner-Diebe".

62 FPÖ: Österreicher verdienen Fairness, Freiheitliches Wahlprogramm zur Nationalratswahl 2017, p. 12.

63 Plattform Radikale Linke: Just another tag on the wall? Rechte Symbole auf Wiens Straßen (Broschüre der Antifa 15), June 2017.

64 Edma Ajanovic/Stefanie Mayer: Mann, oh Mann… Wenn der Schutz ‚unserer Frauen' die Antwort ist, was war noch mal die Frage?, p. 200. Translated by the author.

Religious and Class-based Exclusions

The third trope in the literature builds on the above-mentioned migrant gender images. Radical right parties today demonise Muslim men and represent female migrants as victims of Islamic culture and patriarchy. Furthermore, as Sara Farris and Francesca Scrinzi have argued, conservative camps today use these categories not only to exclude Muslim men but also to integrate Muslim women into Western society and especially into labour-intensive economic fields.[65] The perception of care workers thus presents an emerging field for populism studies. Publications point to the legal and cultural landscape favouring cheap migrant labour in the Italian care sector, especially in domestic life, and note strict protectionism in Austria.[66] Research on far-right attitudes towards Muslim migrant caregivers is rather limited.

Until 2008, the Northern League uncompromisingly stood against unauthorised labour migration. During its participation in the coalitionary government until 2006, it objected to attempts by its bigger ally, Forza Italia, to legitimise illegal migrant labour and sought to enact exclusionary migration laws.[67] The famous 'Bossi-Fini Law', partially tabled by the LN's leader Umberto Bossi, dramatically restricted migration from outside the EU and strengthened controls over the quota for semi-skilled labour.[68] The party's involvement in the coalitionary government between 2008 and 2011, however,demonstrated dramatic shifts in their coming to terms with migrant care workers. The party, which had previously blocked attempts to change the law on illegal migration, began to seek solutions for illegal workers in the care sector. LN member and the then minister of the interior, Roberto Maroni, stated in 2008: "there cannot be an amnesty for those who entered the country illegally, for those who rape women or rob a villa; but we will naturally consider those cases with strong social impacts, such as the case of caregivers".[69] The following year, the government indeed

65 Sara R. Farris: Femonationalism and the "Regular" Army of Labor Called Migrant Women, pp. 184–199; Sara R. Farris/Francesca Scrinzi: 'Subaltern Victims' or 'Useful Resources'?, pp. 241–257; Sara R. Farris: In the Name of Women's Rights.

66 Antje Eichler: Zum Deutungswandel im konservativen Wohlfahrtsstaat – Eine wissenspolitologische und wissenssoziologische Analyse der Diskurse um die Legalisierung der ausländischen Pflegekräfte in Österreich, Trier 2014.

67 Michael Samers: Strange Castle Walls and Courtyards, pp. 221f.

68 Asher Colombo/Giuseppe Sciortino/Elisa Craveri: The Bossi-Fini Law: Explicit Fanaticism, Implicit Moderation, and Poisoned Fruits, in: Italian Politics 18 (2002), pp. 162–179; Andrej Zaslove: Closing the door?, pp. 99–118.

69 la Repubblica: Maroni: "No sanatorie immigrati". Poi frena: "Sulle badanti, vedremo", 17.05.2018, www.repubblica.it/2008/05/sezioni/cronaca/sicurezza-politica4/bossi-spagna/bossi-spagna.html (accessed on 15 August 2020), translated by the author.

granted an amnesty only for illegal migrants working as caregivers and domestic workers, a field in which domestic labour was not sufficient.[70]

The LN decision to grant amnesty to illegal care workers could seem puzzling in the beginning. Nevertheless, the party's traditional view of woman as the backbone of family and provider of care for children and the elderly was the main impetus for such a populist radical party to tolerate migrant labour in this field.[71] In Northern Italy, especially in the Northern League's electoral base consisting of middle class and lower-class workers, women were expected to fulfil both work and family commitments. The party thus promoted women's work commitments, as well as their traditional role in patriarchal Italian families.[72] A recent example is a flyer distributed in Crotone for the 2019 women's day, which argued that Italian women's natural role and source of dignity was support for their family.[73] Although the Northern League partially pointed to gender equality and securitised women's problems in social life, its political campaigns still revealed the traditional concept of women in Italian society as the anchor of family and demographic reproduction. Migrant care-workers could play a role in the survival of this patriarchal tradition and potentially contribute to the native women's productivity in working and family lives.[74] Therefore, the pertinent amnesty and the underlying tolerance of migrant care-giving workers constituted a noteworthy exception to the party's overall attitude towards migration.

The question yet remains whether the Northern League also explicitly tolerates the Muslim female care workers in Italy. So far, only few studies have referred to Italian families' preference to hire Christian, if not Catholic, migrant caregivers.[75] Concepts of caregivers within the LN attest that the class-based representations of migrants

70 Michael Samers: Strange Castle Walls and Courtyards, pp. 209–231; Sara R. Farris: Femonationalism and the "Regular" Army of Labor Called Migrant Women, p. 13.

71 Sara R. Farris/Francesca Scrinzi: 'Subaltern Victims' or 'Useful Resources'?, pp. 241–257; Marta Cordini/Costanzo Ranci: Legitimising the care market: the social recognition of migrant care workers in Italy, in: Journal of Social Policy 46:1 (2017), pp. 91–108.

72 Sara R. Farris/Francesca Scrinzi: 'Subaltern Victims' or 'Useful Resources'?, p. 248.

73 Giuseppe Gaetano: 8 marzo, il volantino della Lega di Crotone: "Offende le donne chi ne rivendica l'autodeterminazione", in: Corriere Della Sera, 06.03.2019, https://www.corriere.it/politica/19_marzo_06/8-marzo-volantino-lega-crotone-offende-donne-chi-ne-rivendica-l-autodeterminazione-b354a986-3ff7-11e9-bb83-aca868a1eb53.shtml (accessed on 10 April 2020).

74 Similar views were shared by the National Industrial Association's 2016 report, which noted that domestic caregivers help Italian women to create more time for their work life. Centro Studi Confindustria: Immigrati: da emergenza a opportunità. Dimensione, effetti economici, politiche, Roma 2016, p. 7

75 Franca van Hooren/Birgit Apitzsch/Clémence Ledoux: The Politics of Care Work and Migration, in: Agnieszka Weinar/Saskia Bonjour/Lyubov Zhyznomirska (eds.): The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Migration in Europe, London 2019, pp. 263–373; Sara R. Farris/Francesca Scrinzi: 'Subaltern Victims' or 'Useful Resources'?, pp. 254–256.

could change on specific grounds, but the situation of Muslims in employment requires further research at the party level.

The Freedom Party of Austria has been struggling with illegal immigration since the 1990s and has also sought to curb it with temporal migration in those fields that require a cheap workforce.[76] In 2002, the FPÖ, during its coalition with the Austrian People's Party, managed to amend the Alien Act and Asylum Law and partially curbed labour migration. Through a bill named 'Integrationsvertrag' (covenant/contract for integration), a number of changes in Austria's migration regime thus abolished the quota for semi-skilled workers from outside the EU and instead facilitated the influx of seasonal workers.[77] The party maintained its emphasis on temporary labour and presented it as an alternative to non-skilled and semi-skilled migration. The handbook released by the FPÖ for its party representatives in 2013 and the programme devised for the national elections of the same year similarly promised the status of guest-worker to non-European migrants, who would work in Austria temporarily, without social benefits and without a right to family reunification.[78] Migrant caregivers also remained a taboo, as for the party, at least until the mid-2000s, care-taking primarily entailed labour provided within the Austrian nation.[79] With the EU's expansion to include Eastern countries and female migrants from Central and South-Eastern Europe moving into relevant positions, the coalition between the Social Democratic Party and Austrian People's Party granted amnesty to illegal care workers (now European citizens) in 2007, and the FPÖ did not oppose the decision strongly.[80]

The party has recently been exhibiting signs of change in its attitudes towards non-EU caregivers.[81] Before the breaking of the coalitionary government between the FPÖ and the Austrian People's Party, in an interview, Strache spoke of their plans to

76 Tjitske Akkerman: Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government: Immigration and Integration Policies in Nine Countries (1996–2010), in: West European Politics 35:3, pp. 511–529. Kenneth Horvath: Securitisation, Economisation and the Political Constitution of Temporary Migration, pp. 154–170.

77 Andrej Zaslove: Closing the door?, pp. 99–118.

78 FPÖ Bildungsinstitut: Handbuch freiheitlicher Politik. Ein Leitfaden für Führungsfunktionäre und Mandatsträger der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs (4th edition), 2013, p. 37; Karl Ettinger: Programmanalyse: „Arbeitslose raus" nicht umsetzbar, in: Die Presse (print edition), 16.08.2013.

79 Wahlprogramm der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs FPÖ, Nationalratswahl 2006, pp. 2f; Almut Bachinger: Der irreguläre Pflegearbeitsmarkt. Zum Transformationsprozess von unbezahlter in bezahlte Arbeit durch die 24-Stunden-Pflege, Unpublished Dissertation, Vienna 2009, pp. 116–118.

80 Eva Fleischer: Migrant Care Work in Austrian Families – a Win-Win-Situation for Everyone?, in: Belachew Gebrewold/Andreas Th. Müller/Johanna Kostenzer (eds.): Human Trafficking and Exploitation. Lessons from Europe, London 2017, pp. 112–128, p.117.

81 Tina Olteanu: Gender Relations and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), in: Perspective Politice 10:1 (2017), pp. 75–81.

legitimise illegal migrant care workers from outside the EU with five-year contracts.[82] A propaganda book endorsed by the party featured clues on the reasons behind this toleration, as it pointed out the relationship between the FPÖ's patriarchal concept of family and the need for immigrant care workers. Michael Howanietz wrote and Norbert Hofer, former minister in the Austrian government, edited *For a Free Austria*, a semi-official collection of party politics, whose section on the social state gives essential evidence regarding the FPÖ's future attitude towards immigrant care workers. The book argues that communities depend on "the quality of families", stresses the importance of demographic reproduction and calls any other alternative disloyal.[83] Howanietz straightforwardly argues:

> woman, redefining herself from a feminist deconstructionist ambition to a self-proclaimed birth mother, longs for a complete guy who gives her all the emotional and economic security a young mother needs to turn to the offspring with carefree dedication. Both longings are not fulfilled.[84]

The book thus only favours childcare by mothers. Nevertheless, if it facilitated Austrian women's role in the family and demographic reproduction, some care work by the migrants could be allowed. "The continuous mass immigration", Howanietz admitted, was likely to overcome the shortage for caregivers for early childcare.[85]

The LN's and FPÖ's recent attitudes towards migrant care workers and debates over authorising illegal labour in this field suggest changes in the interplays between ethnic and class-based discrimination against migrants. Both parties, willing to save the traditional concept of family, became more tolerant towards migrant caregivers, especially since, in their opinion, migrant labour could help Austrian and Italian women to fulfil both their work and family commitments. The question to what extent religious discrimination remain effective in labour perceptions, however, requires further research into the caregiving sector.

82 ORF News: FPÖ will nicht in Regierung, 20.09.2019, https://newsv1.orf.at/060818-2953/?href=https%3A%2F%2Fnewsv1.orf.at%2F060818-2953%2F2954txt_story.html (accessed on 20 September 2020).

83 Michael Howanietz: Für ein freies Österreich (Editor: Norbert Hofer), Vienna 2013, pp. 30f.

84 Ibid., p. 31, translated by the author.

85 Ibid, p. 33.

Conclusion

Since the early 2000s, populist-radical parties of Western Europe increasingly turned to the rejection of Islam and Muslim migrants through gender-sensitive propaganda. A growing number of publications addressing this period argue that far-right camps do not only increasingly target Muslim minorities but also differentiate between migrant gender images and even instrumentalise female representations for integration. The question remains how these religious, gender-sensitive, ethnic, and class-based aspects are reflected by political parties in their written and visual propaganda. Delving into election campaigns and tracing the shifting relevance between various categories of exclusion provides historical insight into these arguments.

Ethnic, gender and class-based attitudes towards Muslim migrants in the given propaganda material support the first mentioned trope in literature and the orientation of far-right discourses towards anti-Islamism. They also suggest that ethnic references to migrants never disappeared in the far-right oppositions to Muslim migrants. Although Turkey's EU bid remained a common theme for the parties, the LN chose to frame its propaganda in a way that allowed it to attack African refugees and Roma people, whereas the FPÖ focused on Turkish and Arabic minorities in Austria. Concerning the second assumption regarding the differentiation of Muslim migrants into gender groups, election campaigns indeed evolved into representations of criminal men and female victims. In summary, over the past two decades, the LN's and FPÖ's propaganda changed to target African, Arab, and Turkish migrants and create contrasts between (criminal) Muslim male and (persecuted) female migrants.

The question of the connection between Muslim stereotypes and the class-based exclusions of migrants in FPÖ and LN materials remains unanswered. According to the third assumption of the literature, emancipating Muslim women from Islam serves to integrate them into the production fields that need cheap labour.[86] The party propaganda under consideration did not suggest such an argument. However, one can still point out changing attitudes towards migrant caregivers and draw inferences regarding their meaning for traditional gender images in FPÖ and LN materials. Party attitudes towards female roles in the family and in the working life underpin an emerging tolerance towards the employment of migrant women in the care sector. The long-term preoccupation with Italian and Austrian women's efficiency in their working lives and family lives, as well as demographic production, are likely to bring about functional shifts in the communicated roles and concepts of migrants. Never-

86 Sara R. Farris: Femonationalism and the "Regular" Army of Labor Called Migrant Women, pp. 184–199.

theless, the attitudes towards Muslim migrant workers in the care sector require further empirical research addressing the extent to which minorities' religious identities are relevant for their employment.

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Carlos Rafael Rea Rodríguez

Framing in a Multicultural Social Movement: The Defence of the San Pedro Mezquital River (Mexico)

Abstract

This article analyses the sustainability movement that opposed the construction of the Las Cruces hydroelectric project in the San Pedro River watershed in Nayarit, Mexico. It focuses on the movement's theoretical framework and general orientation in order to show how the various and distinct frameworks that emerged throughout the evolution of the movement were selected, adjusted and creatively reworked within the movement. This allowed these frameworks to adapt to changing local social, cultural, and environmental conditions through a process that also enriched them and imbued them with new meanings through contact with the perspectives of coastal agricultural and fishing communities, as well as with indigenous Naayeri communities in the mountains.

Keywords: *sustainability movement*; *Mexico*; *frames*; *sustainable equilibrium*; *good living*

Introduction

This article analyzes the sustainability movement that formed in opposition to the construction of the Las Cruces hydroelectric project in the San Pedro River watershed in the state of Nayarit, western Mexico. It begins by presenting the movement's theoretical framework and general orientation. It then describes how distinct frames that have arisen through academic discourse have contributed to the coalescence of this movement as it evolved. This entails explaining how various aspects of the theoretical framework were selected, adjusted, and creatively reworked in order to adapt the general framing to local social, cultural, and environmental conditions, during a process that enriched them and gave them new meaning through contact with the perspectives of coastal agricultural and fishing communities and the indigenous Naayeri (or Cora)[1] communities in the mountains. This led to a gradual and complex transition from

1 Ethnic group that inhabits the Sierra Madre Occidental, in the state of Nayarit (in the municipality of Del Nayar), although they also have settlements in the state of Jalisco. They call

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positions that were closely tied to sustainable development to non-developmentalist positions. One position that stands out is the Naayeri's worldview, which is characterized by a search for spiritual and ecological balance and harmony (similar to concepts of 'good living' among the Kichwa, Quechua, and Aymara in South America, as well as intercultural 'dialogue of knowledge').

The movement analysed established an important alliance among the fishing, agricultural, and indigenous sectors that share this watershed, as well as with regional, national, and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the academic sectors that played a role in its formation. This broad alliance of such disparate sectors and organizations came together through the formation of two councils: the Inter-Community Council composed of members of indigenous groups and the mestizo population and a council made up exclusively of representatives of Naayeri communities.

This movement emerged in opposition to a project that was based on what we could call the logic of "hydraulic structuralism", as termed by Arrojo.[2] This logic has been applied to legitimize global capital's aggressive privatization of water, and in this case electrical energy, in many so-called 'underdeveloped nations' around the world.

This article analyses:

1. the underlying orientations that clashed in the context of this mega-project,
2. how the framing of protest has changed**,** and
3. the dimensions and significance of those changes.

Formally speaking, the protest movement has sought to establish the sociocultural bases for generating an inter-community project to galvanize alternative forms of collective wellbeing on a regional scale. Achieving those goals has required a complex framing process through which the region's inhabitants engaged in dialogue and negotiations involving knowledge and policies of an intercultural nature. This process was made possible by identifying and/or defining common adversaries, namely, those who promoted the construction of the Las Cruces Dam, a project that the inhabitants considered to be a very real and shared threat.

themselves Naayeri. This native people resisted the Spanish conquest and colonisation until 1721.

2 Pedro Arrojo: El reto ético de la nueva cultura del agua. Funciones, valores y derechos en juego, Barcelona 2006.

Theoretical and Methodological Focus

Our analysis was carried out using the neo-pragmatic[3] perspective of framing theory. First, we used the notions of framing and counter-framing proposed by Benford and Hunt,[4] who conceived of the framing of collective actions as operations that define "situations as problematic (diagnosis) and [propose] scenarios of reparation (prognosis)," which call "for their sympathizers to mobilize and coordinate collective actions".[5] These authors refer to counter-framing as attempts to "reject, undermine, or neutralize the myths, versions of reality, or interpretative frameworks of a person or group".[6] The prevailing notion of framing here is clearly strategic. While it clarifies a dimension of collective action that is actually present, it erroneously converts it into a synonym for the totality, thereby disregarding other dimensions, such as identity and emotions, among others, and excluding the uncertainty and chance that are integral to such phenomena. Here, by adopting the perspective of Trom and Zimmerman[7] and Cefaï,[8] we present a pragmatic and dramaturgical interpretation of these two operations in order to illustrate their experimental and relational character, the diverse motives, and the uncertainty that are inherent in all framing operations as they arise, evolve, and become clearly defined. We begin by using these approaches to rethink the nature of processes that give life to social movements.

3 Carlos Rea: Acción colectiva y procesos de enmarcamiento: los deudores de la banca en México, in: Il Dubbio 3 (2004), pp. 69–83; Danny Trom/Bénédicte Zimmermann: Cadres et institution des problèmes publiques. Les cas du chomage et du paysage, in: Daniel Cefaï/Danny Trom (eds.): Les formes de l'action collective. Mobilisation dans les arènes publiques, Paris 2001, pp. 281–315; Daniel Cefaï: Les cadres de l'action collective. Définitions et problèmes, in: Daniel Cefaï/Danny Trom (eds.): Les formes de l'action collective, pp. 51–97; John Dewey: The public and its problems, New York/Athens [1927] 1954. Other useful references in this topic are: Antonio Rivas: El análisis de los marcos: una metodología para el estudio de los movimientos sociales, in: Pedro Ibarra/Benjamín Tejerina (eds.): Los movimientos sociales. Transformaciones políticas y cambio cultural, Madrid 1998, pp. 181–215; John McCarthy/Jackie Smith/Mayer Zald: El acceso a la agenda pública y a la agenda del gobierno: medios de comunicación y sistema electoral, in: Dough McAdam/John McCarthy/Mayer Zald (eds.): Movimientos sociales: perspectivas comparadas, Madrid 1999, pp. 413–441.

4 Robert Benford/Scott Hunt: Cadrages en conflit. Mouvements sociaux et problèmes sociaux: Daniel Cefaï/Danny Trom (eds.): Les formes de l'action collective, pp. 163–194.

5 Ibid., p. 167.

6 Ibid.

7 Danny Trom/Bénédicte Zimmermann: Cadres et institution des problèmes publiques.

8 Daniel Cefaï: Les cadres de l'action collective.

Our approach understands the constitution of social movements through a pragmatist view[9] of how practical investigations develop, that is, how the participating actors (re)constitute themselves and gradually come to concur and coordinate as they search for solutions to problems that alter or disrupt the normal course of their daily lives, or that threaten to do so. This process reaches a point at which their inquiries are transformed into defiance, or into a resolute defence of the existing sociocultural order. As the shared social problem is reconfigured into a public issue, many factors simultaneously emerge and fade: the actors involved, the axes of conflict among them, the arenas of controversy, the pertinent institutional devices that exist to confront them, and the audience that witnesses the dispute. That is, a dramaturgical dimension appears through the disputes among the actors in the diverse public arenas (public drama) as they present partially or radically distinct, or even opposing, definitions of the causes and consequences of a problem, and the means for solving it. The actors thereby mobilize specific discursive and performative strategies and tactics as they strive to ensure that their view of the situation prevails, while at the same time discrediting and rejecting those of their opponents. They also attempt to convince the wider public that their position is the only correct one, while motivating people to get on board with them, or at least not join an opposing group.[10] In disputes of this nature, the actors implement a series of roles, a grammar of motives, certain frames of meaning, and a repertory of specific practical actions and stagings that, together, define a system of conflictual action[11] imbued with a specific sociohistorical meaning.

This perspective leads us to understand the framing process as:

> an operation that permits the mobilizing/updating of frames; which brings into play an ever-varying mix of strategies, practical necessity and reproduction, adjustment and invention, all based on intuition and discovery, trial and error, projection and *a posteriori* reconstruction, and entails cultural and ideological referents, affections and emotions, institutional limits and situations, and consensus and imposition. Framing is not, then, exclusively or by priority, a strategic operation,

9 Daniel Cefaï: La construction des problèmes publics. Définitions de situations dans des arènes publiques, in: Réseaux 14:75 (1996), pp. 45–66; also see Michel Callon: Eléments pour une sociologie de la traduction. La domestication des coquilles Saint-Jacques et des marins-pêcheurs dans la baie de Saint-Brieuc, in: L'année sociologique 36 (1986), pp. 169–208.

10 Robert Benford/Scott Hunt: Cadrages en conflit. Mouvements sociaux et problèmes sociaux.

11 Daniel Cefaï: Qu'est-ce que'une arène publique? Quelques pistes pour une approche pragmatiste, in: Daniel Cefaï/Isaac Joseph (eds.): L'Héritage du pragmatisme. Conflits d'urbanité et épreuves de civisme, Paris 2002, pp. 59–100._

but rather, a form of practical investigation (*d'enquete*, cf. Trom and Zimmerman, 2002) that acquires the form of categorizations.[12]

In brief, we understand framing and counter-framing as experimental processes that, far from omitting a strategic dimension, combine it with distinct kinds of operations, though not necessarily harmoniously. In the concrete case that concerns us, these processes underwent reciprocal adjustments as the conflict evolved. For the people who opposed the construction of the dam, forming a broad social and political intercultural alliance over the length and breadth of the watershed required putting into practice a dialogue centered on a certain body of knowledge, political conceptions, and views of nature and the world. What gradually emerged was the most stable and mature version of their counter-framing, which we set out to explain in this article.

Our research is based on information gathered through documentary sources (official documents from the social movement, other social organizations, and government agencies, as well as academic pronouncements), participant observation, a series of semi-structured interviews, and informal, unstructured interviews with individuals directly involved in the movement. I must clarify that, as Coordinator of the *Pro-Regiones* project[13] in Nayarit during the early years of the study period (from 2008 until 2011), I participated in processes to provide information on this hydroelectric project, convene discussions about it, and define and implement a strategy to inform and explain the nature of this government project in communities throughout the watershed. I also directly participated in creating the Inter-Community Council for Sustainable Development of the San Pedro River (CIDSCRSP), and in other later and important activities carried out by the movement, which are described herein. The research group to which I belonged included professors and students at the Autonomous University of Nayarit, supported by a team of peers at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). The research group's principal activities consisted of holding information workshops, developing participatory community diagnoses, contacting local, national and international scholars, and accompanying local actors during interactions with government agents who promoted the project.

12 Carlos Rea: Acción colectiva y procesos de enmarcamiento: los deudores de la banca en México.

13 A university project that began at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) with activities in several regions of the country, and which applied Sergio Zermeño's theoretical-methodological perspective of sustainable development. In Nayarit, this initiative created the Pro-Regiones Nayarit Project, based at the Autonomous University of Nayarit.

A History of Confrontation

Context and Background

The San Pedro-Mezquital River watershed (SPMW) is located in the state of Nayarit, in northwestern Mexico. This river system originates in the neighbouring state of Durango, where it is called 'La Sauceda'. The portion of the basin that is located in Nayarit is of singular importance because (1) it is the only undammed zone in Mexico and (2) it contains the *Marismas Nacionales,*[14] the most extensive wetlands on Mexico's Pacific coast and one of the most important wetlands in the American Pacific region. This area is characterized by great biodiversity and high productivity. Several Naayeri communities exist in the watershed, as well as some Wixarika (or Huichol)[15] communities, imbuing the region with notable sociocultural importance. However, the basin is experiencing a serious process of deterioration due to the contamination of the San Pedro River,[16] exacerbated by a new factor that constitutes an immense ecological risk: the mega-project to construct a system of large dams.

The proposal to build huge hydroelectric projects in this region responds to a context of global dimensions, as recent decades have witnessed the extraordinary construction of monumental dam projects worldwide, recently accompanied by multibillion-dollar markets for water. This has propelled the privatization and de-nationalization of this resource to the advantage of large transnational corporations, and to the detriment of extensive regions and numerous social groups that have seen their sources of this vital liquid snatched away.[17] Sadly, the discourse of global warming and sustainability has been used as a powerful justification for these policies across large areas of the globe, allegedly as an option for producing non-polluting energy and water for human consumption.

It was in this globalized setting that the governments of Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (National Action Party, PAN, 2006–2012) and Enrique Peña Nieto (Institutional

14 Marismas Nacionales is "a stretch of lagoons roughly 20 kilometers wide and 90 kilometers long, which depends on normal water flows and seasonal flooding with freshwater and sediments, especially from the San Pedro River, and saltwater from tidal flows from the Pacific Ocean" (Academic Pronouncement against the construction of Las Cruces hydroelectric dam, March 2010).

15 Ethnic group that inhabits the Sierra Madre Occidental, in the state of Nayarit and parts of the states of Jalisco, Durango, and Zacatecas. They call themselves Wixaritari (in plural) or Wixarika (in singular).

16 Carlos Rea et al.: Marcos y redes sociales: educación ambiental y desarrollo regional sustentable en la región baja de la Cuenca del Río San Pedro en Nayarit, Research Report, Mexico 2007.

17 Vandana Shiva: Las guerras del agua. Privatización, contaminación y lucro, Mexico 2003; Pedro Arrojo: El reto ético de la nueva cultura del agua. Funciones, valores y derechos en juego.

Revolutionary Party, PRI, 2012–2018) launched proposals to promote the generation of clean energy in Mexico, in response to present and future demands for progress and national development that would not contribute to global climate change. In this context, and operating through the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE in Spanish), their governments proposed constructing the Las Cruces hydroelectric mega-project in Nayarit (among several other projects), even though three enormous dams were already functioning in that state (Aguamilpa, El Cajón, and La Yesca).

In late 2008, the CFE announced a project to build five dams on the San Pedro River and seven more on the Acaponeta River, primarily to generate electricity.[18] A meeting at the Autonomous University of Nayarit (UAN) marked the inception of a controversy that would generate one of the most impactful social movements in the region, as professors and members of civil society raised their voices in opposition to the project (initially led by a university-based group called *Pro-Regiones* (UAN/National Autonomous University of Mexico, UNAM)[19] and the World Wildlife Fund, WWF). In January 2009, this group undertook an intense information campaign in towns and communities throughout the watershed, designed to:

- promote the creation of community and inter-community spaces for discussion, which would serve as platforms for disseminating information, defining positions, and eventually organizing resistance to the project;
- salvage, reinvigorate, or create regional 'ecosystem' identities; and
- promote initiatives and activities aimed at achieving regional sustainability.

This process quickly began to drive an important public debate among the inhabitants of the watershed, one that would later acquire importance at the state level.

The Actors

The dispute led to the formation of a conflictual system that featured two opposing camps, one of which was composed of local inhabitants of the San Pedro River watershed who opposed the project. This included members of cooperatives, *ejidatarios,*[20] rural producer organizations, and indigenous communities (Naayeri and Wixaritari).

18 This initiative involved reactivating an older project called the 'Northwest Interconnected Hydraulic Plan', which was designed to transport huge volumes of water from Nayarit to Sonora through a system of dams and canals interconnected with rivers in the region.

19 The Pro-Regiones Project was succeeded by an organised movement called the Center for Social Development and Sustainability Nuiwari A.C., created by Pro-Regiones/UAN.

20 The *ejido* is a type of collective property of the rural land, recognised in Mexican law, which is indivisible, inalienable and cannot be inherited, and the *ejidatarios* are the families who are

These varied groups formed an organizational structure consisting of the Inter-Community Council and the Naayeri Indigenous Council, the movement's core organizations that were created primarily through the work of *Pro-Regiones*. Over time, these councils were strengthened by the backing of local, regional, national, and international NGOs that provided technical, legal, environmental, and economic advice, along with the support of labour unions, cooperatives, and urban, farmers, youth, and women's organizations, as well groups of scholars in Mexico and abroad. This heterogeneous constellation of organizations has generally backed the Naayeri councils' positions in opposition to dam construction and in defense of the territory, culture, identity, and views of the collective wellbeing of towns and communities in the watershed.

The other camp was composed of a broad base of adversaries who were identified as: the federal government, which included the CFE, the National Commission for the Development of Indigenous Peoples (CDI), the National Water Commission (CONAGUA), the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGARPA), the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT), the state government of Nayarit, and the national and transnational consortiums that intended to build the dam. A group of secondary supporters included professors at the UAN and the University of Guadalajara (UdeG) who worked for government agencies, municipal governments, and regional economic interests and who believed they would benefit in some way from the project.

Arenas of Struggle for the Movement in Defence of the San Pedro River

The work performed during the information campaign began in January 2009, by *Pro-Regiones* and the WWF. This led to the creation of the Inter-Community Council for the Sustainable Development of the San Pedro River Watershed[21] in July of that year, which incorporated numerous *ejidos*, cooperatives, and indigenous communities. The year 2012 saw the founding of the Naayeri Indigenous Council, composed of communities and groups associated with this indigenous people.[22] The whole set of the movement's actions that revolved around these two community councils involved debates and dealings with social, academic-scientific, legal, political, and media institutions and agencies.

part of an *ejido*. Nevertheless, from the neoliberal reform of agrarian Law in 1992, privatisation of *ejidal* land is possible.

21 Carlos Rea/Luz Ceballos/Bertha Villaseñor: Equilibrio sustentable y resistencia social en la cuenca del río San Pedro en Nayarit, in: Desacatos 47 (2015), pp. 116–131.

22 Interview to Julián López (Naayeri spokesman), Tepic 2018.

In the social domain, the councils constituted the heart of the resistance to the hydroelectric project and the defence of local lifestyles and collective wellbeing. They also served as the setting-off point for activities designed to organize and incorporate indigenous and mestizo populations in the watershed. Their work was carried out by representatives and working groups that were active in various communities in the basin, as well as by producer organizations and the resolute involvement of indigenous communities with traditional governing structures. The two councils[23] also coordinated relations among an array of social organizations and sectors allied to the cause, and led the conflictual discussions with the government agencies that promoted the project.

It is important to note that the native communities' impact on the heart of the movement gradually increased. From an initial attitude marked by scepticism and caution, the Naayeri in the mountainous Sierra Madre region (led by residents of the communities of Presidio de los Reyes and Mesa del Nayar) came to exercise significant influence. This evolved into cultural, moral, and political leadership in resistance to the dam, and began a process of defining options for the collective wellbeing of the region.[24] In fact, the indigenous council eventually linked the defence of the river with defending the sacred sites of the Naayeri people, several of which are also sacred to the Wixaritari, Mexicaneros (or Meshikan)[25] and Tepehuans (or O'dam)[26], as well as with other historical demands by these native peoples. This dynamic strengthened relations between the Naayeri of the San Pedro watershed and those in the Sierra, and with other native peoples in the region, especially the Wixaritari, in the common defence of the sacred sites of Haramara and Wirikuta.[27]

With respect to the academic-scientific debate, the defense movement had to gather and systematize scientific information with the help and support of professors, researchers, and members of local, national, and international NGOs. Those materials were enriched by information and experiences provided by local people as the movement prepared to confront representatives of the CFE at distinct moments. One of those moments took place during a visit by members of the International Wetlands Convention (RAMSAR) in June 2010, the first time that promoters and opponents of

23 The Centro para el Desarrollo Social y la Sustentabilidad Nuiwari AC played an equally important role in this history of struggle.

24 Carlos Rea/Luz Ceballos/Bertha Villaseñor: Equilibrio sustentable y resistencia social en la cuenca del río San Pedro en Nayarit.

25 Ethnic group that belongs to the municipality of Mezquital, in the Sierra Madre Occidental, in the state of Durango. They also inhabit the states of Nayarit, Zacatecas, and Jalisco. They call themselves Meshikan.

26 Tepehuanes (from the South) is an ethnic group that inhabits the Sierra Madre Occidental, in some areas of the states of Durango, Nayarit, Zacatecas, and Jalisco. They call themselves O'dam.

27 Interview to Julián López (Naayeri spokesman), Tepic 2018.

the project confronted each other publicly and formally in an institutional setting. A second occasion occurred in February 2014 at a meeting held to present and discuss the environmental impact reports that were developed to justify the feasibility and importance of the hydroelectric project. The protests that the residents, professors, and NGOs presented on that occasion forced the proponents to commission several additional studies in order to correct the deficiencies detected by the opposition.[28] Taking place within that arena of debate were numerous conferences, public forums, academic panels, roundtable discussions, and other meetings that all helped people form a clearer idea of the 'state of the question', for both the inhabitants of the basin and for public opinion.

Turning to the legal aspect, the movement worked intensively to formalize its objections and to document the government's non-compliance with legislation on matters related to the environment, changes in agrarian property laws, and the rights of original peoples, especially the right to be consulted as stipulated in the International Labor Organization's Convention 169, to which Mexico is a signatory.

Regarding the movement's gradual politicization, this meant gaining strength by forging alliances through meetings and conferences with civil society organizations and other social movements. Notable among these measures was the October 2012 IX National Meeting of MAPDER, that is, the Movement of People affected by Dams and in Defence of Rivers,[29] and the First Statewide Forum of Independent Civil Society Organizations in May of the same year.[30] The principal issue addressed at that forum was the fight against the Northwest Interconnected Hydraulic Plan, which included the Las Cruces dam and the Centenario Canal, another highly-controversial water diversion plan proposed by the state government. The second issue was the defense of indigenous peoples, their territory, culture, identity, and sacred sites.

On various occasions, the fight against the hydroelectric project led the mestizo and indigenous communities involved to raise awareness about their demands by blocking city streets. This occurred in Tuxpan in September 2013,[31] when the Naayeri communities, accompanied by a large contingent of mestizos, staged the first massive occupation of public spaces in the municipal capital. A similar event took place in

28 Dominio Público: Suspendida evaluación de la MIA Presa Las Cruces, podría ser desechada, 25 March 2014, at: http://dominiopublico.mx/suspendida-evaluacion-de-la-mia-presa-las-cruces-podria-ser-desechada/ (accessed on 22 January 2015).

29 Mapder: Declaración de Presidio de los Reyes, at: http://www.mapder.lunasexta.org/?p=2046 (accessed on 19 June 2015).

30 Nayarit en línea: Organizaciones independientes buscan erradicar problemáticas de Nayarit, 18 May 2014, at: http://www.nayaritenlinea.mx/2014/05/18/organizaciones-independientes-buscan-erradicar-problematicas-de-nayar it?vid=63554 (accessed on 15 January 2015).

31 René Ruiz: ONG se manifiestan contra edificación de la presa TRes Cruces en Nayarit, in: Crónica, 10 September 2013, at: http://www.cronica.com.mx/notas/2013/781833.html (accessed on 4 April 2015).

January 2014,[32] when a convocation of independent social organizations in the state resulted in a multitudinous march in Tepic in support of the movement—the first time that its presence was felt in the state capital. At the end of that year, the streets of Tepic were occupied once again, this time by residents from 44 indigenous communities who, along with several urban social organizations, denounced intense state repression and expressed their solidarity with the struggle of parents of the missing students from Ayotzinapa[33], Guerrero.

With regard to mass media, the movement organized several press conferences, gave interviews, and opened significant local spaces, thanks to the large-scale public actions that were undertaken. Here, it is important to mention the 'Campaign to Defend Muxatena'. Launched in 2014,[34] this movement demanded the cancellation of the Las Cruces project and respect for Naayeri sacred sites, with 49,000 people signing the related petition.

However, as the movement grew it found itself facing an enemy that had adopted a strategy to steadily weaken it through intimidation, repression, and even the jailing and murder of indigenous leaders in the mountainous regions.[35] Those actions by the state were accompanied by an intense media campaign that presented the dam as 'necessary and inevitable'. The CFE and the social organizations that it hired also offered to carry out sorely-needed, but small projects and works in communities as a way to overcome local social resistance. In response, in March 2014, members of the movement sent commissions to Mexico City for a series of meetings with congressional representatives, human rights groups, and universities, at which they denounced the repression to which they were subjected and began to move the conflict onto the national social, media, and political agendas.

32 Agustín Del Castillo: Convocan a manifestación cultural en defensa del Río San Pedro, in: Milenio, 9 June 2014, at: https://www.milenio.com/estados/convocan-manifestacion-cultural-defensa-rio-san-pedro (accessed on 4 April 2015).

33 43 students of the Rural Normal School 'Rural Raúl Isidro Burgos' of Ayotzinapa, Guerrero, were victims of enforced disappearance on 2 September 2014, in Tixtla, in the municipality of Iguala de la Independencia. They allegedly disappeared at the hands of police officers of Iguala and Cocula, who handed them to drug cartel Guerreros Unidos to murder them, according to the version of Attorney General's Office.

34 Juan José Guerra Abud et al.: No autorice la mega hidroeléctrica en Nayarit; proteja el río San Pedro Mezquital, los pueblos indígenas y los manglares de Marismas Nacionales, 2 March 2014, at: https://www.change.org/p/no-autoricen-la-mega-hidroel%C3%A9ctrica-las-cruces-defiendemuxatena-juanjoseguerra-robertosandoval-estefanoconde (accessed on 9 June 2015).

35 Ángel Espa: El río San Pedro y la nación Náyeri amenazados por las transnacionales, in: Grieta, 23 February 2015, at: https://www.grieta.org.mx/index.php/2015/02/23/el-rio-san-pedro-y-la-nacion-nayeri-amenazados-por-las-trans nacionales/ (accessed on 7 March 2016).

Finally, in 2016, President Peña Nieto was forced to admit that his government did not have the funds needed to carry out the project, and that the construction would have to be financed through private investments. Thus, in early 2017, the entire project was suspended, likely once and for all.[36]

The Framings in the Dispute

We will now analyse the general characteristics of the framings by both sides in the conflict.

Official Framing[37]

To justify the importance—indeed the necessity—of the project, from the outset[38] the CFE based its campaign on the assertion that the urgent need to actively combat the effects of climate change worldwide required a new national energy policy, one that would be more in line with the global consensus to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This meant prioritizing clean energy sources such as hydroelectricity, wind power, geothermal energy, and even nuclear power. But that argument appeared to be merely instrumental, that is, a means of justifying the project's developmentalist logic, which understands and treats nature as simply a provider of resources for human benefit, a strictly anthropocentric perspective. The human and social dimensions of sustainability—the search for individual and collective wellbeing—accompanied this logic as a purportedly automatic consequence of the allegedly 'rational' exploitation of resources, but *not* as an ethical premise for organizing the social use of nature.

The government's position was that Nayarit possessed enormous hydraulic wealth, more than sufficient to support the development of projects designed to exploit these resources in order to meet the increasing national and international demand for electricity. However, it never addressed the issue of the constant upward spiral of consumption, a reality that revealed its flawed logic and its failure to consider potentially dire consequences, as well as the urgent need to substantially modify it. The govern-

36 Verónica Ramírez: Se cancela presa Las Cruces, in: Realidades, 31 January 2017, at: http://realidadesperiodico. com/nota.php?id=54375 (accessed on 16 July 2018).

37 See the chapter on justification, in: Federal Electricity Commission: Manifestación de Impacto Social del P.H. Las Cruces, at: https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/155900/Evaluaci_n_o_Manifestaci_n_de_Impac to_Social _del_Proyecto_Hidroel_ctrico_Las_Cruces.pdf (accessed on 13 May 2015).

38 Based on arguments presented in various public meetings by CFE officials and technicians, as well as by private consultants contracted by that agency.

ment's approach seemed to say that we must simply try to respond to demand as efficiently as possible, but uncritically, though this meant that the most marginalized populations in the most socioeconomically disadvantaged and least politically-relevant states would shoulder the burden that economically-advantaged groups in rich states were unwilling to bear. The official discourse further argued that the Las Cruces dam was a 'sustainable' project in the sense that it was

- economically feasible;
- would bring significant social benefits; and
- took environmental protection into account in its conception, construction, and operation.

This discourse on the project was clearly framed in terms of state intervention in the exploitation of strategic resources based on the logic of supposed inter-regional solidarity, which also conformed to the criteria of the market economy. The central element assumed by this logic was that any serious government has an implicit responsibility to satisfy the energy needs of national modernization projects in an environmentally responsible way, in order to bring benefits to society as a whole. It implies acting opportunely to provide the nation with the infrastructure required to exploit a vital natural resource that in many regions has become a scarce and therefore valuable commodity. The fact that water exists in abundance in certain areas of Mexico gives those regions a considerable comparative advantage that increases their competitiveness. According to the official logic, these were the circumstances under which Nayarit should engage in exploitation in order to generate wealth, while at the same time efficiently meeting present and future energy demands, within and beyond national borders. Obviously, the construction of the dam, the management of hydraulic resources, and the exploitation of electricity would occur within the boundaries, criteria, and dynamics of the free market economy, while the criteria of public patrimony, public interest, and collective wellbeing were deemed irrelevant. The prevailing element in this framing is a modernizing orientation that is anthropocentric, rationalist, productivist, extraction-based, mercantilist, and confiscatory—one that is founded upon conceptions of hydraulic structuralism.[39]

39 The tendency to construct large hydroelectric projects characterised the management of surface waters around the world in the second half of the twentieth century, driven primarily by the U. S. government, but also promoted by multinational corporations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization, and the World Bank (Vandana Shiva: Las guerras del agua). This dynamic of privatising water on a global scale has been accelerated by the neoliberal emphasis on extraction, which intensifies processes involving dispossession and territorial depredation, in the interests of capitalist accumulation by transnational entities (David Harvey: The New Imperialism, Oxford 2003; Carlos

The variations in the official framing that were observed from the onset of the conflict to 2017 were basically of form, not substance. As the number of social and technical objections multiplied and organized social resistance gained strength, the CFE held firm to its position that the conflict needed to be settled in closed spaces through purely technical discussions. Clearly, its objective was to attract, isolate, and neutralize opposing social actors. Now with the support of the WWF, the CFE proposed additional protocols to improve the process, offered to increase social participation, and promised to guarantee the minimum amount of water necessary to preserve the environmental, social, and productive processes in the watershed. However, the behaviour of the official sectors—marked by cooptation, intimidation and repression—contradicted and delegitimized those minor adjustments to their framing.

Framing by the Movement

Unlike the government's position, the movement's framing underwent substantive changes over time. Here, three main periods can be identified.

First Period: Sustainable Equilibrium

The first phase combined the establishment of the movement itself with the process of developing its initial framing. As various frames were being evaluated with the goal of developing a definitive frame, the discussions involved were affected by internal tensions that reflected the members' diversity and their distinct orientations towards key matters that affected the group as a whole. And while we can assume that those orientations were modified as the movement developed, we will attempt to accurately describe the most mature and general positions observed among the actors.

One of the proposed frames was characteristic of the WWF, the NGO that convened the first discussions about the dam project. This view can be categorized as critical but fundamentally conservationist, a frame where the quality of life of human groups is secondary to conservation and the appropriate or sustainable use of resources, or at least disengaged from it, and in which it is not considered a problem in itself. However, the WWF later adopted a negotiating stance with official organisms that was virtually devoid of criticism, and shared the idea that the behavior of semi-gov-

Rodríguez: Geopolítica del desarrollo local: campesinos, empresas y gobiernos en la disputa por territorios y bienes naturales en el México rural, Mexico 2015) and to the detriment of indigenous and rural communities. Such projects also actively involve the interests of national and regional actors (government and private) who directly or indirectly benefit from their approval.

ernmental industries can be moralized by appealing to the rule of law in Mexico. Nevertheless, despite this significant change, the WWF's intervention was crucial during the early stages of the conflict in terms of increasing the visibility of the environmental importance of the San Pedro River.

The next framing to be considered was the one posited by the university group *Pro-Regiones* (UAN/UNAM), which explicitly adopted sustainable equilibrium,[40] as its theoretical-methodological proposal. This approach supports the sustainable use of all forms of energy generated by an ecosystem, in a reasonably well-organized manner and with fair distribution. Its goal is to achieve social densification, that is, to improve the quality of life of human groups through a balanced relationship with their natural surroundings. This objective can best be achieved in medium-sized regions by relying on a sociology of convergence, not conflict. Hence, while it reconfigures the relation between human beings and nature in order to reinsert the latter into a comprehensive ecosystem plan, the sustainable equilibrium remains anthropocentric, at least to a degree.

The university project progressed to the point of seeking to help expand the ability of community actors to act autonomously. To this end, it promoted informed and reflexive, but active, initiatives by local residents, to open public spaces, and actions to develop a democratic, participatory culture that could impact the process of democratic institutionalization.[41] The cornerstones of this frame were the defence of universal and collective rights and the direct participation of people in defining the path that they believed would improve their quality of life. Thus, its main concerns did not include the growth of material production as a premise of wellbeing. Instead, it sought to construct and strengthen sociocultural, political, and economic factors that are integral to improving people's living conditions. With this orientation, resistance to the hydroelectric project is not considered to be a goal in and of itself, but rather a step in the quest to achieve sustainable equilibrium in the region.

Nevertheless, tensions arose between these frames and the diverse views of the inhabitants of the lower watershed (especially the community of Tuxpan), whose framing can be understood as centring on the river itself, with which, they assert, they maintain a strategic, instrumental relationship. This may well reflect the fact that many of those localities are of relatively recent formation, and therefore, they have no ancestral ties to the river or land. Although the river is part of an increasingly deteriorating regional environment, it still allows people to carry out the economic activities with which they sustain their families and communities. However, probing this frame

40 Sergio Zermeño: Reconstruir a México en el siglo XXI. Estrategias para mejorar la calidad de vida y enfrentar la destrucción del medio ambiente, Mexico 2010.

41 Jürgen Habermas: Tres modelos de democracia. Sobre el concepto de una política deliberativa, in: Polis 10, at: http://www.revistapolis.cl/10/habe.htm (accessed on 4 May 2011).

more deeply reveals that the river is a framing that nourishes their historical memory of earlier agrarian struggles and recognizes organizational structures that support collective dynamics, objectives, norms, and solidarity.

With respect to the Naayeri indigenous community of Presidio de los Reyes, which, together with Tuxpan, formed one of the fundamental axes of the movement during the first period, we found that nature, as a set of resources, coexists with, but is gradually subordinated to, a spiritual and holistic view. This is a consequence of the search for balance between humans and their natural surroundings, and of pretensions to development, community wellbeing, and environmental health. The people of Presidio were seeking resources and political participation in a decision-making process that deeply affected them, but even more significantly, they were striving to achieve a harmonious ecosystem, respect for their culture and social organization, and recognition of their ancestral rights to the land and water as their patrimony.[42]

Other frames emerged from the diverse agricultural, fishing, and urban groups and communities along the coastal plain and the indigenous Naayeri region. Their respective orientations gradually became formulated and then expanded, and were immersed in differences, tensions, contradictions, and even conflict. Despite this, certain features predominated that allow us to speak of a common position. Little by little, interaction among these distinct frames led to the emergence of a position in which the framing that characterized the *Pro-Regiones* initially predominated. This reflected the fact that *Pro-Regiones* was the principle player in the information campaign to spread the word about the impending hydroelectric project, and in the first organizational efforts in towns and indigenous communities before the creation of the Inter-Community Council. However, local inhabitants frame added a fundamentally important concept, namely, an experiential component that was as much cognitive in nature as it was emotional and affective. As a result, the sustainable equilibrium perspective became much more meaningful for inhabitants and was integrated into their interpretation of the phenomenon that they were confronting.

Once constituted, the Inter-Community Council for the Sustainable Development of the San Pedro River watershed formulated a declaration that synthesized the arguments made by the opponents of the dam. This key document[43] presented the following fundamental demands:

- the involvement in the consulting process of all the social, economic, political, and cultural actors in the region who were directly or indirectly affected by the hydroelectric project;

42 Pedro Arrojo: El reto ético de la nueva cultura del agua.

43 CIDSCRSP: Primer pronunciamiento del Consejo Intercomunitario para el Desarrollo Sustentable de la Cuenca del Río San Pedro, 1 August 2009.

- the opening of institutionally-recognized spaces for public debate, where all parties could actively participate in an informed manner;
- the evaluation of the feasibility and environmental and social impacts of the project, together with the resulting resolutions, within the confines of national and international law;
- giving priority to alternative infrastructure works that would be less costly and better addressed the needs of the region; and
- the implementation of regional development strategies in an integral manner.

The framing outlined therein highlights political-technical aspects that required the inhabitants to actively participate in a fundamentally public debate. Aspects of academic discourse were also still evident, and contributed to defining the framing presented by the movement at that time.

Second Period: Dominance of the Indigenous Worldview

During the second period, both the grammar of sustainable equilibrium promoted by *Pro-Regiones* and the position held by the *ejidatarios* in Tuxpan were gradually subordinated to the Naayeri way of thinking, which came to predominate. Consequently, concepts such as wealth, growth, and development, among others, no longer appeared among the members' central concerns, but were replaced by human dignity, respect, autonomy, and balance among humans, nature, and the spiritual and sacred realm.[44] This perspective had thus evolved from anthropocentrism to biocentrism and ecocentrism. Similarly, insistence on the right to be different and to be heard and recognized stood out. Through this process, the concept of development was transformed from a single view of the future to an embryonic view of other possible projects that contribute to wellbeing.[45]

> […] our original peoples still conserve […] nature as a common good off of which we have lived and wish to keep living. We're not interested in [and] don't think

44 Interview to Odilón de Jesús (Naayeri spokesman), Tepic 2015.

45 This way of thinking and living is similar to views of 'good living' that emphasise the centrality of nature as a sacred, living being that is a subject of rights, that place the community above the individual, and relate to nature with care, instead of the view of unbridled exploitation for supposed human benefit. Finally, it proposes happiness as the final goal of everyday practices and of life itself (Boris Marañón: Buen vivir y descolonialidad. Crítica al desarrollo y racionalidad instrumentales, México 2013; Pablo Davalos: El "Sumak Kawsay" ("Buen Vivir") y las cesuras del desarrollo, in: América Latina en Movimiento, at: http://alainet.org/active/23920 (accessed on 2 June 2012).

> about accumulating wealth, but in conserving the health of nature, our Mother Earth, our nature, keeping her in good health because if our Mother is healthy then we will surely be healthy also.[46]

This change in the movement's framing was also demonstrated by the fact that the legal arena took centre stage. It was during this second period that the government intensified its actions to change land use regulations in the territory of the indigenous communities, though this meant multiple violations of rights, including those of indigenous peoples, agrarian rights, and basic human rights. In this phase of the struggle, the movement imposed injunctions to block the government's efforts and demanded that it consult with indigenous peoples, as stipulated by law. Finally,

> in 2017, [members] from the Mexican Center for Environmental Law filed an injunction on behalf of the initiative by the Wixarika people in Bancos de San Hipólito, because they had a ceremonial center on the river that they shared with the Naayeri and O'dam. [That measure] proceeded and blocked dam construction.[47]

Another axis of this social framing was the growing indigenous component, given that the struggle for indigenous peoples' rights was resonating loudly in both the national and international media as well as in legal realms, which held out the promise of being a more effective and efficient means of publicly promoting the movement's motives and goals. This was also influenced by the thematic, spatial, temporal, historical, and cultural proximity of the Wixaritari, who had recently succeeded in their internationally visible defense of their territory (the case of Wirikuta).[48] Another key aspect was the sweeping nature of the criticisms formulated by the movement, which by now called into question the entire development model that was being espoused by the state of Nayarit, including agro-industrial exports, the privatization of beaches for large tourist complexes, and the privatization of hydraulic and geothermic resources to generate electricity for agriculture and human consumption. This led to the conviction that

> we had to stay organized, continue to organize, and begin to coordinate with other struggles that are going on right now, on other fronts, some in education, others over questions of work, social issues, human rights abuses; that is, different orga-

46 Interview to Julián López (Naayeri spokesman), Tepic 2018.

47 Ibid.

48 Carlos Rea/Luz Ceballos/Bertha Villaseñor: Equilibrio sustentable y resistencia social en la cuenca del río San Pedro en Nayarit.

> nizations on distinct fronts of resistance, of struggle […] that's how we came into contact and came to collaborate with other struggles [and] obtain advice from professors and people who offered guidance.[49]

Finally, it is important to note the gradual emergence of tensions between the movement and some of the national and international NGOs that supported it, due to the latter's tendency to make decisions for the members of the movement based on their professional experience and the fact that they offered advice, guidance, and indispensable financial resources. These tensions later translated into the assertion of the movement's autonomy, not only from the state but also from some of its allies. During this phase, the team of university professors in *Pro-Regiones* Nayarit also lost its central position in the process, and was replaced by the Nuiwari[50] civil association and natural forms of leadership that arose and became established at the core of the Inter-Community Council and the Naayeri Indigenous Council.

Third Period: Inroads in the City and on the National Scene

The third period was marked by the predominance of the indigenous grammar in the movement's general framing. Facing increased state pressure, and in the aftermath of the government's resounding defeat in the discussions about the environmental impact report in February 2014 (though that report was eventually approved by SEMARNAT), the centrality of the indigenous social component was reaffirmed and organized by the councils, while the movement's allies (NGOs, advisors) were relegated to a secondary role in terms of both participation and influence. The adversaries were basically the same, but the movement had gained a clear understanding of the reality that their opponents represented: a predatory, neoliberal, extraction-based, global development model.

> […] we've always lived here […] sometimes, you know, governments negotiate with transnational corporations to directly affect our territories without taking into account that we live off the river […] we live off our Mother Earth, and that we've always been here. We were here in the colonial period and remain here with our ways of life, our culture, our traditions, but governments don't consider this when it comes to building megaprojects on our lands.[51]

49 Interview to Julián López (Naayeri spokesman), Tepic 2018.
50 The Centro para el Desarrollo Social y la Sustentabilidad Nuiwari AC.
51 Interview to Pedro Cayetano (Naayeri spokesman), Tepic 2018.

The movement's strategic allies came to include an expanding group of national social and legal actors, though political actors were considered allies of a more tactical nature. During this period, the movement's organizational work and actions were considerably more systematic and strategically planned, thanks to the involvement of Nuiwari, the two councils (CDSCRSP, CIN), and the most supportive NGOs. However, the influence of Nuiwari and the other NGOs, with their professionalized logic of action and concern for efficacy, continued to create certain tensions with the dynamics that are characteristic of the Naayeri communities, which are governed by traditional, religious criteria oriented towards reaching community consensus based on a conception of temporality that is significantly distinct in terms of its definition and the performance of actions.

Regarding the predominance of this indigenous element in the movement's overall framing, we can see that the central goals during this stage were to gain recognition and active respect for cultural differences, the right to autonomy, the right to be different but equal and to live in a distinct way but together, and above all, legitimacy for views of collective wellbeing that are different from the modern mestizo-western perspective. These circumstances provided a learning experience for the mestizo population that was involved, directly or indirectly, with the movement.

> […] the first thing that mestizos may have learned from the original peoples is another way of perceiving our Mother Earth, our nature, based on the awareness that we belong to our Mother Earth, not the other way around […] we need to nurture her, take care of our Mother Earth, our nature, and not exploit it with the intensity with which it is now being exploited, with no thought given to the effects.[52]

The movement's framing was also modified by practical exigencies that were imposed by a changing political scene, as the government intensified its active promotion of the dam and adopted a more aggressive attitude towards the opposition.[53] The new framing clearly sought to widen the movement's reach in cities (principally with citizens and social and political actors in Tepic and Mexico City), expand and solidify its contacts with actors in social spheres (on the local level with organizations, collectives,[54] and diverse movements; on the national level with universities, social movements, and environmental and human rights NGOs), and penetrate the institutional political are-

52 Interview to Julián López (Naayeri spokesman), Tepic 2018.

53 A new state government took office in late 2017. It has yet to announce its official position on the dam.

54 There is an important relation with social, cultural and party collectives composed of urban youth, who in the crisis of local traditional cultural politics search for alternative political and symbolic references. This can lead to important identifications with elements of indigenous forms of thought and living.

na (through frequent contact with candidates for different positions at the municipal and state levels, and with state and federal representatives). Also notable was its stronger incursion into the legal arena on the basis of indigenous law, which is supported by agrarian statutes, and to a lesser degree by environmental law. The movement also made inroads into the arena of national (and increasingly international) public opinion. And even though it was keenly aware that its adversary was large and the pressure it imposed was causing suffering, it became evident during this period that by turning to the institutional spaces that were within its reach and by appealing to public opinion, the movement's framing never renounced its search for a political solution to the conflict, not even for a second. Moreover, it never abandoned the fundamental component of social organization as the guarantor of its struggle.

Conclusion

Through this history, we see the formation of an "actantial"[55] system that emerged as a social problem became defined in terms of a public problem, complete with victims, perpetrators, judges, and witnesses. This process developed in a mutually experimental way amidst conflictual interactions among the actors involved. In this saga, the university professors with the *Pro-Regiones* research team were precursors to the operation of denomination in the watershed. They formed a shared definition of the situation by interacting with other academic organizations and civil society, and by consensus. While, at the time, that was perceived as a serious problem of general interest, it simply represented an external view.

Making the problem publicly visible did not begin immediately. Rather, the initial core group made a strategic decision to focus on expanding the social bases in order to position the community so that a collective actor could assume a leading role once the conflict became a matter of public debate. This phase was followed by a long, slow process of galvanizing the social sectors and producer organizations in the watershed around the two councils, and the ensuing collaboration with groups and sectors at the state and federal levels. This entailed comparing and evaluating diverse cultural and political framings, which had to be at least partially harmonized through processes of intercultural dialogue of knowledge, as the indigenous worldview was gradually being introduced. Achieving this meant confronting the official framing, which considered the matter simply as an initiative to sustainably exploit natural resources based on criteria of efficiency and profit, in response to a supposedly necessary logic of development for the benefit of the nation.

55 Luc Boltanski/Yan Darré/Marie-Ange Schiltz: La dénonciation, in: Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 51 (1984), pp. 3–40.

In opposition to this framing, the movement presented a counter-framing that conceived of water and land as common patrimonies, prioritized human and biological wellbeing, asserted the centrality of the sustainable equilibrium of humans and nature, and appealed to the principle of ecosystem care rather than economic feasibility. The specifics of this framing were gradually defined by experimental adjustments that began with initial contact among the distinct views of members, and then continued as the conflictual relationships with the dam's promoters played out through confrontations in distinct arenas of struggle.

These were the two versions that competed for credibility and legitimacy among the watershed's inhabitants. As a result of this dispute over the denomination and significance of the process, a well-justified suspicion towards the official position emerged and became entrenched in important sectors of the population. And over time, this acquired its own form and content through the inter-community declaration discussed above. Here, we can see a demand for the democratic management of the hydraulic ecosystem,[56] which was to be understood not only as a set of resources but also as a common patrimony. And as such, management would not only be based on economic profit calculations—even if that appealed to an intergenerational ethic of solidarity (echoed in sustainable development)—but on a biocentric and holistic perspective that recognizes the environmental, sociocultural, and spiritual spheres to be just as important as economic factors, or more so.

Finally, it is important to highlight the general orientations that opposed one another and the institutional devices that were publicly used as the 'correct' ones for confronting and resolving the conflict. This is related to a clash between two views of how to conceive of improving people's quality of life. One of those is modern and rationalist, based on the idea of progress. The other predates and falls outside the modern project, and is definitively critical of it. It asserts a fundamental place for individual and collective happiness and ecosystem balance on the normative horizon.

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56 Pedro Arrojo: El reto ético de la nueva cultura del agua.

Christoph Lorke

Beyond Egalitarianism: Statistical Knowledge and Social Inequality in the German Democratic Republic

Abstract

Despite all the political and ideological pronouncements, there were also various forms of social inequality in the 'real existing socialism' of the GDR (German Democratic Republic). These have been extensively studied at the latest since the construction of the Berlin Wall. Since these years, there has been an intensified preoccupation with socially deviant living conditions, which have been documented statistically. However, these figures raised questions about the limits of socialist communisation and the realisation of the ideologically articulated goal of bringing about a convergence of the 'classes and strata'. Therefore, the goal was to synchronize these figures with the state's self-image, which in turn revealed numerous contradictions. Based on a deconstruction of contemporary statistical measurement procedures as well as studies and the resulting interpretations of social inequality, the article first proposes a phase classification of this approach to social differentiation. In a further step, the resulting intended and unintended effects are illuminated.

Keywords: *social inequality; social sciences; statistics; poor and rich; marginalized groups; Socialism; Cold War; Ideology*

Modern societies constantly produce descriptions of their social structures. Statistical methods of measurement are a reflection of a modern social order and at the same time an expression of normative standards and justifications.[1] However, the appropriation of social reality by political leaders sometimes contradicts real social developments. In the societies of 'really existing socialism' (*real existierender Sozialismus*), as recent research concluded, social inequalities remained a taboo[2]; the vision of an egalitarian,

1 See, amongst others: Ann Rudinow Sætnan/Heidi Mork Lomell/Svein Hammer (eds.): The Mutual Construction of Statistics and Society, New York 2011; Richard Rottenburg/Sally E. Merry/Sung-Joon Park et al. (eds.): The World of Indicators. The Making of Governmental Knowledge Through Quantification, Cambridge 2015.

2 Christiane Reinecke: Fragen an die sozialistische Lebensweise. Empirische Sozialforschung und soziales Wissen in der SED-„Fürsorgediktatur", in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 50

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harmonious society prevailed, instead. This seems hardly surprising, since the issue of social inequality—or rather the issue of overcoming it—was deeply entrenched in the politics of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The much invoked 'rapprochement of classes and strata' (*Annäherung der Klassen und Schichten*) and the granting of social security were among the central promises and correspondingly propagandistically declared goals of the socialist state. According to the self-perception of socialist societies, the societal transformation into such a state had several positive effects on the structure of society: a homogeneous society, including small degrees of social differentiation, small differences in income, and standardised socio-political achievements. This claim also explains the overemphasis on social equality and the fade-out and externalisation of certain social phenomena such as 'poverty' and 'wealth', which were defined as 'alien' to socialism. Seen from this perspective, social policy was a means of preserving power through the preventive suppression of social tensions. Furthermore, it was to serve as propagandistic proof that socialist societies were the fairer, more humanitarian alternatives to their western equivalents.[3]

Precisely for this reason, the question arises as to how social difference was captured in East Germany and how state socialist egalitarianism affected the understanding of social differences. Recent studies suggest that these postulates and promises of an egalitarian society remained an illusion in the GDR, as well as in the other countries of the "Eastern Bloc".[4] These findings are widely and commonly

(2010), pp. 311–334; Lothar Mertens: „Was die Partei wusste, aber nicht sagte…" Empirische Befunde sozialer Ungleichheit in der DDR-Gesellschaft, in: Idem (ed.): Soziale Ungleichheit in der DDR. Zu einem tabuisierten Strukturmerkmal der SED-Diktatur, Berlin 2002, pp. 119–157; in contrast, see: Siegfried Grundmann: Soziale Ungleichheit – ein Tabu in der DDR?, in: Nikolai Genov/Reinhard Kreckel (eds.): Soziologische Zeitgeschichte: Helmut Steiner zum 70. Geburtstag, Berlin 2007, pp. 97–109. According to Grundmann, the presentation of social differences was rather distorted, short-ended and defused (p. 98).

3 From a sociologist point of view, see: Frank Adler: Einige Grundzüge der Sozialstruktur der DDR, in: Projektgruppe „Das Sozio-ökonomische Panel" (ed.): Lebenslagen im Wandel. Basisdaten und -analysen zur Entwicklung in den Neuen Bundesländern, Frankfurt am Main/New York 1991, pp. 152–177.

4 Members of the technical intelligentsia and armed organs, heads of the upper levels, functionaries or chief physicians as well as independent households formed the upper social edge in GDR society. Even if politicians tried to counteract a bundling of negative social conditions and reduce their emergence by securing basic needs, certain other groups can be found on the lower rungs of the social ladder. Female and unskilled workers and employees in the agricultural sector tended to have below-average mobility opportunities. In addition, pensioners in need of care and recipients of minimum pensions, disabled persons unable to work, single parents and large families were regarded as the largest fringe groups of socialist societies. Cf. Elvir Ebert: Einkommen und Konsum im Transformationsprozeß. Vom Plan zum Markt – vom Mangel zum Überfluß, Opladen 1997; André Steiner: Statistische Übersichten zur Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945. Band SBZ/DDR, Berlin 2006, p. 88;

known.[5] Nevertheless, the specific conditions under which these observations of the social emerged still continue to constitute a considerable research gap, especially with regard to the history of knowledge. My paper aims to paint a more complex picture

Jens Gieseke: Soziale Ungleichheit im Staatssozialismus. Eine Skizze, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History 10:2 (2013), pp. 171–198.

5 We also know a lot about the mental processing of social inequality and the modes of imagining inequality that prevailed in politics, science and the media (e. g. Christoph Lorke: Armut im geteilten Deutschland. Die Wahrnehmung sozialer Randlagen in der Bundesrepublik und der DDR, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2015; Idem: Depictions of Social Dissent in East German Television Detective Series, 1970–1989, in: Journal of Cold War Studies 19:4 (2017), pp. 168–191), about discrepancies between state propaganda claims and social reality, for example in relation to pension policy (Beatrix Bouvier: Die DDR – ein Sozialstaat? Sozialpolitik in der Ära Honecker, Bonn 2002; Christoph Lorke: Von Anstand und Liederlichkeit. Armut und ihre Wahrnehmung in der DDR (1961–1989), in: Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History 10:2 (2013), pp. 199–218; Dierk Hoffmann: Die ungelöste Rentenfrage in der DDR, in: Deutsche Rentenversicherung 68:2 (2013), pp. 112–120; Idem: Am Rande der sozialistischen Arbeitsgesellschaft: Rentner in der DDR 1945–1990, Erfurt 2010; for a local level in a comparative approach, see: Dorothee Lürbke: Armut und Armutspolitik in der Stadt: Castrop-Rauxel, Freiburg und Schwerin im innerdeutschen Vergleich, 1955 bis 1975, Freiburg 2014; for poverty amongst large families, see: Christoph Lorke: „Soziale Ungleichheit und soziale Ungerechtigkeit“: Kinderreiche Familien in der DDR, in: Deutschland Archiv Online, at: http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/zeitgeschichte/deutschland-archiv/206153/soziale-ungleichheit-und-soziale-ungerechtigkeit-kinderreiche-familien-in-der-ddr [accessed on 26 September 2019]) and about mechanisms of repression in the context of the GDR social policy (e. g. Alexander Bruce Burdumy: Sozialpolitik und Repression in der DDR. Ost-Berlin 1971–1989, Essen 2013; for the criminal offence of “Asozialität”, see: Matthias Zeng: „Asoziale“ in der DDR: Transformationen einer moralischen Kategorie, Münster 2000; Sven Korzilius: „Asoziale“ und „Parasiten“ im Recht der SBZ/DDR: Randgruppen im Sozialismus zwischen Repression und Ausgrenzung, Köln/Weimar/Wien 2005; Thomas Lindenberger: „Asoziale Lebensweise“. Herrschaftslegitimation, Sozialdisziplinierung und die Konstruktion eines „negativen Milieus“ in der SED-Diktatur, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 32:2 (2005) pp. 227–254; Joachim Windmüller: Ohne Zwang kann der Humanismus nicht existieren… – „Asoziale“ in der DDR, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/Wien et al. 2006). For a comparative classification in the specific German-German constellation, see: Hans Günter Hockerts (ed.): Drei Wege deutscher Sozialstaatlichkeit: NS-Diktatur, Bundesrepublik und DDR im Vergleich, ünchen 1998; Winfried Süß: Soziale Sicherheit und soziale Ungleichheit in wohlfahrtsstaatlich formierten Gesellschaften, in: Frank Bösch (ed.): Geteilte Geschichte. Ost- und Westdeutschland 1970–2000, Göttingen 2015, pp. 153–193; Manfred G. Schmidt/Tobias Ostheim: Sozialpolitik in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, in: Manfred G. Schmidt/Tobias Ostheim/Nico A. Siegel et al. (eds.): Der Wohlfahrtsstaat: Eine Einführung in den historischen und internationalen Vergleich, Wiesbaden 2007, pp. 173–192; Johannes Frerich/Martin Frey: Handbuch der Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland. Teil 2: Sozialpolitik in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Münchden 1993. Reference is also made to the relevant 11 volumes on the history of social policy in Germany since 1945, published by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

in order to describe and historicise these processes of reflection. How can we capture something analytically which, according to the socialist party leaders, was not allowed to exist at all? Approaching the production of social classifications from a historical perspective, one can assume that their contemporary perception and perceptibility was always structured by systems of perception and evaluation and the principles of their 'classification'. They were the products of past and present symbolic confrontations with the social world. Specific taxonomies reflect effective social definitions. These 'social maps' served to structure and classify the complex reality of social structures and inequalities.[6] According to Pierre Bourdieu, the state had the monopoly on the "appropriate" classification and order of the social. Consequently, I assume that the formation of categories, their recognition and reproduction have decisively shaped social order.[7]

In order to assess the extent to which these rather general considerations can claim validity for the more or less 'closed' GDR society, it is first necessary to at least sketch fundamental developments in the field of the (social) sciences. For quite a few observers saw little more than 'self-deception'[8] in empirical social structure research in the GDR. Thus, there was a need for scientific expertise in the GDR, too, but only in a narrowly defined ideological framework. This meant that room for maneuver, available resources and the choice of topics were largely determined by the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED). Admittedly, research has shown that a distinction must be made between different periods. Thus, for example, for the period from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, with growing demands for control and a growing need for information, it is still possible to discern, despite narrow limits, co-determination by individuals and—with the SED's unchallenged claim to power—influence on politics by academics. At that time, there was a widespread belief, both in science and politics, in the predictability of social processes and social planning ambitions, as well as the partial integration of scientific findings into political and cultural action—from which various social science research efforts were to benefit.[9] In the period that fol-

6 Peter A. Berger: Ungleichheitssemantiken. Graduelle Unterschiede und kategoriale Exklusivitäten, in: Archives Européennes de Sociologie 30:1 (1989), pp. 48–60, here referring to Bernhard Giesen: Natürliche Ungleichheit, soziale Ungleichheit, ideale Gleichheit. Zur Evolution von Deutungsmustern sozialer Ungleichheit, in: Idem/Hans Haferkamp (eds.): Soziologie der sozialen Ungleichheit, Opladen 1987, pp. 314–345.

7 Pierre Bourdieu: Sozialer Raum und „Klassen", Frankfurt am Main 1995, pp. 23–30, especially p. 25; See also: Peter A. Berger: Die Herstellung sozialer Klassifikationen: Methodische Probleme der Ungleichheitsforschung, in: Leviathan 16:4 (1988), pp. 501–520.

8 As a West German economist and philosopher described it: Horst Laatz: Zur Entwicklung der empirischen Sozialstrukturforschung in der DDR, in: Dieter Voigt (ed.), Die Gesellschaft der DDR. Untersuchung zu ausgewählten Bereichen, Berlin 1984, pp. 147–165.

9 Central to the relationship between empirical social research and politics in these years is the article by Christiane Reinecke: Fragen an die sozialistische Lebensweise. Empirische Sozial-

lowed—specifically from the end of the 1970s onwards –increasing refusal of and resistance to consultation is discernible, a return to the earlier, increasingly one-dimensional relationship between science and politics, whereby the exchange between political authorities and scientists was to decline significantly, if not a pronounced lack of interest. With regard to the communication between science and politics, East German social scientist Manfred Lötsch was resigned to the fact that critical indications remained in the anterooms of the actual decision-making processes or were reinterpreted there.[10] Thus, by this time and with the drifting apart of social policy programs and rhetoric on the one hand and economic performance on the other, the GDR had reached a point at which social planning promises had been pushed to their limits by social science.[11] This, in turn, created the breeding ground for the emergence of increasingly critical expert knowledge—whereby the knowledge gained here was largely ignored by the political leadership even until the fall of the Berlin Wall, certainly also because the findings there pointed to necessary changes that did not meet with any approval among the top functionaries who were not very reform-minded.[12]

forschung und soziales Wissen in der SED-„Fürsorgediktatur", pp. 314–316. For the earlier phase, see the preliminary remarks in: Andreas Malycha: Geplante Wissenschaft. Eine Quellenedition zur DDR-Wissenschaftsgeschichte 1945–1961, Berlin 2003; Idem: Neue Forschungen zur DDR-Wissenschaftsgeschichte. Aspekte des Verhältnisses zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 41 (2001), pp. 663–676; Peer Pasternack: Wissenschaft und Politik in der DDR. Eine Kontrastbetrachtung im Vergleich zur Bundesrepublik, in: Deutschland Archiv 41:3 (2008), pp. 510–519; Agnes Tandler: Geplante Zukunft. Wissenschaftler und Wissenschaftspolitik in der DDR 1955–1971, Florenz 1997; See, fundamentally, about that relationship and the various feedbacks: Peter Weingart: Die Stunde der Wahrheit? Zum Verhältnis der Wissenschaft zu Politik, Wirtschaft und Medien in der Wissensgesellschaft, Weilerswist 2001; Mitchell G. Ash: Wissenschaft und Politik. Eine Beziehungsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 50 (2010), pp. 11–46, especially pp. 30–42.

10 Manfred Lötsch: Abschied von der Legitimationswissenschaft, in: Hubertus Knabe (ed.): Aufbruch in eine andere DDR. Reformer und Oppositionelle zur Zukunft ihres Landes, Reinbek b.H. 1989, pp. 192–199, p. 197; See: Christiane Reinecke: Fragen an die sozialistische Lebensweise. Empirische Sozialforschung und soziales Wissen in der SED-„Fürsorgediktatur", p. 321.

11 Lutz Raphael: Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen – Wissens- und Sozialordnung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts, in: Idem (ed.): Ordnungsmuster und Deutungskämpfe. Wissenspraktiken im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts, Göttingen 2018, pp. 13–50, p. 32; See also: Idem.: Experten im Sozialstaat. Statuswechsel und Funktionsdifferenzen in Demokratie und Diktaturen in Deutschland 1933–1990, in: Idem (ed.): Ordnungsmuster, pp. 95–129, p. 107.

12 André Steiner: Wissenschaft und Politik. Politikberatung in der DDR?, in: Stefan Fisch/Wilfried Rudloff (eds.): Experten und Politik: Wissenschaftliche Politikberatung in geschichtlicher Perspektive, Berlin 2004, pp. 101–125. On the relationship between science and politics in the GDR, with particular reference to aspects of political control and dominance

Based on these preliminary considerations, my paper aims to analyse the effects and consequences of statistical and social knowledge about social imbalances in GDR society in a longitudinal perspective, whereby the GDR was an exemplary and equally special case for the 'Eastern Bloc'.[13] The focus is on the construction, purposes and dissemination of existing contemporary knowledge about social, or even more precisely: monetary inequality, rather than the concrete results of these diagnostics. Investigating the forms, techniques and effects of knowledge production and circulation seems promising. The deconstruction of contemporary modes of measurement and interpretation of "social space" enable us to ask new questions about representations of social orders under particular political conditions—not only of a socialist dictatorship but also in modern industrial societies in general.[14] Such a perspective also allows insight into contemporary ideas and different interpretations of social equality and justice.

and the limits of political-dictatorial penetration of individual subjects, see: Jürgen Kocka: Wissenschaft und Politik in der DDR, in: Idem/Renate Mayntz (eds.): Wissenschaft und Wiedervereinigung. Disziplinen im Umbruch, Berlin 1998, pp. 435–459. For institutional and personnel frameworks of GDR sociology, see: Hansgünter Meyer: Soziologie und soziologische Forschung in der DDR, in: Bernhard Schäfers (ed.): Soziologie in Deutschland. Entwicklung, Institutionalisierung und Berufsfelder. Theoretische Kontroversen, Opladen 1995, pp. 35–50; Horst Berger: Das Institut für Soziologie und Sozialpolitik im Spannungsfeld von Wissenschaft und Politik, in: Wolfgang Girnus/Klaus Meier (eds.): Forschungsakademien in der DDR – Modelle und Wirklichkeit, Leipzig 2014, pp. 211–239; for an overview, see also: Jürgen Kaube: Soziologie, in: Jürgen Kocka/Renate Mayntz (eds.): Wissenschaft pp. 255–310. On the relationship of social self-interpretation and scientific practice to planning processes, see also: Peter C. Caldwell: Dictatorship, State Planning, and Social Theory in the German Democratic Republic, Cambridge 2003; Dolores L. Augustine: Red Prometheus. Engineering and Dictatorship in East Germany, 1945–1990, Cambridge 2007.

13 For an overview, see: Frank Adler: Einige Grundzüge der Sozialstruktur der DDR; for an in-depth understanding, see: Heike Solga: Auf dem Weg in eine klassenlose Gesellschaft? Klassenlagen und Mobilität zwischen Generationen in der DDR, Berlin 1995; see also Siegfried Grundmann: Die Sozialstruktur der DDR: Versuch einer Rekonstruktion auf der Basis einer 1987 durchgeführten soziologischen Untersuchung, Berlin 1997; for research in the GDR before 1989, see: Rudi Weidig (ed.): Sozialstruktur der DDR, Berlin 1988 (here almost two thirds of the GDR population was subsumed under the category of 'working class' status 1985, p. 16); in the Federal Republic, e. g. Dieter Voigt/Werner Voss/Sabine Meck: Sozialstruktur der DDR. Eine Einführung, Darmstadt 1987; Horst Laatz: Klassenstruktur und soziales Verhalten. Zur Entstehung der empirischen Sozialstrukturforschung in der DDR, Köln 1990.

14 Thomas Mergel: Soziale Ungleichheit als Problem der DDR-Soziologie, in: Christiane Reinecke/Idem (eds.): Das Soziale ordnen. Sozialwissenschaften und gesellschaftliche Ungleichheit im 20. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt am Main 2012, pp. 307–336, here p. 307, p. 316; for aspects of social mobility and patterns of inequality in the GDR society, see also: Idem: Gleichheit und Ungleichheit als zeithistorisches und soziologisches Problem, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History 10:2 (2013), pp. 307–320.

Moreover, we can outline how statistical knowledge translated into political action. In order to deal with these questions, first, I put a phase model up for discussion, before I address the intended and unintended 'side effects' of these developments.

Approaches to and Measurements of Inequality in GDR Society. A Phase Model

Statistical studies on social differentiation, for various reasons, did not play a pronounced role in the first years following the founding of the GDR. Only the establishment of the First Five-Year Plan, forced collectivisation, the workers' revolt of 1953 and the food ration cards still valid until 1958 should be mentioned. In other words, all of these aspects make a more in-depth study of social differentiation in the 'reconstruction years' seem inappropriate, as more acute problems had to be overcome at first.[15] Moreover, such discussions would have led the desired rapid realisation of the intended social model *ad absurdum*. In contrast, the 1960s can be described as a *phase of discovery* of social frictions in GDR society. This shift can only be understood against the background of the development of knowledge about global inequality after 1945, a research area that has recently received more attention from the historical sciences.[16] After the construction of the Berlin Wall, political attention increasingly turned inwards. Now, the focus was on questions concerning the economic measurability of social differences and the political feasibility of solving social problems. During the years of euphoric planning, when the belief in shaping social conditions became increasingly important, this general trend led to discussions about material and social living conditions and needs in the Soviet Union, the GDR and other socialist countries.

This, however, resulted in official investigations kept under lock and key. Political leaders commissioned scientific studies in order to obtain information on social developments and vacancies, for example with regard to wage structures or the required level of state allowances such as pensions or child benefit.[17] Since the mid-1960s, greater

15 Cf. the contribution in Dierk Hoffmann (ed.): Vor dem Mauerbau: Politik und Gesellschaft in der DDR der fünfziger Jahre, München 2003.

16 Cf. Daniel Speich Chassé: Die Erfindung des Bruttosozialprodukts. Globale Ungleichheit in der Wissensgeschichte der Ökonomie, Göttingen 2013; for a comparative perspective, see the instructive ideas in Felix Römer: The Politics of Measurement: Knowledge about Economic Inequality in the United Kingdom and Beyond since 1945, in: History of Knowledge, 2 June 2019, at: https://historyofknowledge.net/2019/06/02/politics-of-measurement/ (accessed on 26 September 2019).

17 Berthold Bley: Zur Quantifizierung der Bedürfnisse und der Bedürfnisbefriedigung im Sozialismus, in: Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift/Technische Hochschule Ilmenau 27 (1981), pp. 17–29. The first studies were carried out in the early 1960s and were intended to de-

effort was put into drawing a picture of social structures based on empirical facts. Initially, statistical-methodological questions were discussed at sociology congresses. Various transfer processes can also be observed in a transnational context, with the Soviet Union playing a decisive role here.[18] The numerous statistical studies from these years demonstrate the increasing preoccupation of socialist regimes with questions of social equality, social differences and its dialectics.[19]

While inequality of income and especially poverty remained a taboo in public, it became the subject of scientific observation, at least for internal purposes. "The essential task of the socialist state"[20], one economic dissertation claimed in 1963, "is to eliminate unjustified differences in the satisfaction of needs, but maintain some differences". It is hardly surprising that no specific reference was made here to the differences that still existed. However, at the same time, it was almost conceded with resignation that even in socialism these "cannot be eliminated once and for all".[21] In addition, there has been a reduction in consumption in families as the number of children increased, particularly in the area of nutrition. On the basis of these findings, an increase in payments from the Social Fund was called for, which was then implemented.[22] inequalities of income were regularly noted, for example in an economic dissertation from 1965, which was, for good reasons, declared a confidential matter (*vertrauliche Dienstsache*): The author, an economist from the Institute of Political Economy at Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, demanded that the consumption level of the lower income groups should match neither to the average improvement of living standards nor to the average consumption level. He suggested increasing lower incomes, as well as pensioners' incomes, and to reduce the number

scribe socio-economic conditions by means of statistics. They saw themselves as a contribution to highlighting the importance of statistics for improving social living conditions: Kurt Lungwitz: Über die Klassenstruktur in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. Eine sozialökonomisch-statistische Untersuchung, Berlin 1962; see for sociological contexts Horst Laatz: Klassenstruktur und soziales Verhalten. Zur Entstehung der empirischen Sozialstrukturforschung in der DDR.

18 Thus, for example, the reception of relevant studies from the Soviet Union by GDR life-standard research lead to various transfer processes. An example of this is Waleri Jakowlewitsch Raizin: Normativmethoden der Planung des Lebensstandards, Moskau 1967, Bundesarchiv Berlin, DE 1/54600.

19 Initially, statistical-methodological questions were discussed at sociology congresses. See, as an example Manfred Lötsch: Sozialstruktur der DDR – Kontinuität und Wandel, in: Heiner Timmermann (ed.): Sozialstruktur und sozialer Wandel in der DDR, Saarbrücken 1988, pp. 13–26.

20 Paul Frenzel: Die Sicherung einer planmäßigen Entwicklung der Befriedigung individueller Bedürfnisse mittels des sozialistischen Systems der Einkommensbildung, Leipzig 1963, p. 74, p. 79, p. 159. All translations were made by the author.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

poorly paid jobs. Thus, a necessary correction of the gap between the lower and upper income groups was seen as the most urgent task. If there were no political interventions, the author warned, "exaggerations can lead to serious political problems" and would be an obstacle to the political and moral unity of the people.[23] Even if we can only make assumptions about the (certainly limited) influence of scientific expertise on day-to-day politics, such theses are unlikely to have left the political leadership untouched. One way or another: social policy appears here as a defensive prevention policy.[24] Such demands did not go unheard. The multiple increases in gross minimum wage, state child benefit and pensions in these years were the direct consequences of those scientific-statistical explorations. This example reflects the central functions of empirical social research not only in the GDR; this was most likely the case in most Western and Eastern industrial societies in the second half of the twentieth century: in the exercise of control through classification, in the enabling of planning of social processes and ultimately as a vehicle of obtaining political legitimacy both internally and externally.[25]

It is, therefore, not surprising that a comprehensive scientific institutionalisation of the observation of the social sciences was established precisely in these years. In the mid-1960s, the research department 'Standard of Living', affiliated with the State Planning Commission, took up work. It dealt with the quality, quantity and structure of certain consumer goods, services and housing.[26] This development was part of a comprehensive reform course in the 1960s, and did not only put into perspective the GDR's self-image as a 'working society'.[27] It also refers to the dimension of the symbolic order and the power of categorisation by scientific experts, who were closely

23 Josef Bernard: Das persönliche Eigentum und der Stand der Versorgung der Arbeiter- und Angestelltenhaushalte mit langlebigen Konsumgütern, Halle 1965, S. 88. The income of private craftsmen was about twice as high as that of workers and employees which ultimately led to the latter falling short of their consumption levels. Cf. also his considerations one year before: Idem: Die ökonomische Funktion des persönlichen Eigentums im Sozialismus, in: Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift/Technische Hochschule Ilmenau 13 (1964), pp. 379–387.

24 Josef Bernard also considered the most pressing social problems to be solved to be the low child benefit, the great social disadvantage of women with illegitimate children and the low pension for single pensioners: Josef Bernard: Sozialpolitische Probleme der perspektivischen Entwicklung des Lebensstandards, in: Hans Rößler (ed.): Die Konsumption im Reproduktionsprozeß, Halle 1967, pp. 371–404.

25 Christiane Reinecke: Fragen an die sozialistische Lebensweise. Empirische Sozialforschung und soziales Wissen in der SED-„Fürsorgediktatur".

26 Bernard Rolle/Helmut Steiner: Von den Anfängen der DDR-Sozialstrukturforschung. Voraussetzungen – widersprüchlicher Verlauf und ausgewählte Ergebnisse, in: Ingrid Lötsch/Hansgünter Meyer (eds.): Die Sozialstruktur als Gegenstand der Soziologie und der empirischen Forschung. Beiträge zu einem Kolloquium in memoriam Manfred Lötsch, Berlin 1998, pp. 25–60, here pp. 42–45.

27 Martin Kohli: Die DDR als Arbeitsgesellschaft? Arbeit, Lebenslauf und soziale Differen-

linked to the political elite and who pointed to the high degree of scientification of politics and the politicisation of science.[28] These interdependencies refer to the political aim of measuring the degree of social differentiation on the one hand, but tabooing their analysis on the other hand, since the results were usually only accessible to a small circle of selected persons.[29]

After the *phase of discovery*, the 1970s were as a *phase of intensification* in dealing with economic inequality, which was not least a side effect of the *Unity of economic and social policy* program in the GDR. The implementation of a performance-oriented wage policy in the context of the 'developed socialist society' aimed at reducing existing social contradictions and increasing average and minimum wages, as well as pensions. Scientific observations also justified the overriding political goal, which was not the pursuit of economic equality, but a society with equal development and life opportunities throughout. Raising the lowest income level was seen as a means of reducing inequality and mitigating certain reproductive mechanisms, such as the lowest levels of living conditions, physically dangerous and inferior work, low education and unfavorable housing conditions.

At that time, various statistical findings indicated that differences in consumption among the population were first and foremost determined by the income factor.[30] Several studies based on income statistics from the early 1970s showed that a larger household size was associated with lower income levels, which had far-reaching consequences for the families: The increased need for frugality led to lower consumption of fruit, tropical fruits, sweets, cocoa products as well as shoes. Due to the 'money question', as it was explicitly and relatively openly called in one study from 1973, larger families had to resort to cheaper goods more frequently. Based on these figures, the study observed "significant differences in some areas of living standards", which particularly affected large families. Politicians were therefore called upon to "gradually eliminate these unjustified differences".[31]

zierung, in: Hartmut Kaelble/Jürgen Kocka/Hartmut Zwahr (eds.): Sozialgeschichte der DDR, Stuttgart 1994, pp. 31–61.

28 Pierre Bourdieu: Sozialer Raum und „Klassen", pp. 23–30; Steffen Mau: Das metrische Wir: Über die Quantifizierung des Sozialen, Berlin 2017, pp. 197–204.

29 Helmut Steiner: Aufbruch, Defizite und Leistungen der DDR-Soziologie: Die 60er Jahre, in: Hans Bertram (ed.): Soziologie und Soziologien im Übergang. Beiträge zur Transformation der außeruniversitären soziologischen Forschung in Ostdeutschland, Opladen 1997, pp. 223–262; see also Helmut Steiner/Gustav-Wilhelm Bathke/Hansgünter Meyer (eds.): Klassengesellschaft im Umbruch. Soziale Mobiliätsprozesse in der DDR-Gesellschaft, Berlin 2010.

30 Günter Manz: Die Einordnung des sozialistischen Lebensniveaus in die Volkswirtschaftsplanung, Berlin 1972, p. 73.

31 Peter Rohrberg: Bedürfnisse und Volkswirtschaftsplanung, Berlin 1973, p. 101. However, rising incomes were not seen as the only way to solve these problems. The care and upbring-

Further studies arrived at similar findings about such "considerable differences in per capita income".[32] Some of the studies even predicted that this situation would "be highly unlikely" to disappear in the future. Sometimes researchers even predicted that, "with high probability", this situation would never be resolved. Party leaders must have been particularly alerted by a proposal in a study from 1972: the study called for a long-term plan to "counteract the widening of income disparities between the lower and upper groups".[33] In fact, the regime made certain efforts to achieve this: between 1965 and 1975, the per capita income of workers' and employees' households did indeed increase considerably. The net monetary income of households and individuals changed, too. Per capita income in 1965 was less than 400 marks in two-thirds of all households—a number regarded as a kind of subsistence minimum. 10 years later, only a quarter were left with less than 400 marks per month. The fact that these 400 marks were worth significantly less in 1975 than a decade ago due to rising prices was, of course, not mentioned in the contemporary surveys. Despite many improvements, it was also noted that the incomes of households with five or more members grew more slowly than the rest of society.[34] Further surveys found more economic disparities. In

ing of children in kindergardens to relieve women and a higher financial compensation for the cost of child care were also mentioned, cf. Esther Matterne: Verbrauchsgewohnheiten in kinderreichen Familien und daraus abzuleitende Bedarfstendenzen, Leipzig 1974, p. 7, p. 49. Bundesarchiv Berlin, DL 102/841. Regarding this aspect, see also the statistical observations in other contemporary studies: Christel Lehmann: Die Entwicklung von Kindern aus desorganisierten Familien, Berlin 1970, p. 42; Fritz Ahnert: Untersuchungen über die Sozialstruktur dissozialer Familien im Kreis Kalbe/Milde, Magdeburg 1969, p. 27; Helga Ahnert: Untersuchungen über den Einfluß dissozialer Familienverhältnisse auf die körperliche und geistige Entwicklung der Kinder im Kreis Kalbe (Milde), Magdeburg 1969, pp. 27f. According to the lists in the latter studies, a family with two childrenhad 122.50 Marks per month at their disposal, including child benefit per capita; this proportion decreased steadily: four children (87.20 Marks per month, including child benefit), eight children (73.80 Marks per month, including child benefit) or even twelve children (44.97 Marks per month, including child benefit).

32 See the next annotation.

33 Ökonomisches Forschungsinstitut der Staatlichen Plankommission: Abschlußbericht zur Analyse ausgewählter Probleme sozial-ökonomischer Prozesse der Jahre 1960 bis 1970 als Ausgangspunkt der langfristigen Planung, ausgearbeitet von der Forschungsgemeinschaft „Entwicklung des Lebensniveaus" unter Leitung von Dr. Montag, 1972, pp. 10f.; pp. 16f., Bundesarchiv Berlin, DE 100/400. The low proportion of women in the higher wage groups was identified here as particularly problematic. In the construction industry, where the highest average wage was achieved, the proportion of women was extremely low, namely at 11 per cent.

34 An increase in monthly household income was also recorded. The increase in net revenues and the 'elevator effect' observed here is explained by the rise in qualification levels and by the qualification structure. For the lowest income groups and families with several children, the increase in the minimum wage had an impact. Werner Schmidt: Untersuchungen

1979, an analysis of net monetary income between 1970 and 1980 showed a "significant difference between growing absolute differences and decreasing relative differentiation".[35] The language used here remained deliberately defensive. The term 'inequality' was intentionally avoided. Instead, the term 'difference' was used to describe the social order, so that no problem of unequal distribution of resources was expressed.

The most comprehensive study dates from the early 1970s and was prepared at the Institute for Consumption and Living Standards of the Faculty of Economic Sciences at the School of Economics in East Berlin. This was the only time in GDR history that a poverty threshold had been calculated. The study constructed a 'shopping basket' based on extensive statistical calculations and defined a social minimum for the GDR society. By including various needs such as nutrition, housing, culture and education, it demonstrates that the researchers were oriented towards international views—including those of the western situational approach.[36] The evaluation of the figures triggered far-reaching internal discussions and raised general, uncomfortable questions of income policy. It was less about the remarkable fact that the 'shopping basket' also included gifts from the West. The authorities were more concerned that 45 percent of all households with five or more persons and two out of three pensioner households lived "below the poverty line".[37] Moreover, the study detected a "poor" diet among the lowest income groups, especially with increasing family size.[38]

zu Entwicklungstendenzen und Hauptfaktoren der Einkommen und ihrer Unterschiede in Familien der Arbeiter- und Angestellten im Zeitraum 1965–1975 (1974), p. 15, p. 25, pp. 28f. Bundesarchiv Berlin, DE 100/424.

35 Jürgen Boje: Forschungsbericht. Analyse der Entwicklung der Nettogeldeinkommen der Bevölkerung im Zeitraum 1970 bis 1980 mit einigen Schlußfolgerungen für 1981 bis 1985 (1979), pp. 46f. Bundesarchiv Berlin, DE 100/466.

36 The other aspects listed here were (in this order) health and personal hygiene, communication and change of location. See Renate Walther: Die Bedürfnisse der Bevölkerung in der entwickelten sozialistischen Gesellschaft, Berlin 1972. These evaluations were based on a typical household of four people: a 32-year-old man, a 30-year-old woman and two children aged 10 and seven.

37 Günter Manz: Entwicklung der Armut in Ostdeutschland unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Altersarmut, Halle/Saale 1995, p. 87; Idem.: Einkommens- und Subventionspolitik, in: Idem./Ekkehard Sachse/Gunnar Winkler (eds.): Sozialpolitik in der DDR – Ziele und Wirklichkeit, Berlin 2001, pp. 179–198; Elvir Ebert: Einkommen und Konsum im Transformationsprozeß. Vom Plan zum Markt – vom Mangel zum Überfluß, p. 58; a summary of the household income of private households (estimated on the basis of model calculations by the Institute for Market Economy Leipzig) is provided by Gunnar Winkler (ed.): Sozialreport '90. Daten und Fakten zur sozialen Lage in den neuen Bundesländern, Berlin 1990, p. 123.

38 In general, too much energy and too much fat was consumed. With decreasing income per capita and increasing family size, the consumption of meat, sausages, dairy products, fruit and vegetables also decreased, as did the intake of nutrients such as protein, calcium,

So, the mid-1970s and early 1980s heralded a *phase of skepticism and uncertainties*. While socialism had begun with the goal of eliminating or reducing economic injustices as far as possible, the regime now laid stress on the realisation of the performance principle. This was not a completely novel idea; rather, the corresponding considerations of promoting and increasing the material and cultural standard of living were already virulent in the past. But this aspect was now gained a different quality. As a result, in view of socio-economic difficulties, rising foreign debt, the threat of a loss of control and the realisation that social processes cannot easily be regulated.[39] The performance principle increasingly called into question the basic assumption that fundamental social contradictions could in principle be overcome. Despite of harmonising social descriptions, various studies drew attention to the continuing "problems of the process of approaching classes and social layers" and called for a rethinking oriented towards rationalisation and effectiveness.[40] This marked a conceptual turning point in

phosphorus, iron, vitamin B2 and C. The consumption of food was also reduced. Günter Manz: Entwicklung der Armut in Ostdeutschland unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Altersarmut, p. 77; Manfred Möhr: Zur Ernährungssituation in der DDR, Berlin 1971, pp. 19f.

39 As early as the 1950s, this approach was propagated with reference to the 'principle of material interest' and to the mobilisation and increase of labour productivity, including considerations on benefit payments: Harry Matthes: Das Leitungsprinzip als Grundlage der Entlohnung in der volkseigenen Wirtschaft, Berlin 1954. With regard to increasing labour productivity in the agricultural production cooperatives (*Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften*) to increase yields, Josef Sommer: Sozialistische Arbeitsorganisation und Leistungsprinzip in den LPG, Berlin 1959, a little later on principles of competition in agriculture Dieter Pfützner/Fritz Theilig: Was der Genossenschaftsbauer vom Leistungsprinzip wissen muß, Berlin 1960. Apart from these early reflections, see already the first reflections on this with the ordinary member of the Academy of Sciences of the GDR: Otto Reinhold: Theoretische und praktische Probleme der entwickelten sozialistischen Gesellschaft, Berlin 1974.

40 Parteihochschule „Karl Marx" beim Zentralkomitee der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands (ed.): Probleme der Klassen- und Sozialstruktur der entwickelten sozialistischen Gesellschaft, Berlin 1976/77; Gert-Joachim Glaeßner: Sozialstrukturforschung in der DDR zwischen Affirmation und kritischer Analyse. Ein Beitrag zum Gedenken an den Soziologen Manfred Lötsch, in: Hans Bertram (ed.): Soziologie, pp. 103–108, especially p. 104. The striking emphasis on rationalisation and efficiency can also be found at Manfred Lötsch: Über die soziale Struktur der Arbeiterklasse. Einige Schwerpunkte und Probleme der soziologischen Forschung, in: Wissenschaftlicher Rat für Soziologische Forschung in der DDR (ed.): Soziologische Probleme der Klassenentwicklung in der DDR. Materialien vom II. Kongreß der marxistisch-leninistischen Soziologie in der DDR, 15.–17. Mai 1974, Berlin 1975, pp. 89–110.

GDR social self-descriptions (which of course was also observed in the Federal Republic)[41]; it was also characterised as the "realistic" turn.[42]

Besides reward, the 'performance principle' always also implied sanction and was therefore Janus-faced. In retrospect, Manfred Lötsch, who headed the department "Social Structure in Socialist Society" at the Academy for Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the SED, and who can justly be called the most important keynote speaker, conceded that there was a "considerable deficit of performance-stimulating mechanisms"[43] in GDR society. The dilemma formulated by scientists of maintaining fundamental socialist visions on the one hand and 'releasing potentials' among individuals through functional differentiation on the other, offered ample rooms for political controversy. Various researchers highlighted the different positions of the individual professions within the reproduction process. It was criticised that technical engineers had the highest qualifications, but their income barely reached the level of economists or middle managers. From the researchers' point of view, these wage differences had an "unjustified impact" on consumption opportunities.[44]

This also included questions connected to the distribution of money and thus "fair" distribution and activation possibilities, i. e. the demand for consistent implementation of the performance principle, while at the same time improving the supply of consumer goods.[45] In all these considerations and deliberations, the principles of

41 See, for example, Ernst Zander: Kommunismus und Leistungsprinzip, Heidelberg 1975, for later years, see Dieter Voigt/Sabine Meck: Leistungsprinzip und Gesellschaftssystem, in: Dieter Voigt (ed.): Die Gesellschaft der DDR. Untersuchung zu ausgewählten Bereichen, Berlin 1984, pp. 11–46.

42 Manfred Lötsch: Sozialstruktur der DDR – Kontinuität und Wandel; see also Rudi Weidig: Sozialstruktur der DDR, p. 159: "Social differentiations that reproduce and manifest themselves are inevitable means for overarching goals."

43 Manfred Lötsch: Abschied von der Legitimationswissenschaft, p. 195.

44 Wolfgang Grömmer: Probleme der Entwicklung der sozialistischen Intelligenz bei der Gestaltung der entwickelten sozialistischen Gesellschaft, Berlin 1977; the "rapprochement between the working class and intelligence" was also rejected in this study; see also Dieter Dietzel: Probleme der Stellung und Entwicklung spezifischer Gruppen von Angestellten in der Sozialstruktur der sozialistischen Gesellschaft, Berlin 1977; Angela Lachmann: Einkommenspolitik und Leistungsprinzip – Der Zusammenhang zwischen sozialistischer Verteilungspolitik und volkswirtschaftlichem Leistungswachstum unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Einkommen der Bevölkerung aus gesellschaftlichen Fonds, Leipzig 1987. In the latter dissertation, the author demanded that the priority of income distribution according to work performance should be maintained (p. 155).

45 Autorenkollektiv des Lehrgebietes Politisch Ökonomie des Sozialismus der Sektion Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin: Die Leistung im Wechselverhältnis von Produktion und Distribution und das Geld im Sozialismus, Berlin 1982; Ulrich Busch: Sozialistisches Leistungsprinzip, Geldeinkommen und Konsumgüterproduktion, in: Wirtschaftswissenschaft 35:3 (1987), pp. 355–372.

social security of course remained untouched.[46] What remained unspoken in all these works, however, was that women's employment was often economically indispensable in order for family income to reach an existence "above the lowest level"[47]; Neither did the unsurprising fact that merit was excluded in certain areas of the GDR working world, above all in the area of state security[48] and armed organs (like the National People's Army/*Nationale Volksarmee*, the border troops of the GDR or the German People's Police/*Deutsche Volkspolizei*), play a role. This resulted in demands for an increasingly performance-oriented wage policy. For this reason, according to some researchers, "driving forces" (*Triebkräfte*)[49] should be given special recognition in future as productive and innovative elements of social development. These differences in performance and social positions were considered to be legitimate and were intended to increase individual responsibility and personal initiative.[50]

46 On the contemporary discussion of the relationship between social security and the socialist principle of merit, see the essays in Klaus Gloede/Joachim Pein/Kurt Hecht (eds.): Das sozialistische Leistungsprinzip als Triebkraft der umfassenden Intensivierung. Konferenz der Forschungsgruppe „Sozialistisches Leistungsprinzip" der Sektion Marxismus-Leninismus am 25. und 26. Oktober 1988, Potsdam 1988; from a trade union perspective and with regard to performance-stimulating bonus payments, see Erhard Koschwitz/Wolfgang Mallock: Leistungsprinzip – warum und wie?, Berlin 1988.

47 Manfred Lötsch: Sozialstruktur und Systemtransformation, in: Rainer Geißler (ed.): Sozialer Umbruch in Ostdeutschland, Opladen 1993, pp. 31–39, here p. 39.

48 Günter Förster: Die Juristische Hochschule des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit. Die Sozialstruktur ihrer Promovenden, Münster 2011, pp. 162–169.

49 Pioneering was Manfred Lötsch, partly together with his wife: Manfred Lötsch: Sozialstruktur und Wirtschaftswachstum: Überlegungen zum Problem sozialer Triebkräfte des wissenschaftlich-technischen Fortschritts, in: Wirtschaftswissenschaft 29:1 (1981), pp. 56–69; Idem: Soziale Strukturen als Wachstumsfaktoren und als Triebkräfte des wissenschaftlich-technischen Fortschritts, in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 6 (1982), pp. 721–731; Ingrid Lötsch/Manfred Lötsch: Soziale Strukturen und Triebkräfte: Versuch einer Zwischenbilanz und Weiterführung der Diskussion, in: Jahrbuch für Soziologie und Sozialpolitik (1985), pp. 159–178; Ingrid Lötsch/Manfred Lötsch: Kontinuität und Wandel in der Sozialstrukturforschung der DDR, in: Jahrbuch für Soziologie und Sozialpolitik (1989), pp. 231–248. See furthermore Rudi Weidig (ed.): Soziale Triebkräfte ökonomischen Wachstums: Materialien des 4. Kongresses der Marxistisch-Leninistischen Soziologie in der DDR, 26.–28. März 1985, Berlin 1986 (and here especially his presentation : „Hauptreferat: Soziale Triebkräfte ökonomischen Wachstums": "And finally, the performance principle applies in our society. […] Income differences of a certain degree caused by this are social differences. […] They act as a driving force by helping individuals, groups and collectives to realise that it is the improvement of one's own performance that can improve income levels and personal circumstances." Translated by the author); Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der SED (ed.): Bedingungen und Triebkräfte des Leistungsverhaltens im Sozialismus: Forschungsergebnisse einer interdisziplinären Arbeitsgruppe der Sektion Marxistisch-leninistische Philosophie der Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Berlin 1989.

50 Karin Linse: Die Entwicklung der Lohnformen in der DDR, Jena 1988, p. 100; Lothar

Contemporary (Re-)Interpretations of Economic Inequality and its Lingering Effects. Cursory Remarks and Conclusions

When various social scientists began to differentiate between justified and unjustified differences within GDR society and to search for causes of the low social mobility of certain social groups, other studies quickly focused on the factor of individualisation. On the one hand, the result was a more complex, problem-conscious picture of state-socialist GDR society; on the other hand, (social) scientific observation revealed numerous side effects, three of which will be examined in more detail.

Firstly, this approach cemented an existing division into 'worthy' and 'unworthy' poverty. Low incomes of large families, for example, were explained by contemporary scientists as a result of their inability to adequately handle existing economic resources. Instead of clothes and food, a TV would be purchased, was the assessment, which was empirically supported by a list of equipment with durable consumer goods, as in a medical-sociological examination from 1970. Whereas 44.3 per cent of the average population in the Magdeburg district had a washing machine and 43.7 per cent a refrigerator, the figure for the so-called 'dissocial families'—a social category that was developed in those years specifically to describe social reality[51], but was by no means limited to the GDR and thus once again refers to structural observational similarities of the social[52]—studied was only 28.8 and 11.5 per cent, respectively. The situation

Mertens: Rote Denkfabrik? Die Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der SED, Münster et al. 2004, p. 255.

51 See, for example, and amongst others, the following works from the medical or medical-sociological research contexts, as Steffen Möbius: Zur Pathogenese und Prognose der Dissozialität im Kindesalter unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der frühkindlichen Hirnschädigung, Jena 1969; Helmut Heinroth: Alkoholmißbrauch und Sozialverhalten – dargestellt an sozialhygienischen Untersuchungen in Familien, die durch Alkoholmißbrauch entfällig wurden, sowie epidemiologische Beziehungen zur Dissozialität in einer Großstadt, Halle 1975; Annemarie Franz: Auswirkungen frühkindlicher dissozialer Lebensbedingungen auf Entwicklung und Verhalten von Vorschulkindern, Rostock 1980.

52 In general, see Christoph Lorke: Armut im geteilten Deutschland. Die Wahrnehmung sozialer Randlagen in der Bundesrepublik und der DDR. A close correlation between the observation of social 'lower classes' and the attribution of 'dissociality' can also be seen in the Federal Republic. See, for example, the studies by Werner Schumann: Intrapersonale und interpersonale Spannungen bei Dissozialen und sozial angepassten Jugendlichen, Berlin 1961; Dietmar Kurzeja: Jugendkriminalität und Verwahrlosung. Zu den Ursachen der Dissozialität Jugendlicher. Kritische Bestandsaufnahme und Versuch einer Neubestimmung, Gießen 1973; Ilona Töpner: Drogenkonsum in Beziehung zu Dissozialität und Aggressivität bei Jugendlichen. Eine psychologische Untersuchung an 586 Real- und Gymnasialschülern, Würzburg 1976; Udo Rauchfleisch: Dissozial. Entwicklung, Struktur und Psychodynamik

was different regarding the supply of television sets: While these were to be counted in 74.5 per cent of all households, the proportion among 'dissocial families' was slightly higher (77 per cent). The fact that this deviation did not represent a significant difference and could also be attributed to other causes did not play a role in the interpretation of the social. Rather, the interpretation chosen here fitted in with the overall image that the author projected in connection with bourgeois lines of tradition above the lower social margin.[53] Excessive consumption of alcohol, promiscuity and a lack of physical hygiene fit into this image of imagined social deviation, as these conclusions can be found in contemporary research.[54] Such "symbolic operations" regarding self-responsibility could not only contribute to permanently marking 'otherness' in 'one's own' society, but also help to mobilising other forms of behavior.[55] They perhaps wanted to make unmistakably clear that social problems were societal atavisms, exceptions and absolutely 'alien' to socialist nature. This example reflects processes of 'othering' and thus attempts to externalize such observations.

Secondly: Despite assurances to the contrary, such contemporary categorizations regarding economic structures helped to maintain the existing social order. This refers both to traditional gender imbalances (that could only be hinted at in this text)[56] and—because foreign 'contract workers' were not included in the analyzed statistical measurements—to the stabilisation of an ethnically homogeneous socialist society,

dissozialer Persönlichkeiten, Göttingen 1981; Karl Gerlicher/Joachim Jungmann/Jochen Schweitzer (eds.): Dissozialität und Familie. Zur Kooperation von Jugendhilfe und Jugendpsychiatrie unter familientherapeutischer Sichtweise, Dortmund 1986.

53 Fritz Ahnert: Untersuchungen über die Sozialstruktur dissozialer Familien im Kreis Kalbe/Milde, p. 30; for interpretations, see Christoph Lorke: Armut im geteilten Deutschland. Die Wahrnehmung sozialer Randlagen in der Bundesrepublik und der DDR.

54 Among many examples, see Christel Lehmann: Die Entwicklung von Kindern aus desorganisierten Familien; Hermine Blümel: Augenblicklicher Stand der Erfassung und Betreuung dissozialer Familien in einem Berliner Stadtbezirk, Berlin 1970; Erika Donath/Ilse Schneeweiß: Dissoziale Familien aus jugendärztlicher Sicht, in: Medizin und Soziologie 3 (1967), pp. 158–167; Matthias Wolf: Ursachen und Mitbedingungen der Asozialität. Typenanalytische Untersuchungen zu Dissozialen sowie typenanalytische Auswertung von Nachuntersuchungen der späteren Entwicklung der begutachteten Probanden, Berlin 1978; Doris Mackuth/Eberhard Burger: Über Ursachen und Erscheinungsformen der Dissozialität. Untersuchungen an Familien des Kreises Eberswalde, Berlin 1980.

55 Peter A. Berger: Ungleichheitssemantiken. Graduelle Unterschiede und kategoriale Exklusivitäten.

56 For modern research, see Katrin Schäfgen: Die Verdopplung der Ungleichheit: Sozialstruktur und Geschlechterverhältnisse in der Bundesrepublik und in der DDR, Opladen 2000; regarding intersectionality, see Jens Gieseke: Die egalitäre DDR? Staatssozialistische Intersektionalität und der lange Schatten des Intershops, in: Eva Maria Gajek/Christoph Lorke (eds.): Soziale Ungleichheit im Visier: Wahrnehmung und Deutung von Armut und Reichtum seit 1945, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2016, pp. 163–180.

which was oriented towards a four-person household. Possible consequences for the period after 1990 can only be guessed at here.[57]

Thirdly, and of great relevance for the final crisis of the GDR: The increasing reflection on social differences was a *nolens volens* modification of existing visions of social justice. From then on, the principle of performance, the greater degree of autonomy and transparent social differentiation , for many, were the most important distributive principles that were to incentivise the workforce of the companies. These ideas were popularised in various ways in the final years of the GDR. The aim was to design the distribution of the acquired social wealth in such a way that on the one hand the social entity was promoted and on the other hand the diverse specific interests and needs of the concrete subjects, too.[58] This intensive preoccupation led to the fact that the Central Committee could hardly close its eyes to the contradictions mentioned. In 1986, it focused on the "requirements and driving forces of economic growth through the further acceleration of scientific and technological progress and through the intensification of the national economy"[59], as evidenced by the still existing, albeit highly selective, perception of social science findings. There was, thus, a genuine awareness of the problem, and even more: In some party officials' view, , talking about equality and justice resembled 'squaring the circle', because socially "different starting conditions" of different family milieus undeniably existed. Therefore, it was not considered reprehensible, for instance, to guarantee outstanding researchers an "adequate material recognition of their achievements and above-average living conditions"[60], such as the provision of their own homes or special holiday and recreational opportunities. According to advocates of the "driving force", the GDR could only remain competitive with capitalist companies in the world market if individual work performance was rewarded and a larger income gap taken accepted, even if this lead to discontent. Regarding these particularly high-performing cadres, however, there were warnings against conveying an impression of "exclusivity". This could create a psychological distance to the rest of the population.[61] Those demands for stimulating effects, recognition of performance and performance-related pay were later raised even more strongly by other authors for specific groups and were reissued for a wider audience,

57 To cite just one of many possible references: Jan C. Behrends/Thomas Lindenberger/Patrice G. Poutrus (eds.): Fremde und Fremd-Sein in der DDR. Zu historischen Ursachen der Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Ostdeutschland, Berlin 2003.

58 Josef Bernard/Hans-Jürgen Gericke (eds.): Sozialistisches Leistungsprinzip und umfassende Intensivierung, Halle/Saale 1987.

59 Bericht des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands an den XI. Parteitag der SED, Berlin 1986, p. 58.

60 Frank Adler: „Jeder nach seinen Fähigkeiten, jedem nach seiner Leistung". Soziologische Analyse zur Durchsetzung des Leistungsprinzips in unserer Gesellschaft, Berlin 1987, p. 32, p. 62, p. 82.

61 Ibid.

stressing the need for social differences. For example regarding the natural and technical intelligence, whose number was estimated at 6,000 to 9,000 persons. They would have taken on a "key role" due to their "innovative basic function", whereby dysfunctional levelling of income would have a performance-inhibiting effect on their willingness to be (highly) productive. They were, therefore, not only granted more time and space for creative thinking and a high appreciation of their professional performance, individuality and self-realisation as well as freedom of creative thinking, but also a higher degree of recognition of social differences. In the view of another contemporary author, at any rate, the given structures contrasted with the requirements of the socialist performance principle.[62] Elsewhere, in a brochure published by the Academy of Social Sciences at the Central Committee of the SED, it was even stated that the performance principle created 'social energy' for performance in work and education and that performance-related remuneration had a stimulating effect. Social differences between predominantly physical and predominantly mental work were accepted as necessary as well as just, and it was predicted that these would not be eliminated in the future.[63]Although these demands were finally not implemented, they point to the growing contradictions of the late GDR society and the resulting tensions and doubts.

According to Bourdieu, naming power (*Benennungsmacht*) is the capacity to influence and regulate certain terms, categories, and perceptual schemes to authorise social worlds of imagination. The symbolic order of society always entails the assignment of status and prestige, but also forms of delegitimisation. This presupposes notions of a just order and accepted inequalities that influence the ideas of social appropriateness. Order knowledge and classification, according to Luhmann, promote the assignment of clear boundaries and affiliations. Thus, statistical results refer to symbolic representations of structures of inequality and to unequal "interpretation patterns" in politics, science and "semantics".[64]

The history of statistics on income and wealth in the GDR after 1945 offers a prime example of the dynamics of science, power and knowledge. GDR society was by no means free of social differentiation: by gender, age, region, by sector and occupation, by educational level, by informal influence and meritocratic aspects, but also with regard to access to 'western' resources. Due to scientific efforts to collect infor-

62 Irene Müller-Hartmann: Sozialstrukturelle Probleme der Entwicklung der natur- und technikwissenschaftlichen Intelligenz unter den Bedingungen der Intensivierung, Berlin 1989, pp. 151f.

63 Frank Adler: Jedem nach seiner Leistung – soziale Sicherheit für alle, Berlin 1989, p. 14.

64 Understood here as higher-level generalised, relatively situation-independent available rules of processing meaning and interpreting reality, which have "inequality" as their theme. Niklas Luhmann: Gesellschaftliche Struktur und semantische Tradition, in: Idem: Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik. Studien zur Wissenssoziologie (vol. 1), Frankfurt am Main, pp. 9–71, here p. 19.

mation as an element of societal self-reflection and interpretation, these developments did not remain hidden from the political leadership. Contemporary forms of scientific description outlining the social order always were associated with the question of social security. These descriptions served purposes of prevention and security among others, because predictions about the nature and inequalities of a society could help minimise the occurrence of unpleasant social risks.

In the sense of a history of precaution in modernity[65], social and socio-political areas have by no means been excluded from such attitudes. Reflections on differences of income and their possible consequences have been common since the early 1960s. "The failure to take poverty research into account is due to the inability of the SED leadership to really understand the real social processes"[66], said GDR poverty researcher Günter Manz, a long-standing staff member at the University of Economics (*Hochschule für Ökonomie*) in Berlin-Karlshorst and entrusted with the compilation, supervision and evaluation of scientific papers devoted to social processes of differentiation. However, as discussed in this article, it was also the ambivalent notion of social justice that became increasingly clear at the end of the GDR. These conditions/contexts fostered the powerlessness of the leading party in the face of complex processes of social change.[67] Instead of a more in-depth examination of the results of statistical income studies, defensive prevention and intervention strategies minimising potential social risks were adopted. At the same time, mantra-like formalised and ritualised semantics of integration and inclusion dominated in the GDR public.[68] However, this contradiction must not obscure the fact that these contemporary social constructs have always and mostly tacitly touched upon several reciprocally excluding dimensions; in some respects, this may have had an impact after 1990, too.[69] Excluding dimensions like the ones discussed above are often ignored in nostalgic reviews of the social character of GDR society.—Such dimensions, just as current expressions of social dissatisfaction in the East are not only the result of the manifold upheavals after 1990[70], but also of the lived, experienced and internalised social structure before that year, with all its contradictions.

65 Nicolai Hannig/Malte Thießen (eds.): Vorsorgen in der Moderne: Akteure, Räume und Praktiken, Berlin/Boston 2017.

66 Günter Manz: Armut, p. 11.

67 Ibid.

68 Very pointed about this is Ralph Jessen: Semantic Strategies of Inclusion and Exclusion in the German Democratic Republic (1949–1989), in: Willibald Steinmetz (ed.): Political Languages in the Age of Extremes, Oxford 2011, pp. 275–291.

69 For reflections on this, see Christoph Lorke: Gleichheitsversprechen und ihr Erinnern im geteilten und vereinten Deutschland, Arbeitspapier aus der Kommission „Erinnerungskulturen der sozialen Demokratie", at: https://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_ek_ap_07_2019.pdf (accessed on 28 September 2019).

70 Regarding the increasing social inequality, see the research of Gunnar Winkler: Sozialreport (different years); Rainer Geißler (ed.): Sozialer Umbruch in Ostdeutschland, Opladen 1993;

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Dietmar Wittich (ed.): Momente des Umbruchs: Sozialstruktur und Lebensqualität in Ostdeutschland, Berlin 1994; Martin Diewald (ed.): Zwischenbilanz der Wiedervereinigung. Strukturwandel und Mobilität im Transformationsprozeß, Opladen 1996.

Philipp Müller

Past Intensities. An Obituary for Alf Lüdtke (1943–2019)

Abstract

This obituary commemorates the life and work of the nationally and internationally renowned German historian Alf Lüdtke, who is best known for his concept of the everyday history and who, in the 1970s and 1980s, together with other colleagues, began to develop historically questions inspired by concepts of anthropology. With his studies he made very important contributions to the history of policing, violence, fascism in Germany and governance in general. In this context he began very early to highlight the importance of symbols and emotions and the role of ordinary women and men in historical processes and dynamics of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Keywords: *Alf Lüdtke; History of the Everyday; Alltagsgeschichte; Eigensinn; Historical Anthropology; History Workshop; Topf & Söhne; 17th June 1953*

Intensity was a trademark of Alf Lüdtke's in his private life as well as in his historical research. His concept of the history of the everyday, his historical working methods, his writing and his criticism—whether solicited or unsolicited—were always characterised by the endeavour to think the intensity of history and also to produce it purposefully.

This endeavour was guided by his firm conviction that diversity, differences, and the combination of heterogenous elements proved rather productive means to generate the intensity he desired. For this reason, he repeatedly considered collage-like forms of textual representation and was interested in the possibilities afforded by the montage of text and image to arrive at novel views. His efforts are most evident, however, in his answer to the question of who should be involved in an undertaking such as historical research. The Colloquium for Police History, for example, which he co-initiated and ran for years together with Herbert Reinke, was not just a forum for scholarly studies. It was deliberately open to police officers interested in history and/or in doing independent research on the subject of police history, and together—also with the steady support and enthusiasm of Michael Sturm—they worked with associations, museums and educational institutions.

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For Alf Lüdtke, history was a matter of the many, both in the past and in the present. In retrospect, it was therefore particularly important to focus on those women and men who had already been, seemingly unintentionally, ignored at the time and who were not predestined to be monumentalised in the politics of remembrance. But even in the present, history was an undertaking that would not and could not be an elitist. More people had to be involved in it than the few academics who researched historical topics professionally. In both respects, his thinking and his 'doing' of history was decisively influenced by political ideas and performances in the 1960s and 1970s, a time in which the opening up and democratisation of society and politics was a generally respected and pursued political project. He himself contributed significantly to this by seeking contact and exchange with the history workshops and participating in their movement, which also resulted in the founding of the journal *WerkstattGeschichte*.[1] For related reasons, he invited to his own research colloquium not only students and doctoral candidates who exchanged views on their dissertations. Film-makers, journalists, and archivists and other professions engaged in the production of history were also guests at his colloquium at the Max Planck Institute for History in Göttingen and later at the Centre for Historical Anthropology at the University of Erfurt, which he had co-founded with his colleague and friend Hans Medick. The different professional and social activities of the people he assembled promised untapped knowledge and new perspectives on the otherwise so familiar terrain of history. It was especially through this aspect—the encounter and engagement with different professional and social practices and their specific knowledge beyond the boundaries of professional historiography—that he saw the opportunity to establish unexpected relationships and to gain new insights.

For him, the encounter with the intellectually unexpected was also the attraction of the interdisciplinary Graduiertenkolleg "Mediale Historiographien. Media of History—History of Media", which he had helped design and in which he participated from the beginning. It was precisely these intellectual encounters, as he once remarked, that did not come about by themselves in the day-to-day routine of academia. It was, therefore, not only necessary to keep the threshold for irritation as low as possible, but also to do something about it from time to time. Above all, he knew how to introduce an elegant procedure to promote the possibilities of such encounters. The first part of the exercise was to get rid of the standard form of academic exchange: the expert talk. The second part of the exercise consisted of choosing a specific material item when introducing a research project. The chosen item—in practice this could turn out to be a picture postcard, a film, a container gridlock or even a work of art—would trigger other viewpoints. It was the concrete and multifaceted materiality that turned into a

1 Its website is available at https://werkstattgeschichte.de/ (last accessed 26 January, 2021).

productive force for everyone involved in the discussion, and, in this manner, an unintended and uncalculated polyphony was to be created.

Against this backdrop, his public commitment to history is hardly surprising. Of the many initiatives that he launched and the many projects in which he was involved, the example "Topf und Söhne" is particularly worth mentioning.[2] The Erfurt-based company "Topf und Söhne" was in the business of firing technology during the German Empire and began to specialise in cremation, among other things, before the firm eventually developed and produced the cremation ovens for the crematoria at the Auschwitz-Birkenau extermination camp. In cooperation with students from the University of Erfurt, Alf Lüdtke developed micro-historically designed guided tours for a new exhibition in the east German town, and, in cooperation with his students, made factory photographs from the former company archive accessible. Above all, however, he was involved in the uncovering of this German site of remembrance and supported it significantly. Another project was dedicated to researching the Erfurt uprising on 17 June 1953. Together with his students, including his later assistant professor Sebastian Jobs, he researched the uprising—an event that was previously known primarily as a phenomenon limited to Berlin. Together, they created a public exhibition in the centre of the town, the Anger, about the uprisings and riots. The posters attached to construction fences aroused the interest of the public to such an extent that, ultimately, more eyewitnesses were identified and the historical studies could eventually be deepened; a second and larger exhibition with the title "Ausnahmezustand" (state of emergency) in Erfurt's Stadtmuseum followed suit. Above all, however, the posters enabled a direct and sometimes exceptionally open discussion with the citizens of the city, and to a few of them, the displayed original of the firing order that went from the district authority to the police, was—in retrospect—an unacceptable public annoyance.

The pursuit of the intensity of history was central to Alf Lüdtke's understanding of particular facets of history. For him, the history of political violence, for example, was not exhausted in a legal decree and its numerous series and anonymous processes. Historical analysis had to trace the relations of power and violence—in their entire breadth—as they occurred and unfolded in people's lives. This history, therefore, also included actors who appropriated new authorisations for themselves to inflict pain on others, and it also included those women and men who suffered this pain and had to endure it; *Eigensinn*—this most famous coinage of Alf Lüdtke's and at the same time a frequently misunderstood concept—was present here on both sides. A further consequence of his understanding of history was that mundane things and aspects of history experienced a fundamental revaluation. As Walter Benjamin once demanded, it was necessary to distance oneself from the sacralised objects of history and, in turn,

2 The project information website is available at http://www.topfundsoehne-fotos.de/topfundsoehne/projektinformationen.html (last accessed 26 January 2021).

to focus on the everyday actors, their practices and their things. Unlike Walter Benjamin, however, Alf Lüdtke's reappraisal of the mundane did not undergo a literary-aesthetic transformation. Rather, he regularly warned against the danger of romanticising the everyday, which was precisely what the aesthetic appeal of the particular and the marginal lent itself to. Instead, the things of the past became objects of meticulous, microanalytical study.

The imperative of intensity was momentous for his own writing of history. Every single word had to be perfectly correct in terms of content. Thematically, all variants of a historical issue had to be taken into account and, moreover, integrated into the overall structure of a text. For Alf Lüdtke, this was an essential ethical as well as intellectual duty of a historician's work. What is more, single sentences of his texts sometimes do not just articulate a particular valid observation on one level, but rather a statement that must be correct on several levels simultaneously; and in the further sequence of sentences, the number of levels may then additionally vary. As a result, some of his texts, especially those studies originally written in German, undergo an unusually high degree of compression and finally take on an analytical, even philosophical quality. In this way, he abandoned a genuinely historical option of text composition—the lightness of historical narration based on the succession of words—and consequently irritated readers accustomed to the linear progression of sentences and topics. As much as Alf Lüdtke stretched his historical texts and studies to the limit—following his concept of history, he demanded a great deal of himself as well as of his social and intellectual environment, in order to convey the multidimensionality of the everyday. Well, historical intensity is not a given, as he would have put it.

Alf Lüdtke died on 29 January 2019. With him, we have without a doubt lost a great and inspiring source of historical intensity.

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Jan Kellershohn

Nature, Knowledge, and Protest. A Review of Recent Publications on the History of Environmentalism

Melanie Arndt: *Tschernobylkinder. Die transnationale Geschichte einer nuklearen Katastrophe*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020, 499 pp., ISBN: 978-3-525-35208-3.

Nils Güttler: *Alles über das Fliegen. Eine politische Wissensgeschichte des Frankfurter Flughafens*, Vienna: Turia & Kant, 2020, 123 pp., ISBN: 978-3-85132-981-0.

Katrin Jordan: *Ausgestrahlt. Die mediale Debatte um „Tschernobyl" in der Bundesrepublik und in Frankreich 1986/87*, Göttingen: Wallstein, 2018, 424 pp., ISBN: 978-3-8353-3304-8.

Stephen Milder: *Greening Democracy. The Anti-Nuclear Movement and Political Environmentalism in West Germany and Beyond, 1968–1983*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, 280 pp., ISBN: 978-1-107-13510-9.

Christian Möller: *Umwelt und Herrschaft in der DDR. Politik, Protest und die Grenzen der Partizipation in der Diktatur*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020, 396 pp., ISBN: 978-3-525-31096-0.

Martin Spenger: *Green Beat. Gary Snyder und die moderne amerikanische Umweltbewegung*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020, 239 pp., ISBN: 978-3-525-31098-4.

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In her overview of environmental history, published in 2015, Melanie Arndt identifies the history of environmental social movements as major issue. At the same time, she highlights the history of how knowledge and ignorance of the relation between nature, society and technology have been produced as one central category of environmental history.[1] From the perspective of social movement historiography, scientisation and professionalisation are well-recognised crucial trajectories in contemporary history.[2]

Taking these diagnoses as a starting point, this review further investigates how social movements contributed to construing knowledge about nature in the twentieth century and how the notion of 'social movement' itself contributed to this process. It discusses recent publications in environmental history, mostly stemming from Germanophone historiography, or dealing with German environmental history in a transnational perspective. The selected publications are certainly not exhaustive.[3] However, they can be considered representative for three trends in the history of environmentalism: a turn to the local and regional scale, a renewed interest in Central and Eastern European history, and the emergence of innovative methodological approaches. The article focuses on three levels, which can be identified as common issues in recent historiography on environmentalism: first, the relation between protest and knowledge, second the entanglement of social movements and social sciences, and third the ways in which social movements contributed to social and environmental change. Thus, two major tendencies of the past four years' publications on environmentalism are emphasised. On the one hand, historiography highlights that the 'scientisation' of ecological issues has neither been unidirectional nor exclusive. Instead, scientised knowledge has coexisted with other forms of knowledge, such as localised tacit knowledge or religious and 'alternative' knowledges. On the other hand, the notion of 'environmental social movements' or 'environmentalism' are questioned as such. By considering the role that social sciences played in these movements and in observing them, as well as by emphasising the local, regional, and transnational scale, the strict opposition between 'old' and 'new' social movements is undermined. New approaches such as media history or 'eco-biographies' foster this trend. In order to detail these points, I will first deal with the revaluation of the local and regional scale in the history of en-

1 Melanie Arndt: Environmental History, in: Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte. Begriffe, Methoden und Debatten der zeithistorischen Forschung, 23 August 2016, at: http://docupedia.de/zg/Arndt_environmental_history_v3_en_2016, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14765/zzf.dok.2.700.v3 (last accessed on 8 March 2021).

2 Jens Ivo Engels: Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik. Ideenwelt und politische Verhaltensstile in Naturschutz und Umweltbewegung, Paderborn et al. 2006, p. 421.

3 For other publications that could have been included in this review as well, see, e. g., Janine Gaumer: Wackersdorf. Atomkraft und Demokratie in der Bundesrepublik 1980–1989, Munich 2018; Hartmut Berghoff/Adam Rome (eds.): Green Capitalism? Business and the Environment in the Twentieth Century, Philadelphia 2017.

vironmentalism (Güttler and Milder). Then, I will turn to recent studies that reassess the environmental history of Central and Eastern Europe (Arndt and Möller). Finally, media history and biography will be discussed as innovating approaches (Spenger and Jordan).

Nils Güttler's essay on the history of the Frankfurt Airport offers an insightful approach, starting from the local level, to how social movements, ecology, and knowledge have been interrelated in the twentieth century. His book being part of a larger project on the airport and its surroundings, Güttler argues methodologically rather than telling a chronological narrative. He suggests unveiling the down-to-earth entanglements of the airport by putting aside cultural criticisms, which exclusively focus on "globalisation", "acceleration", and "flows".[4] It is the local "'sloshing'" in the sterile metaphysics of this "non-lieu"[5] which intrigues Güttler: the cleaning and security staff, scientists observing the nature around the airport, counter-experts scrupulously drawing maps of the local lichen population or the production of jet fuel. The paradox Güttler deals with concerns the dialectic relation between a cause of protest (i. e., the airport) and the accumulation of knowledge. The airport, being one major source of pollution in the Rhein-Main area, was a main incentive for social movements, scientists, local citizens, and journalists to produce knowledge on the airport and its environs. They even followed different aims: hampering the construction of the famous Runway 18 West in the 1980s, optimising jet fuel infrastructure or saving the municipal forest for reasons of social hygiene. The airport, Güttler concludes, "has created the conditions of its criticisms during the course of its history"[6]. Thus, he draws on recent debates on social movement-based cultures of knowledge.[7] However, by putting the space of the airport centre stage, he emphasises the controversial character of knowledge: not only social movements made use of knowledge—the airport itself employed environmentalists in order to optimise its routines. Through this convincing perspective, Güttler mostly deals with natural sciences (in the widest sense). Other disciplines, which formed the web surrounding this and comparable places of contention, such as social sciences (e. g., through trade unions and studies on labour relations) and humanities (e. g., the famous 'lignite archaeology' in the Rhineland), remain in the background. The advantage of the local scale is that it affords an opportunity to overcome the underlying nature/culture-divide—regarding both, disciplines

4 Nils Güttler: Alles über das Fliegen. Eine politische Wissensgeschichte des Frankfurter Flughafens, Vienna 2020, p. 32. All quotations from the German monographs are translated by the author.

5 Ibid., p. 33.

6 Ibid., p. 103.

7 See, e. g., Aziz Choudry: Social Movement Knowledge Production, in: Peter Pericles Trifonas (ed.): Handbook of Theory and Research in Cultural Studies and Education, Cham 2020, pp. 27–40.

and protest. Güttler sheds light on a number of disciplines, social movements, and political currents lurking in the swamps around the airport. At the same time, this enlightening perspective has its blind spots. At different points, Güttler claims to treat the airport as a "workplace"[8] in the tradition of "labour history"[9]. However, the "kiosk vendor"[10] Güttler wants to give a voice remains quiet compared to the snail researcher. Güttler even concludes baldly that before the First World War, "a lot of workers from the plants on the Main collected snails in their rare free time in order to learn more about their *Heimat*".[11] This sentence epitomises the risk of a history of knowledge: to privilege those considered knowledgeable and to again silence those who did not speak the sermons of the bourgeois self. Hence, Güttler presents a convincing approach, which explains the change induced by social movements through the political role, the circulation, contestation, and interpretation of different forms of knowledge. However, he implicitly adopts a slight academic bias: other types of knowledge or ignorance do not play a role in Güttler's story, yet.

Another way of fruitfully focusing on the regional and the local scale is offered by Stephen Milder's PhD-Thesis, published in 2017. Milder re-evaluates the anti-nuclear movements in West Germany and France and how they related to official politics and the democratic systems in both countries. He emphasises several points: first, he challenges the hypothesis of a post-material turn following a 'value change' around 1970. Environmental movements had not been "selfish and apolitical",[12] but devoted to issues of democracy and economic subsistence. Thereby, Western Societies did not atomise but increase their ability of inclusion and social cohesion. Second, he contests the narrative of an all-absorbing liberal democracy, which integrated the protest successfully via green parties. Instead, Milder argues that the "grassroots activists changed the course of democracy's development in Western Europe"[13]. Third, he undermines the alleged linear progression from grassroots-movements to national politics: founding parties and participating in national ballots were not necessary but highly conflicted. The grassroots movements had to abandon their local and transnational focus in order to fit into the patterns of a representative democracy. To emphasise his points, Milder takes six steps: using the example of protesting the nuclearisation of the Upper Rhine, he first shows that this transnational region disposed of a longer tradition of protest. Local people did not turn against invisible radiation but fought against a perceived threat to their viticulture-based livelihood. Second, by highlighting the region-

8 Nils Güttler: Alles über das Fliegen, p. 39.
9 Ibid., p. 41.
10 Ibid., p. 33.
11 Ibid., p. 77 (italics added).
12 Stephen Milder: Greening Democracy. The Anti-Nuclear Movement and Political Environmentalism in West Germany and Beyond, 1968–1983, Cambridge 2017, p. 3.
13 Ibid., p. 6.

al and transnational dimension of protest, he contradicts the diagnosis of "disaggregation"[14] of Western Societies after the 1970s: conjuring an Alemannic past allowed for building an "alternative authority" in the German, French, and Swiss borderland, opposing government decisions from Paris or Stuttgart and establishing "real transnational coordination"[15]. Turning to the 1975 occupation of the Whyl power plant construction site,[16] Milder draws on the advantages of his transregional approach: locally, this occupation was embedded in Alsace's protest traditions; nationally, it proved to be radically innovating; blurring the line between "daily life and protest"[17]. In the last three chapters, Milder argues that the failed attempts to reproduce events comparable to Whyl—for instance in Brokdorf—led to a quest for new forms of protest, which the movement found in regional elections. Milder attributes the initial successes of West German green lists to their ability to "avoid politics-as-usual"[18] and to evade categorisation as left or right. Finally, Milder interprets the foundation of the Green Party in 1980 and the failure of political environmentalism in France as a result of the European Elections in 1979. These elections forced grassroots movements to adopt the logics of representative democracy, symbolising a divide between political and grassroots environmentalism.

The inspiring regional approach in the first half of his book allows Milder to highlight the diverse forms of knowledge, circulating around contested nuclear power plant construction sites. Initial attempts to stir the local vintners to protest failed. The focus on radiation as "invisible, sinister killer"[19] proved to be a narrative too far away from everyday life. Thus, if scientised knowledge failed to instigate indignation, local, applied, and tacit knowledge was more important. When the discussion with the Stuttgart government turned to the impact of steam on viticulture, the situation derailed: the vintners "were extremely knowledgeable"[20] in this matter, appealing to their "practical wisdom"[21]. Thus, compared to Güttler, who slightly prioritises scientised knowledge production, Milder sensitises the reader to localised, easily missed forms of knowledge. This includes all kinds of knowledge of the local as well, as the case of construing a collective around the alleged Alemannic tradition and the transregional contacts between France, Switzerland, and Germany show.

14 Ibid., p. 52.
15 Ibid., p. 83 (both quotations).
16 Cf. by the same author: Stephen Milder: From Whyl to Wall Street. Occupation and the Many Meanings of "Single-Issue" Protest, in: Moving the Social 56 (2016), pp. 93–114.
17 Stephen Milder: Greening Democracy, p. 127.
18 Ibid., p. 197.
19 Ibid., p. 30.
20 Ibid., p. 41.
21 Ibid., p. 42.

The regional approach bears another advantage: starting from the regional level allows Milder to overcome the 'social movementisation' of post-1970 protest. Contesting the narrative of value change and the diagnosis of "social atomization"[22], he refuses to dissect the protest culture of the 1970s into single-issue oriented "social movements"[23]. The common trait was a movement from the 'grassroots', regardless of their political agenda (and it is unclear, if all occupiers in Whyl even had one). Milder shows how social scientists, such as the Berlin based political scientist Theodor Ebert, participated in the movements they described. The "unsolicited advice"[24] such actors offered to local insurgents, has to be considered as well by historians approaching these protests. By bringing research back to the local and the regional, Milder keeps an appropriate distance from these master narratives.

Hence, Milder argues that historical change, visible in the 1970s anti-nuclear protests, has been discovering "self-governance"[25] as a new style of politics. He focuses the inclusive dimension of this development, which brought together people of different social strata and regional origins. The Whyl occupation in particular is portrayed as aiming at "building community" and "promoting inclusion"[26]. The whole camp had been a "center of collaboration and exchange"[27]. However, as appealing as this might seem, it lacks a critical stance toward the exclusive dimension inherent to all visions of community. Then, the emphasis on the 'grassroots' initiative runs the risk of reproducing contemporary judgments on protests: a clear distinction between "often violent mass site occupation attempts and nonviolent grassroots protest"[28]. Characterising the first as superficial and attention grabbing and the second as "conviction"[29], comes close to distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate protest, blurring the line between 'is' and 'ought to'.

Milder has written an important book, pleading for a (trans-)regional perspective on environmental protests and showing to what extent the view from below contributes to reassessing linear narratives from emergence over protest towards institutionalisation. To put it in Milder's words: knowing nature does not correspond to "Whiggish narratives of West German democratization"[30].

The recent research on environmentalism engenders a reassessment of Central and Eastern Europe and the alleged ignorance of socialist dictatorships towards ecological

22 Ibid., p. 91.
23 Ibid., p. 53.
24 Ibid., p. 92.
25 Ibid., e. g., p. 14, p. 236.
26 Ibid., p. 122.
27 Ibid., p. 124.
28 Ibid., p. 160.
29 Ibid., p. 161.
30 Ibid., p. 237.

issues. Melanie Arndt's major study on the 'children of Chernobyl' is a meticulous analysis of the afterlife of the 1986 catastrophe. In her *Habilitation*, Arndt follows the transnational engagement in favour of the children that were considered affected by the nuclear fallout and contamination in the Soviet Union and, respectively, in Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian Federation. Thus, besides the spatial entanglement, mostly with the United States, she focuses on the ways in which issues of environmental social movements, of humanitarian and civic engagement, of medical and sociological knowledge intermingled, culminating in the construction of the 'children of Chernobyl'. Arndt proceeds in four steps: starting by highlighting the immediate consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, she moves forward to analyse how the Soviet state dealt with the children: by sending them to camps and sanatoriums inside the Soviet Union or to other socialist states such as Cuba. However, as Arndt convincingly argues thirdly, the eroding Soviet Union did not dispose of sufficient capacities to take care of all children considered affected. Thus, the question of the children's well-being undermined the myth of Soviet childhood and thus the authority of the central state. The occurring gap was filled by a growing sector of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civic engagement for sending children abroad, turning them into a "global symbol"[31]—mostly for the global north. In the late 2000s, the renationalisation of children's aid stopped this transnational engagement, for example in Belarus. Lastly, Arndt sheds light on how the children themselves, their companions, and the guest and home families experienced, practiced, and perceived their time abroad. In this "panorama of the ending Cold War"[32] two arguments stand out in the context of this review: first, it appears highly artificial to distinguish social movements by their issues and motivations. Distinguishing neatly between humanitarian, environmental, civic, and religious engagement is impossible. It is rather interesting how these currents interacted. Second, the contemporary diagnosis of the deterritorialisation of risk, the famous *risk society*[33], has been accompanied by a deterritorialisation of solidarity—and by all unintended consequences and misunderstandings those processes engender.

Concerning the relation between knowledge and protest, Arndt points out that defining the consequences of Chernobyl was a question of negotiation. The emergence of a discourse on "radiophobia"[34] in the World Health Organisation and the diverging numbers of radiation deaths—the International Atomic Energy Agency estimated 4,050, Greenpeace 200,000 victims[35]—show that it was no question of ignorance but

31 Melanie Arndt: Tschernobylkinder. Die transnationale Geschichte einer nuklearen Katastrophe, Göttingen 2020, p. 199.
32 Ibid., p. 32.
33 Ulrich Beck: Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity (1986), London 1992.
34 Melanie Arndt: Tschernobylkinder, p. 129.
35 Ibid., pp. 133f.

a problem of abundant and conflicting knowledges. The resulting insecurity and the debates about statistics disguised the individuals suffering and living in the contaminated zones, as Arndt shows using the example of the employees of a paediatric clinic in Novozybkov, who complained about being treated as guinea pigs for scientific research in 1991. Likewise, introducing mass radiation screenings increased insecurity. Hence, the common presumption that children should be helped by evacuating them from contaminated areas formed one recurring theme in the unmanageable debates about the catastrophe—a presumption that even allowed for mobilisation and protest, beginning in 1989.

Arndt uses contemporary scientific results carefully and with an adequate distance, for example when she stresses, that the status of being a 'child of Chernobyl' was highly fluid, disputed, an affirmative self-description as well as an external attribution. Another example is mistrust against the state. The NGOs, which managed the children's trips abroad, were part of the flourishing civil society in Belarus and Ukraine after 1989/90. They used a fierce anti-state rhetoric, focussing on the initiative of the individual and 'self-help' as means of creating a future society, as Arndt closely examines through the analysis of one foundation's history. However, this mistrust was not 'neoliberal' as one might conclude, but rather part of the post-Soviet negotiation of statehood, welfare, and charity—that also led to disappointments about how the label 'child of Chernobyl' had to be orchestrated, for instance through "exhausting folk-dance tours"[36]. Unfortunately, Arndt does not maintain her critical distance throughout the entire book. When she states that research showed that the medical use of staying one month abroad was neglectable[37], it would have been highly desirable to learn how these findings were disputed and negotiated as well.

Finally, Arndt, through several examples in the last chapter, shows that the fact of being a 'child of Chernobyl' had a lasting impact on the children's lives. Some decided to emigrate to the United States, some continued living in Belarus, having learned to cope with the ongoing catastrophe. These learning processes were highly ambiguous, as Arndt emphasises with the example of former 'children of Chernobyl', who see nuclear energy as the sole way to achieve an independent energy policy in Belarus. Thus, sending children abroad fostered social change, but it was neither unidirectional, nor linear. The nationalisation of Chernobyl aid in Belarus in 2008 can also be read as the state's attempt to reconquer its legitimacy—however going hand in hand with closing the window of opportunity for transnational cooperation which civil society had faced in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. At the same time, the humanitarian mission for the children increased cultural exchange—but could also preserve Cold War categories.

36 Ibid., p. 347.
37 Ibid., p. 362.

Hence, Arndt's monograph can be considered a major contribution to different fields. For the history of environmental movements, it proves that a wider understanding of this object is necessary. It was not only a question of protest in front of nuclear power plants or of doing counter-cultural radiation measurements, but also included a priest from New York, campaigning for a children's home in Ukraine. Radiation crosses borders—nationally, but also ideologically and epistemically. The history of trans-movement mobilisations, Arndt's book underlines, is a promising field of research.

Emancipating the history of environmental protest from social sciences operating with the concept of 'new social movements' goes hand in hand with a new, intriguing view on the environmental history of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In his published PhD-thesis, Christian Möller contests the "teleology"[38] which he perceives in older accounts of protest and environment in the GDR: the GDR had been an ecological 'failed state', a real environmental movement had not existed and the small initiatives under the "protective roof"[39] of the Protestant church had been oppressed systematically. Against this view—inspired by the new social movement-approach and erecting the environmental history of West Germany as the norm—Möller highlights the possibilities for participation in ecological issues: the "authoritarian corporatism"[40], building on Mary Fulbrook's concept of the GDR as a 'participatory dictatorship'. Thereby, Möller reassess the notion of protest in 'real existing socialism': historical research on equal terms should not only listen to and search for spectacular demonstrations familiar to a view from the West, but should also take the widespread practice of petitioning *(Eingaben)* in the GDR seriously. Analysing these petitions on environmental issues and focusing on actors from the water and public health administration allows Möller to tell a story, which goes far beyond simple narratives of decline. First initiatives for an environmental policy in the 1950s formulated high aims but fell short of realising them due to lacking resources, as Möller shows by means of the way in which the GDR reformed the procedure for approving new industrial sites. This was an "important turning point in environmental history"[41]. In the 1960s, environmental policy began to take off. Allying a socialist rhetoric with environmentalism, supported by a widespread euphoria for recycling economy and 'land improvement' *(Landeskultur)* as well as a flood of petitions, led to the law on *Landeskultur* (1970) and the establishment of the Ministry for Environmental Protection and Water Management (1972). Thereby, protecting the environment was incorporated into the planned economy, allowing—in theory—for an "equilibrium

38 Christian Möller: Umwelt und Herrschaft in der DDR. Politik, Protest und die Grenzen der Partizipation in der Diktatur, Göttingen 2020, p. 16.
39 Ibid., p. 256.
40 Ibid., p. 24.
41 Ibid., p. 78.

between economy and ecology"[42]. The state paralleled this top-down implementation by offering options for legal (and orchestrated) participation, for instance during the 'weeks for land improvement' *(Landeskulturwochen)*. Möller argues that, thereby, the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED, Socialist Unity Party of Germany) aroused grand expectations, which it was unable to meet afterwards. The SED could not get rid of the "spirits it summoned in 1970"[43]. He illustrates this process with examples from the 1980s, when the official environmental policy got lost in "patchwork solutions"[44] due to economic constraints and international pressure. By turning to the environmental movement in the 1980s, Möller makes two points: he first elucidates that petitions and state-official organisations such as the Association for Nature and Environment *(Gesellschaft für Natur und Umwelt)* offered—restricted—possibilities for participation. Second, he argues that even on the eve of the fall of the Berlin Wall, all environmental groups have been maintaining discussions with the government—they did not aim at "abolishing" but at "ecologically revivifying socialism"[45].

Concerning the relation between knowledge and protest, Möller's impressive study allows two conclusions: first, the rise of an environmental policy was due to a network of experts, established around the Research Council *(Forschungsrat)*, in the 1960s—as in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The enthusiasm for a rational political style opened a window of opportunity, into which concepts of a recycling economy fitted ideally. On this level, protecting the environment was being scientised. Second, the hypothesis of a scientisation of environmental protest and of an increasing weight of scientific data during the second half of the twentieth century does only apply to East Germany with restrictions. Of course, there are petitions that tried to convince government officials by technical and rational knowledge. Möller exemplifies this by discussing an engineer protesting the pollution caused by a chemical pulp mill. However, as numerous examples show, the socialist state primarily demanded an administrative and rhetorical knowledge in order to effectively use the tool of petitioning. This administrative knowledge circulated beneath the surface and beyond the state-driven public sphere. Thereby, Möller sheds light on the neglected and hardly accessible ephemeral sphere of public encounters, which is crucial to understanding environmental protest in the GDR.

Concerning the relation between social sciences and social movements, Möller's study adds to the conceptual and historiographical level. Earlier studies on environmental protest, driven by concepts of the West German new social movements, had overestimated the influence of the church, and had neglected the fact that the pop-

42 Ibid., p. 179.
43 Ibid., p. 187.
44 Ibid., p. 231.
45 Ibid., p. 345.

ulation of the GDR have been adapting the protection of the environment broadly. This consciousness did not take the form of an "alternative habitus"[46] as it commonly did in the FRG. Möller proves that environmental engagement through petitions mirrored local conflicts and a public concern for ecological issues. However, Möller uses different terms in order to analytically grasp these forms of *participation* (as in the title). He mostly employs the term *Teilhabe* (literally: taking part in) without further discussing this notion, e. g., its background in theology and rehabilitation science.

As Arndt, Möller offers a lucid interpretation of the role of the environment in state socialism. Both argue that state socialism did not fail because it suffered of severe ecological problems. There were debates and attempts to improve these conditions. Hence, it was the hiatus between high expectations and ecological ambitions on the one hand and moderate results as well as the bureaucratic reality on the other that undermined confidence in the socialist system. By considering the agency of people living in these systems, both refuse the interpretation that the West was 'really' able to cope with the ecological issue whereas the East used protective measures only as "alibi"[47]. Against the backdrop of the present-day Fridays for Future protests, Arndt's and Möller's monographs offer convincing interpretations beyond the historiographical Cold War divide.

Besides these publications dealing with the local and regional level and rediscovering Central and Eastern European environmental history, there are two monographs that productively apply new approaches to the history of environmentalism. With her published PhD-thesis, Katrin Jordan tackles the issue of how media, anti-nuclear protest, and experts' statements intermingled in the aftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe. Focusing on France and Germany, she excellently questions the narrative of France as a nation of nuclear enthusiasm on the one hand and Germany as a nation of nature-lovers and sceptics toward modernisation and progress on the other. By bringing media into the equation, she argues that juxtaposing these two images falls short of considering how contemporaries interpreted the conflicts and debates following the catastrophe.

Jordan makes a pertinent and valuable contribution to the historiography of the scientisation of protest in the second half of the twentieth century. In both cases, scientisation and counter-expertise played a crucial role for the anti-nuclear movements. However, she states that first and foremost "mistrust against the state"[48], the "nucleocracy"[49], inspired criticism in France. A culture of counter-measurements of radiation, as it had existed in Germany since the 1970s, only arose after Chernobyl. On the oth-

46 Ibid., p. 256.
47 Ibid., p. 17.
48 Katrin Jordan: Ausgestrahlt. Die mediale Debatte um „Tschernobyl" in der Bundesrepublik und in Frankreich 1986/87, Göttingen 2018, p. 176.
49 Ibid., p. 203.

er side of the Rhine, an established infrastructure of 'alternative' environment institutes fuelled a fundamental opposition against the manner in which the German government dealt with the fallout. However, since the genesis of a counter-expertise does not say anything about its validity, Jordan completes the perspective of a politicised science by emphasising the "mediatisation of science"[50]: in Germany, the counter-expertise could draw on alternative journalists willing to integrate such approaches to nuclear energy into their program. In the French media, which was much closer to the central state, "self-censorship" and the "cultivation of arcane knowledge" prevailed.[51] Thus, the scientisation of environmental protest entirely depended on the possibilities of mediatising this counter-knowledge.

Jordan illustrates the advantage of treating social sciences as a source. She carefully analyses how contemporary frames (such as the 'risk society') prefigured and influenced the structure of the public debate: a focus on internal risks in Germany, an emphasis on external threats and strategies of communication in France. In other cases, however, she concedes that neatly distinguishing between disciplines is not always useful, for instance by confirming tendencies of Ronald Inglehart's 'value change' during the 1970s.[52]

Concerning social and environmental change, Jordan carefully embeds her account on Chernobyl in the *longue durée* of anti-nuclear protest and nuclear accidents. The "paternalistic communication style"[53] which the French nuclear administration chose after the Chernobyl incident was a reaction to the Harrisburg accident in 1979—an accident that French media and nuclear experts had interpreted as a symbol of the capacity of 'the West' to control nuclear power. On the other side of the Rhine, German newspapers interpreted Harrisburg as an omen, confirmed by Chernobyl. Jordan's approach, to tell her story as a story of shrinking and expanding opportunities for participation, public visibility, and political cultures, is convincing. Bringing the media into the mix does not only enrich Franco-German historiography but it admonishes social movement historiography to consider media as a crucial player beyond the state-movement-opposition, as well.

Besides media history, Martin Spenger offers a genre of historical writing that remains rare in environmental history and the history of environmentalism: biography. He attempts to historicise the life of the American beat-eco-poet Gary Snyder, who was born in 1930. Stylistically, it is a captivating published PhD-thesis. Spenger widely uses first-person narrations—yet uncommon in German academia—and extensively quotes Snyder's poems. Thereby, he mirrors the main argument of his book: writing

50 Ibid., p. 239.
51 Ibid., pp. 145f.
52 Ibid., pp. 314f.
53 Ibid., p. 228.

the history of environmental movements as a history of a progressive scientisation falls short of including those actors who considered ecology rather an "aesthetic and religious than […] as an exact science".[54] This point is convincing. However, Spenger runs the risk of overdosing the emphasis with his object of interest.

In the field of knowledge and protest, the biographical approach allows for a longitudinal perspective on the different fields and practices of knowledge, which intertwine over the course of the individual's life. Hence, the biography of Gary Snyder shows that there were no pre-scientific and a post-1970 scientised ecological protests. Snyder started his career in the so-called 'beat generation' by revivifying the tradition of "romanticising work in and for nature"[55]. His passion for the myths and—certainly invented—traditions of Native Americans was followed by a devotion to Buddhism in Japan. All 'traditional' practices, which occupied the West Coast alternative milieu during the 1960s and 1970s such as yoga, meditation, or new age, were fostered by Snyder. Even if Spenger emphasises that Snyder kept a distance from the most pronounced forms of 'alternative' knowledge, such as deep ecology and bioregionalism[56], the distinction remains blurred. Historiographically, distinguishing 'scientific' and 'alternative' ecological knowledge might not even be ideal. Of course, there was the rising "reign of crude empiricism of Becquerel, thyroid levels, and soil sampling".[57] However, the biography of Snyder shows first that distinguishing 'real' and 'alternative' science was a question of political conflict itself—they did not succeed each other, but rather coexisted. Second and on the level of personal networks, different and conflicting 'scientised' approaches inside environmental movements did not hinder intense cooperation. If 'ecology' was one of the most virulent empty signifiers of the second half of the twentieth century, then Gary Snyder was its personification.

Thus, Spenger's monograph can be conceived of as a plea for considering the ongoing aestheticisation of nature as one of the major developments in the second half of the twentieth century. By emphasising the political relevance of poetry and literature, Spenger undermines conventional interpretations of the rise of the new social movements as the end of utopianism after 1968 or the 'value change'. Literature and poetry did not only mirror new issues, they also created continuity and pushed mobilisation. Whereas historians have largely explored practices of reading theory or listening to music in the 1960s and 1970s, little is known about reading, discussing, and exchanging poetry. The aestheticisation of protest did not only concern its visuality but also its orality.

54 Martin Spenger: Green Beat. Gary Snyder und die moderne amerikanische Umweltbewegung, Göttingen 2020, p. 133.

55 Ibid., p. 41.

56 Ibid., pp. 134–137.

57 Philipp Felsch: Der lange Sommer der Theorie. Geschichte einer Revolte, 1960–1990, Munich 2015, p. 154.

On the level of social movements and social change, the biographical approach promises insights into the ways in which social movements related to the individual, how they construed charisma, and how an 'ecological' self and self-display worked. However, on this point, Spenger succumbs to the "biographical illusion"[58] Snyder has told of his life. Spenger argues, for example, that the notions of "Nature, Wild and Wilderness" were structuring Snyder's "whole oeuvre"[59]. Spenger does not highlight to what extent these terms were fluid and changing over the course of Snyder's life, but defines them by Snyder's book *The Practice of the Wild*. Thus, instead of dissecting Snyder's biographical work, Spenger tends to reify an a-temporal conviction, guiding the ecological life. Despite this objection, Spenger's study can be read as a methodological case for more "eco-biographies"[60]. For a social movement that was mostly motivated by *abstracta* such as the 'whole earth'[61] and renounced charismatic leadership, the biographical approach is an effective method of bringing the individual to the fore. At least, Snyder's biography shows that ecological behaviour, which environmental movements aimed at introducing, led the activists to display an exemplary life. The parallel of the ecological and a monastic way of life in Snyder's case is emblematic of these constraints and self-commitments. Thus, Spenger's book invites the reader to rethink the relation between the individual and social movements beyond issues of policy.

In conclusion, there seems to be no doubt that partitioning social movements according to their respective motives and issues falls short of considering the historical complexity beneath the surface of protest events. Categorisations such as 'old' and 'new' social movements have been part of a specific culture of knowledge and self-image shaping the so-called 'new' social movements. They were 'new' in the sense that they produced a whole culture of knowledge—delimiting themselves from other social phenomena such as trade unions. This very apparatus finally yielded those 'old' social movements that allegedly did not care about ecology. Thus, further research must reflect on how these distinctions have been involved in contemporary conflicts. The studies reviewed in this article show that it is productive to not only look for "cross movement mobilization",[62] but also beyond these divides as such—one could speak of a 'trans-movement' perspective. Starting from a local and regional perspective—like Güttler and Milder—helps to shed the social movement-centrism that characterises older handbooks, resulting from the former predominance of social sciences in this

58 Pierre Bourdieu: The Biographical Illusion (1986), in: Wilhelm Hemecker/Edward Saunders (eds.): Biography in Theory. Key Texts with Commentaries, Berlin et al. 2017, pp. 210–216.
59 Martin Spenger: Green Beat, p. 151.
60 Ibid., p. 13.
61 Ibid., p. 166 (Snyder used the term "panhumanism").
62 See Moving the Social 63 (2020): Cross Movement Mobilisation. Perspectives from the Global North and South.

field.[63] The case of the 'children of Chernobyl' shows that humanitarianism and environmentalism cannot be thought separately. Furthermore, focusing on the local and regional scale, along with their transnational and transregional entanglements, clarifies that even in the late twentieth century, different forms of knowledge coexisted and competed. The scientisation and professionalisation of environmental protection has been paralleled by an aestheticisation and mediatisation of environmentalism that has to be part of the historical account, as well. Even the claim to be 'scientific' has been challenged by newly emerging 'alternative' kinds of knowledge.

Lastly, even if this review is limited to selected studies, it is striking to what extent the history of nuclear energy remains a core occupation of the historiography of environmentalism. Other impulses for protest, such as lignite mining, spurring the interest of historiography only recently, await further research. One crucial, yet underexplored, development is the juridification of protest since the late nineteenth century, close but not congruent with its scientisation. The recent conflicts around lignite mining in Germany, as well as the Fridays for Future movement, again beg the question whether the history of environmentalism can really be told as a success story of increasing awareness, changing values, and institutionalisation. Apparently, there has been no happy ending, yet.

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63 See, e. g., Roland Roth/Dieter Rucht (eds.): Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945. Ein Handbuch, Frankfurt a. M. 2008.

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

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